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Included in this publication are the following addresses to the meeting: (1) "The Professional Ethics of Teachers in a Democratic School" (Betty A. Sichel); (2) "The 4Cs of the New Scholarship on Women" (James W. Garrison and Anne Phelan); (3) "Is It Possible to be Philosophical About Poverty?" (J. Gordon Chamberlin); (4) "Moral Images, Democratic Institutions, and the Pre-Service Professional Core Curriculum in Teacher Education" (James LeRoy Smith); (5) "The Course of Education: To Lead or to Enable Fanaticism or Liberation?" (Helen L. Harrington); (6) "Ethics and Arts Education: Notes on Plato and Aristotle" (Frans van der Bogert); (7) "'Democratic' Control of Education" (Scott H. Bilow); (8) "U.S. Supreme Court Decisions in 'Bethel' and 'Hazelwood': Is the Pig in the Parlor Gone?" (Bruce Beezer); (9) "Sichel's Theory of Moral Character: A Linchpin Concept for Moral Education Theory" (William Losito); (10) "A Critique of Character and Community in Sichel's 'Moral Education'" (Sam Craver); (11) "A Well-Managed Lifestyle: A View of Liberal Education" (Thomas Buford); and (12) "Conflicting Values in American Higher Education: Development of the Concept of Academic Freedom, 1886-1918" (Charles Tandy). (JD)

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IN THE
EDUCATION PROFESSION

PROCEEDINGS

of the

Thirty-fourth Annual Meeting

of the

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Editor's Introduction

The 1989 Annual Meeting of the South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society was held at Wake Forest University in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Dr. J. Don Reeves was a most gracious host for the two-day conference. It was especially significant that the annual meeting was held at Wake Forest, for its current President, Dr. Thomas K. Hearns, Jr. is a former SAPES member and presenter. Dr. Hearns addressed our evening banquet. His remarks drawn from the notebook of a college president, were both humorous and provocative. It was refreshing to meet a college president whose intellectual intensity had not been dulled by years of administrative responsibilities.

Another highlight of the annual meeting was the presence and contributions of our Keynote Speaker, Betty A. Sichel, from Long Island University. Her address on "The Professional Ethics of Teachers in a Democratic School" was a welcomed extension of ideas contained in her recently-published book, Moral Education: Character Community and Ideals. She stayed on for the Saturday sessions and generously participated in a symposium on her book. That session was most stimulating.

And to the other characteristics go the special thanks of the participants at this annual meeting and to the many readers who will be stimulated by the careful, reflective attention given to each of the topics presented.

Warren Strandberg
Editor

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The Professional Ethics of Teachers in a Democratic School

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Long Island University
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At the same time there has been increasing pressure to make teaching a profession, there has been similar scholarly effort to conceptualize and understand the professional ethics of teachers. This is not surprising! The professionalization of any occupation always requires that considerable attention be paid to the moral standards of its practitioners. since a basic characteristic undergirding a profession and uniting all its practitioners is its moral standards. More than any other emerging profession, teaching has an especially perplexing problem that stems from the role of formal education in a democracy. On one hand, schools must provide citizenship education and transmit or nurture the development of values and moral standards and on the other hand must accept the values and moral standards of the parents and community. With this two prong problem, those studying the professional ethics of teaching, cannot merely concentrate on the professional ethics of the autonomous teacher, but must investigate both the personal ethics of the teacher and ethics within the larger institution, the school.

At present, studies of professional teacher ethics focus on the improvement of the ethics of the individual teacher and ignore the school culture and its effect on the moral decisions and actions of professionals. By assuming that the teacher alone is responsible for morality in the classroom, it is further presumed that a just, humane, and caring school is dependent on each teacher in each classroom becoming just, humane, and caring. With this additive approach, the sum of all just and humane classrooms equals a just and humane school. The onus of moral responsibility is thus on each teacher.[1] However, research on schools and teaching demonstrate that the school culture and environment affect teaching effectiveness and student achievement.[2] With this research on schools in mind, it is argued that improvement of professional teacher ethics requires an emphasis on both teachers and the moral climate of the school.

Developments in medical ethics can provide a model for understanding the relationship between a professional and the institution within which a professional works, between the ethics of the teacher and the school. During the last two decades, health care institutions have created institutional ethics committees (IECs) to educate members of the institution, to formulate ethical policy, and to be a consultative body for difficult, complex ethical dilemmas.[3] This paper argues that schools or school districts[4] should create school ethics committees (SECs) analogous to the IECs of health care institutions.[5] To understand how the IECs of health care facilities can inform practical teacher and school ethics, we first examine the development of IECs and then how a similar model can improve both school ethics and the professional ethics of teachers.

The Institutional Ethics Committees in Health Care Facilities.

Approximately two decades ago, medical practitioners and health care workers began to realize that new technology and social conditions were creating difficult, complicated ethical dilemmas. The

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watershed that changed medical ethics and motivated the formation of IECs was a cluster of court cases and proposed Federal regulations. One court case, the Karen Ann Quinlan case, ended in a landmark decision.[6] Karen Ann Quinlan, a comatose patient in a persistent vegetative state, was attached to a respirator. Though irreversibly brain damaged, she was not brain dead. The Superior Court of New Jersey denied her religious father's petition to have the respirator removed. This Court justified its decision in a number of ways: citing expert medical testimony against removing the respirator; noting that the rapid advancement of medical knowledge made it impossible to foresee whether future knowledge would change the prognosis; recognizing the absence of medical tradition to warrant the act; and arguing that according to the Constitution people have a right to life, but not a right to die. When Karen Quinlan's father appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, that Court reversed the first decision and authorized the removal of the respirator on the basis of an individual's right of privacy.[7]

The exact contours of this Case and both Court decisions are unimportant here. However, one aspect of the New Jersey Supreme Court decision drastically changed medical ethics.[8] The Judge questioned why the health care institution in which Karen Quinlan was a patient did not have a method for formulating ethical policy. Why, the Judge asked, didn't the health care facility have a committee of medical specialists to adjudicate difficult ethical cases, e.g., whether a respirator should be removed from a comatose patient.[9] Though this legal decision referred to expert knowledge and to a medical ethics committee as a committee of medical specialists, within a short time this Court recommendation had more far-reaching consequences than might originally have been imagined.

The Judge's original decision in retrospect can be interpreted as positivistic since it assumed that facts alone can issue moral decisions, that expert medical knowledge can reveal what ethical decision should be made in medical cases. Though they quickly realized that the judge had pinpointed a method for resolving unusually difficult, complex medical ethical dilemmas, some health care workers also tacitly recognized that a positivistic approach was not acceptable, that expert knowledge in itself would not suffice. In addition to there being diverse expert knowledge for the same problem, a judgment required social, value, and legal considerations.

The medical cases that the judge assumed were matters of agreed upon professional practice and knowledge involve ethical and conceptual problems with tangled roots and numerous interrelated dimensions. For example, certain ethical dilemmas occur because of the state of medical knowledge and uncertainty about prognostication and treatment.[10] These and other factors have contributed to the formation of IECs in health care facilities. These committees now make policy on a wide number of issues, examine complex ethical cases, provide a consultative service for medical professionals and staff members, give ethical comfort,[11] and provide various educational services.[12]

Schools and the IEC Model.

We now turn to the main problem of this paper, how the practical ethics of schools can be reframed using a model similar to that of an IEC. The remainder of this paper discusses and justifies SECs in the following way: After a general introduction, three sections focus on the main purposes of school-institutional ethics committees: the educational purpose; the policy-making purpose; and the consultative purpose. A final section briefly discusses the implications of SECs for the professional ethics of teachers.

1. INTRODUCTION

Why would school personnel agree that a SEC should be a major vehicle for generating ethical policy, planning and offering moral education, raising moral consciousness, providing ethical comfort, and consulting on difficult moral cases? School administrators may claim to have the right and responsibility to make decisions and policy regarding the school's climate and the rules governing school life. Teachers may argue that the most successful means to change schools is through union negotiation of policy to be written into contractual agreements. Other teachers and staff may prefer not to take the responsibility inherent in a SEC structure. While these positions may represent current school governance and attitudes, the following arguments justify the efficacy and viability of SECs.

(a) Diverse Interpretations of School Life and Pluralistic Moral Beliefs.

Many moral problems in schools cannot be resolved with the knowledge, skills, and values of any one person, but require input and the expertise of numerous specialists and school personnel. Different school personnel, whether teachers, administrators, librarians, psychologists, or custodians, may view school moral dilemmas in very different ways.[13] These varied interpretations of what the moral dilemma is, of what moral policy is needed, what evidence, knowledge, or resources are required to resolve the moral dilemma, and what the moral judgment should be are dependent on various factors: differences in knowledge and skill of different specialists and school personnel, differences in their experiential backgrounds, in their values and role expectations, and in their theoretical assumptions about the moral domain and moral standards. Instead of using a single perspective, a SEC utilizes the strengths of diverse perspectives, resources, skills, and knowledge when trying to understand and decide what sort of moral policy is needed and when consulting about complex, difficult moral dilemmas.

(b) Complexity of Institutional Structure.

The implementation of school policy involves structural organization that is well beyond the control or authority of any one person.[14] Teachers at times mistakenly believe that when policy is written into a contract with a district, that policy will improve teaching-learning conditions. In retrospect, teachers may discover that the inclusion of policy in a contract has little overall impact on the teaching-learning situation and may even have undesirable consequences. One reason for unexpected results is that the original policy did not consider the organizational structure of the school or district. Successful policy must either include the means to change structure or be consistent with present structures. Since a SEC is comprised of people with different institutional roles and responsibilities, this committee can appraise needed structural change when making policy, consulting about moral dilemmas, and providing moral education.

(c) The School and Democracy.

An even more salient reason for various constituencies to assent to the formation of SECs relates to the underlying principles of democracy and how these principles should inform school life, the school's decision-making procedures and governance. In a democracy, it is believed that each person has sufficient general intelligence and ability to contribute to decision making in areas that affect his or her personal life and community life. All human beings, it is also argued, should cooperate and participate in the social and political life of the institutions of a democracy. Autocratic administrative decision-making or uncontrolled judgments by experts would be anathema to the maintenance of a democratic school environment and structure.

The consequences of denying teachers and other school personnel roles in shaping a school's moral policy have been persuasively enunciated by John Dewey:

> It is still also true that incapacity to assume the responsibilities involved in having a voice in shaping policies is bred and increased by conditions in which that responsibility is denied. . . . Habitual exclusion has the effect of reducing a sense of responsibility for what is done and its consequences.[15]

Elsewhere Dewey states two elements underlying a democracy:

> The first signifies not only more numerous and more varied points of shared common interest, but greater reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests as a factor in social control. The second means not only freer interaction between social groups . . . but change in social habit--continuous readjustment through meeting the new situations

produced by varied intercourse.[16]

These and other passages from Dewey's writings furnish reasons for instituting a democratic approach to ethical policy making and practical school ethics.

First, to insure the continuing vitality of a democracy and to carry out its basic tenets, democracy should exist in all areas of civic and institutional life. The school is an especially important community that should be governed democratically.[17] At the same time that it should be governed democratically, the school has the responsibility to insure the health of civic and political democracy, to transmit and engender the democratic spirit among students and teachers. Finally, the school can provide a means for the enlightened self-transformation of a democratic society.[18] These democratic ideals and missions require members of the school to have roles in deciding the moral policy of the school.

Second, the inclusion of diverse interests and groups in the democratic procedures of a SEC strengthens school personnel's ability to make moral decisions, take responsibility for decisions, and carry them out in action. The issue here is not merely participation because participation is a basic tenet of democracy. Rather, participation is advocated because it achieves desirable collateral ends, e.g., it contributes to a person's ability to make and carry out moral decisions.

Third, exclusion does not necessarily just lead to an inability to make decisions or an inability or unwillingness to take an active role in civic democracy. As important, exclusion from the governance of a school has other consequences for school personnel, many of which are now discussed under different rubrics. For example, it can be questioned whether teacher burn-out is primarily caused by classroom dynamics or whether there are features of the present school system that frustrate and affect teachers and thus contribute to burn-out.[19]

2. The Purposes of School-Institutional Ethics Committees.

a. The Educational Purpose.

The educational purpose of a SEC is two-fold, first, the self-education of the committee and second, the provision of moral education for the larger school community.[20] The self-education of a SEC is propaedeutic to any other purpose. Descriptions of the formation of medical ethics committees note that self-education of IECs takes from one to three or more years. Though self-education is prior to consulting on cases or formulating policy, self-education continues while the committee carries out these two latter functions.

Self-education is exceptionally important since it creates collaborative committee members rather than an adversarial group. Prior to the establishment of a SEC, its members had different school roles and in these roles, often competitively struggled to obtain scarce resources. As SEC members, they must subtly shift roles. At the same time that they retain special knowledge, expertise, and skill, SEC members must simultaneously collaborate with others to resolve complex moral problems and formulate policy. Committee decisions should not be matters of victory or defeat, of a battle to sustain the interests of one group or person, but should recognize the diverse needs and interests of all parties and of the school. While they need specialized educational knowledge, SEC members must also be aware of ethical standards and ideals, procedures and questions that would be appropriate in an ethical forum. Finally, they should to possess ethical attitudes, feelings, sensitivity, and imagination.

A first step in the development of a SEC is to limit preliminary meetings to self-education. These meetings and self-education can be facilitated with the assistance of an ethicist and the presentation of ethical cases that steer the committee away from narrow, special interests and motivate it to function as a collaborative network.[21]

Second, a SEC should provide moral education for the larger school community by organizing practical ethics seminars, courses, workshops, and conferences. In hospitals, IECs often conduct ethical rounds for the hospital staff to examine concrete cases and speculate about how to resolve these dilemmas. IECs at times use videotapes, e.g., a series entitled "Hard Choices." Similarly, SECs might conduct simulations or use videotapes of ethical problems in classes and schools.[22] The educational function of a committee is exceptionally important since it raises the school community's moral consciousness and increases its moral understanding. The moral education function of a school community is ongoing. As new types of moral dilemmas develop and as new ethical tools become available, a SEC continues to provide the moral education necessary to understand new problems and new ethical tools.

b. The Policy Purpose.

Someone may criticize SECs by claiming that they would usurp the rights and responsibilities of individual teachers and school personnel Teachers may exclaim, "How can I make a moral decision if a SEC can override my decision or criticize my actions!" This criticism misunderstands the functions of SECs. It assumes that SECs are identical to Committees on Special Education (CSE). The CSE focusses on individual cases: the educational needs of an individual student is the subject of each deliberation by a CSE. Though a student may require a wide variety of educational experiences, objectives, and resources, that one student is still the focus of a particular CSE hearing and decision. While they are similar to CSEs, SECs are different in numerous ways. SECs would primarily be concerned with ethical policy matters, with facilitating communication, providing moral education, gathering information from various sources, giving ethical comfort, and providing consultative services. In some instances, a concrete moral problem may trigger committee deliberations, but these deliberations would rarely focus on the culpability of individuals. Instead, the problem may motivate deliberation about more general ethical issues and may be the starting point for consideration of ethical policy and education.

A convenient starting point for understanding the policy role of SECs is through a modified form of John Rawls' distinction between justifying rules and justifying actions under rules.[23] In the former case of justifying rules, the problem is: How does one justify general rules or policy that could be standards to resolve a wide variety of concrete moral dilemmas and make moral judgments? In the case of justifying actions under rules, an agent faced with a concrete moral dilemma uses appropriate moral rules or principles to resolve the dilemma. This is not simply having a moral problem, mechanically applying a set of rules to the moral dilemma, and thereby having a formula by which to solve moral dilemmas within the appropriate class.[24] Nothing could be further from the practice! The resolution of a concrete practical moral dilemma requires considerable cognitive thought. An agent has to delineate the parameters of the problem, understand what aspects of the larger experiential situation refer to the moral dilemma, what moral principle or rule applies, etc. Two agents examining an identical moral dilemma might use different moral principles or concepts. If they used the same moral principle, they could possibly make very different judgments.

These two tiers, the justification of rules and the justification of actions under rules, can be applied to SECs. A committee would concentrate on general policy for especially difficult or sensitive issues, matters concerning the school's moral climate. Individual agents would justify decisions under the SEC policy. Individual moral agents would not necessarily agree, about which concrete situations or problems should be included in the class of problems covered by the general moral policy, nor would they concur about moral judgments or actions. In other words, moral agents could still disagree about whether a situation is covered by policy, how to decide and what standards to use if the problem is covered by policy, and what action should be undertaken. What seems most controversial about this claim is that a moral agent could use different moral standards from the policy. However, policy is highly general and does not furnish specific judgments for concrete moral dilemmas. Policy provides a moral background, a structure, an environment within which a moral agent recognizes moral dilemmas and directs her moral attention, attitude, sensitivity, and imagination. The moral agent may decide that the moral dilemma requires the aspects of "caring for" another that are so eloquently described by Nel Noddings.[25] But this decision does not negate the original policy.

c. The Consultative Purpose.

The consultative purpose of SECs includes a variety of functions. Teachers and other school personnel may request a meeting of the entire SEC to consider a practical ethics dilemma. This does not imply that the committee will give a definitive solution to the problem or tell teachers what decision should be made or what their action should be. As the term "consultative" suggests, school personnel consult with committee members to study various possible responses to a moral dilemma. Consultation may take place prior to a moral judgment or subsequent to moral action. Each of these forms of consultation may involve different problems:

Consultation prior to decision and action. If consultation with a SEC is optional, one can question whether once consulted the decision of a committee should also be optional or whether it should be mandatory. In other words, should a teacher (or other school personnel) have the option either to accept or reject the committee's decision or should a teacher be required to accept its decision? If acceptance of a committee's decision were mandatory, this would negate the meaning and spirit of the consultative purpose of a SEC. A very different type of relationship should exist between a SEC and teachers. A committee should not be a surrogate for a teacher's practical ethical decision-making or a means to avoid the responsibility of decision-making. Instead, when consulted, a SEC should assist the teacher with a practical ethics problem by clarifying issues, by examining the problem in a variety of ways, and by bringing a committee's diverse knowledge bases to the issue.

Consultation subsequent to decision making and action. After making a moral judgment and acting on that judgment, a teacher may approach committee members. In retrospect, a teacher may be uncertain about the decision and its consequences and wonder whether a different decision should have been made. At times, the decision and action are not morally questionable. Why then would a teacher consult a SEC? Often, a teacher is genuinely concerned about the ramifications of moral decision-making and acting under situations of great uncertainty. A teacher may have regrets and feelings of moral inadequacy and uncertainty. There is realization that a variety of alternative decisions could have been made or that for certain situations no matter the choice, the results would have been unacceptable. In some cases, subsequent consultation with a committee member may primarily ethical comfort, helping a teacher accept the decision and recognizing its validity. In other cases, a teacher may subsequently develop new ways of looking at similar moral dilemmas and thus acquire greater understanding, skills, sensitivity, and imagination for resolving future practical ethical dilemmas.

Both prior and subsequent to decisions-making, consultation can also be seen as having a strong educational function. For through its consultative purpose, SECs assist teachers or other school personnel in acquiring greater understanding of what the actual practical ethics dilemma is, of what its parameters are, of what knowledge would contribute to an understanding and resolution of the dilemma, what types of ethical standards could be used to resolve the dilemma, and how the dilemma and its possible solutions could affect teachers, students, and others.

Consultation has not been a common occurrence for the average teacher. Rather, teachers are often told that when they close their classroom doors, they can conduct their classes and make decisions themselves, that they alone are responsible for the teaching-learning situation and for the moral climate of their classes. In medicine, a very different situation exists. Though individual physicians are responsible for medical decisions and thus, subject to malpractice charges, physicians often make decisions and practice with considerable formal and informal input from other professionals. Members of IECs mention that when physicians finally accept the notion of an ethics committee, they informally consult with committee members about specific cases. Some committees even have members on call so that a physician or another medical professional can speak with them at any time of the day or night. This variety of consultative practices is exactly what is advocated for school ethics committees.

AFTER THOUGHTS. At this point, someone may still argue that the primary concern of scholars should be the professional ethics of the individual, autonomous teacher. This hesitation can be answered in two ways. First, there are a few ideal teachers who walk the path of fully moral persons no matter how difficult or impossible a school's moral climate is. We cannot expect all teachers to be supererogatory heroes. The morality of the vast majority of teachers and human beings is influenced by their social environment. Though at times teachers rise above the school's moral environment, in many situations the school's moral climate influences the range of moral decisions teachers make. Second, when stressing the practical ethics of teachers, we also need to look at other issues, at how we conceptualize the school as a social institution, what we mean when we speak of a school as a community, what theory of the teacher's self is assumed by the concept of community accepted, what good (or goods) the school community seeks to achieve.[26] Without having theoretical answers to these issues, our search for a way to improve the practical ethics of teachers will miscarry. In other words, the practical ethics of teachers cannot be considered in abstraction from a wide range of other theoretical, conceptual, and practical issues.

The argument of this paper is that one way to improve the practical ethics of teachers is to pay attention to the social and moral environment in which they make moral decisions and carry out moral actions. SECs will not abrogate the moral decision-making of teachers, but will create a moral environment in which teachers can make more responsible and responsive moral decisions. SECs will create an environment in which teachers recognize that professional ethics is of fundamental importance in teaching and in schools.

NOTES

1. For this, Kenneth R. Howe, "A Conceptual Basis for Ethics in Teacher Education," Journal of Teacher Education 37(1986):9-10.

2. For example, Michael Rutter, et.al., Fifteen Thousand Hours (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), 178.

3. For another profession on the IEC model, Frederic G. Reamer, "Ethics Committees in Social Work," Social Work 32(May-June 1987):188-192.

4. Whether institutional ethics committees should exist in schools or school districts depends on many factors, e.g., the size of the school versus district. In this paper, school and school district are used interchangeably.

5. For two studies of IECs: Norman Fost and Ronald E. Cranford, "Hospital Ethics Committees," Journal of the American Medical Assoc. 253(1985):2687-2692; Fred Rosner, "Hospital Medical Ethics Committees: A Review of Their Development," Ibid., 2693-2697. For a more complete bibliography, Ruth Macklin and Robin B. Kupfer, Hospital Ethics Committees (New York: Albert Einstein College of Medicine, 1988), A5-A9.

6. Two other cases involved the care of infants, the Baby Doe case of Bloomington, Indiana and the Infant Jane Doe case of New York State. Both cases concerned parents' decisions (following physician recommendations) to forgo surgery and allow their severely handicapped infants to receive only "normal" care and be kept comfortable. These cases provided impetus for federal regulations on the care of severely ill neonates. The People v. Barber and Nejdl, the prosecution of two physicians after the death of their patient, was another case that motivated institutions to search for new methods of making ethical policy and resolving difficult medical ethics problems.

7. The Court did not authorize the removal of all life-support apparatus. Quinlan received nourishment through various devices. For this distinction, James Rachels, The End of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 101.

8. The Quinlan Case had other consequences, Marc Lappe, "Dying while Living: a critique of allowing-to-die legislation," Journal of Medical Ethics 4(1978): 195-199.

9. For both Court decisions, Robert F. Weir, ed., Ethical Issues in Death and Dying (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

10. For uncertainty in medical diagnosis, Marianne A. Paget, The Unity of Mistakes (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 24.

11. Medical ethicists note that an IEC often provides "ethical comfort" for members of the institution. For example, a nurse may ask an IEC member about a practical ethical decision she made. The moral dilemma may have had no possible outcome that would have satisfied the nurse. With any decision, the patient would suffer and die. The nurse would feel anguish. An IEC in this case would not seek a better decision or criticize the decision made, but would provide the moral comfort needed for a sensitive, caring nurse.

12. For the function, operations, structure, dynamics, and methods of IECs, Ronald E. Cranford and A. Edward Doudera, eds. Institutional Ethics Committees and Health Care Decision Making (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Health Administration Press, 1984).

13. For the school culture and the different points of views of school personnel, Seymour B. Sarason, The Culture of the School and the Problem of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971).

14. Ibid.

15. John Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration," in John Paul Strain, Modern Philosophies of Education (New York: Random House, 1971), 113.

16. John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1915), 100.

17. Ibid.

18. For example, George S Counts, Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order? (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978/1932).

19. For participatory and democratic standards, Norman S. Care, On Sharing Fate (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 77.

20. A SEC can also sponsor moral education workshops and conferences for the general public in the

larger community.

21. For one view of how to insure discussion among people with very different moral beliefs and interests, Charles E. Lamore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), esp. Chapter 3.

22. The following books could foster an SEC's educational purpose: Kenneth A. Strike and Jonas F. Soltis, The Ethics of Teaching (New York: Teachers College Press, 1985); Kenneth A. Strike, Emil J. Haller, and Jonas F. Soltis, The Ethics of School Administration (New York: Teachers College Press, 1988).

23. John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," Philosophical Review 64(1955): 3-32.

24. For a criticism of blindly applying rules to a moral dilemma, Lamore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, Chapter 1.

25. For example, see Betty A. Sichel, "An Ethics of Care and Institutional Ethics Committees," Hypatia, forthcoming.

26. For these and other questions, Julius Moravesik, "Communal Ties," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 62 (1988)

RESPONSE TO THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF TEACHERS IN A DEMOCRATIC SCHOOL

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Professor Sichel defines the problem of her paper thus: "How can the practical ethics of schools be reframed?" A satisfactory answer, she argues, must address both the personal morality of the teacher and the moral climate of the school. She then proposes the establishment of School Ethics Committees (SECs), modeled after Institutional Ethics Committees (IECs) which exist in many hospital settings. The heart of the paper sets forth three functions of SECs (educational, policy-making, consultation), and then offers three arguments to support establishment of SECs. First, in recognition of diverse interpretations of school life and pluralistic moral beliefs, SECs would draw on the strengths of diverse perspectives. Second, in recognition of the complexity of institutional structure, SECs could make provision for implementation of policy by including in their membership persons with various roles. Third, in recognition of the requirements of a democratic society and particularly of democratic school administration, SECs would provide for participation in the decisions by all parties affected.

If this is a fair summary of Professor Sichel's paper, I should like to offer the following comments.

(1) The notion of engaging moral agents in a discussion of moral issues is commendable. It assumes rejection of a completely subjective, relativistic ethic. It also assumes the rejection of an environment of the type described recently by a government bureaucrat who explained many apparently illegal actions by remarking that the agency was amoral. Persons with widely different moral views can surely approve discussion of issues. Even traditional moral education with its emphasis on direct inculcation of rules, is not hostile to the intellectual analysis of moral problems. In support of this point, Wynne and Vitz note that moral dilemmas were offered to readers or listeners of the Iliad (900 b.C.) and in the rabbinical debates over Talmudic moral issues.[1] Professor Sichel correctly notes that physicians have a stronger tradition of professional consultation than do teachers even when ethical issues are not at stake. The implication is that the education profession would be well served by adopting the consultation model both in ethics as well as in other professional areas. Thus, without making any assumptions about the power or limitations of reason to resolve all moral issues, there is surely benefit to be found in rational discussion, particularly if the result of such discussions were the creation of a "moral environment" for teachers and students.

(2) The parallels and differences between IECs in the medical model and SECs in the educational setting invite consideration. A major stimulus for IECs was remarks by a judge in the Karen Quinlan case. Thus IECs were concerned mainly with the ethical dilemmas brought on by advances in medical technology on the one hand and by the desire to stay within the law to avoid medical malpractice suits on the other hand. Since the probability of educational malpractice suits is much less for teachers than for physicians,

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and since educational technology has not created acute moral dilemmas for teachers as it has for physicians, one may ask what conditions suggest the need to develop SECs. Much of the literature on professionalizing education assumes that medicine is the profession to imitate. But does the achievement of professional status mean that educators should adopt this particular model of addressing ethical questions? Other elements in the application of the medical model to educational settings should be explored. Do the nature of the physician's task, the relationship to the patient, and the nature of events which precipitate consultation with an IEC differ significantly from the nature of teacher's task, the teacher-student relationship, and the kind of events which would precipitate consultation with an SEC? Of course, there is really no need to justify encouraging people to think about and actually be good; however, Professor Sichel's three-fold argument for SECs appears to be an ex post facto justification rather than a statement of initial conditions which call for such a provision.

(3) One justification offered for SECs is the demands of democratic educational administration. Citing John Dewey, Professor Sichel notes that "habitual exclusion has the effect of reducing a sense of responsibility for what is done." On this basis, she urges the importance of obtaining the input of various school personnel such as teachers, administrators, librarians, psychologists, and custodians. It would be helpful if the roles of the other stake-holders were also emphasized, namely parents and students. In the medical model, IECs surely do not give such short shrift to those most directly affected, patients and their families.

(4) Do the moral discussion techniques of the SECs assume a Deweyan view of morality, or can they accommodate quite contrary views, for example, views which justify moral rules or principles by reference to the will of God? This question is less pressing for IECs since those participants tend to be oriented more strongly to the law on one hand and to a long standing and powerful professional code of ethics on the other hand. The school touches a wider range of moral issues than are commonly treated by IECs, and the teacher herself, by virtue of her rule as a moral model, exerts influence across a broader range of ordinary life experiences than does the physician. Further, Professor Sichel proposes that SECs engage in the moral education of the community. By citing George S. Counts book, Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order? it appears that "community" has a much wider scope than merely educating the immediate school clientele. If then, the SEC discussion model implies a Deweyan bias against supernaturally grounded morality, it will encounter some of the same problems experienced by the values clarification and Kohlbergian approaches.

Perhaps one early item in the self education agenda of SECs would be to map those areas of moral concern appropriate for the school setting. Without some delimitation of the moral sphere with which they are to be concerned, SECs may result in the schools accepting yet another role for which they are not equipped, and being charged with usurping the roles of church, family, and other social agencies.

This comment arises from the analysis of communal ties by Julius Moravcsik which Professor Sichel cited. Moravcsik defines community as "shared aims and cooperation," but cooperation of a kind in which the occasional adversarial stance is not viewed as fundamental. Many communities, however, intersect in the school. Attachments and obligations within these communities have different levels of priority for the members. For some of these, differing positions on certain moral issues are certain to be perceived as fundamental.

This suggests that the most effective SECs will eschew the broad role of providing moral education for the larger community, and will articulate a civic morality as the moral realm suited for this particular community, a realm which represents the overlap of the common concerns for living in a democratic, civilized society.[2]

(5) What provision is there for the school personnel who participate in the SECs or who receive advice from them to be motivated actually to behave morally? It goes without saying that there is a distinction between cognitive awareness of moral issues, and moral behavior. Bureaucratic structural changes may facilitate the implementation of policies judged to address moral issues, but the most fully moral person must act from inner commitment and motivation. The SEC discussion model may not provide as powerful sources of motivation as are available to the IECs where liability suits and violation of the Hippocratic oath provide strong motivation. Jonas Soltis has noted that emphasis on raising ethical consciousness and developing moral reasoning skills "may mask the need for teaching and nurturing other essentials for ethical conduct including a sincere commitment to do what is right."[3] This is what Terence Anderson has called "the motors of morality" or the motivation and moral agency needed both to advance from one moral stage to another, and in higher stages to do what one believes to be right.[4]

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1. Edward A. Wynne and Paul C. Vitz, The Major Models of Moral Education: An Evaluation (ERIC, ED 260 021, 1985), 41.
2. Julius Moravcsik, "Communal Ties," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 62(1988):214.
3. Jonas Soltis, "Teaching Professional Ethics," Journal of Teacher Education 37(1986):3.
4. Terrence R. Anderson, review of Moral Development Foundations: Judeo-Christian Alternatives to Piaget/Kohlberg by Donald M. Joy (Ed.), Journal of Moral Education 14(1985):133.

The 4Cs OF THE NEW SCHOLARSHIP ON WOMEN

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We believe that one of the most important events of our time is the reconsideration of the meaning of the ideals of Enlightenment, especially those dealing with standards of rationality and scientific objectivity as tools of social progress that have dominated Western culture for the last three hundred years or so. Since mid-century this narrative has fallen into incoherence and serious epistemological crises and clearly requires reconstruction. This reconsideration and reconstruction has implications for everything from the foundations of educational research to the ideal of the educated person. Although found in many forms, we feel that the recent feminist critiques associated with what Jane Roland Martin has called "the new scholarship on women" holds forth one of the brightest beacons for guiding us through to the necessary reconstruction[1]. The feminist reconstruction seems especially pluralistic in its approach; it is guided by such diverse disciplines as critical theory, psychoanalytic gender theory, postpositivism and neo-pragmatism, to name only a few influences. Following these lines the new scholarship seems to be working toward a reconstruction of objectivity and rationality in ways that would place social, political, and economic relations on a continuum with metaphysical and epistemological relations, thereby restoring the balance between nature and human nature. What follows is intended merely as an introduction to some of the principles of "the new scholarship on women" that may be of interest to educators. We will emphasize the reliance of the new scholarship on postpositivistic philosophy of science, although we will try to clarify the connection between their use of postpositivism and the other disciplines not ordinarily related to epistemological and metaphysical issues. It is these connections that we believe provide the new scholarship with its unique contribution and importance for education.

"Since the mid-1970s, feminist criticisms of science have evolved from a reformist to a revolutionary position, from analyses that offered the possibility of improving the science we have, to calls for a transformation in the very foundations both of science and of the cultures that accord it value." Feminist critiques such as Harding's[2] assert that the epistemologies, metaphysics, ethics and politics that dominate science are androcentric in ways that are mutually supportive and reinforcing. It is claimed that science is fundamentally belief and value-laden in such a way that problem recognition and representation, research design, execution and interpretation, as well as research distribution, are all distorted in masculine-biased ways. Such assertions of theory, belief and value-ladenness seem to challenge the vaunted objectivity of scientific inquiry. Nevertheless, few if any of these critiques recommend we reject science; rather it is hoped that we can reconstruct it by recognizing the necessary theory and value-ladenness of scientific inquiry. It is felt that if we can identify, critique and correct the previously concealed androcentric presuppositions that have so far guided scientific inquiry, then it will

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be possible to transform and improve it. Perhaps we may make science more objective by making it more self-reflective.

Since the mid-1970s we have also seen feminist educators frame critiques of the foundations of education that are very similar to those described by Harding for the foundations of science. These critiques have examined, among other things, the foundations of moral knowledge (Gilligan)[3] teaching and curriculum (Noddings)[4], and even the very aim of education itself (Martin).[5] Yet, so far, strangely enough, there has been no extensive, sustained and explicit feminist critique of the guiding presuppositions that form the foundations of educational research as science. It seems to us that the time has now come for educational researchers to confront the feminist critique of science squarely. Toward this end we will introduce some of the basic constituents of the feminist critique of science, examine some of the possible psychosocial causes of the androcentric elements they find in the origin of modern science, and show how some feminists have tried to transform the currently dominant ideal of objectivity that they believe is gender-biased. This ideal of objectivity Evelyn Fox Keller calls "objectivism."[6]

Recalling the 3 Cs recommended by Jane Roland Martin to correct the cognitive distortions of the gender-biased contemporary ideal of liberal education (i.e., care, concern and connectedness),[7] we could speak of the 4 Cs that comprise the proposed feminist transformation of science. They are constructivism, community, communication and connection. The 4 Cs are reticulatedly related such that it does not matter where in the network we begin. Everything is connected to everything else; even Martin's Cs and ours share a common term -- connectedness. Collectively the 4 Cs could be said, following Martin,[8] to define "science in a different style." A different style in science that Martin likens to Gilligan's "different voice" of morality, a voice that that Gilligan herself declared "is characterized not by gender but theme. Its association with woman is an empirical observation."[9]

Somewhere near the center of the feminist critique, we suspect, is this statement: All knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is a construction of communities sustained by care, concern and connectedness so as to be able to carry on the continuing conversation of humankind. The metaphor is borrowed from Michael Oakeshott who suggests: "Education, properly speaking, is an initiation into the skill and partnership of this conversation...."[10] Of course the conversation is always open to reconstruction, or for some, deconstruction.

The contemporary feminist critique of science rejects the metaphysics of naive realism and the related epistemological ideal of knowledge as a one-to-one correspondence to a mind-independent reality. Instead, the objects and relations of inquiry are considered to be linguistic constructions. Evelyn Fox Keller writes, "Naming nature is the special business of science. In these acts of naming, the scientist simultaneously constructs and contains nature.... Relation and perspectives thus constitute the first stage of meaning: the stage that frames the linguistic subset available to the working scientist."[11] Without identity criteria it is impossible to individuate and follow the objects of inquiry. In the constructivist anti-realist view, identity criteria are made instead of discovered. The same could be said of the sentences that describe the interactions between the named objects, that is, the so-called "laws of nature." In this view there is no knowledge, and certainly nothing that could be called shared knowledge, that lies beyond the limits of linguistic construction. For this reason, not only the acts of naming, but the construction of the guiding metaphors of science are crucial. Special attention should be paid to the metaphors of relationship between knower and known. For instance, Bacon's "chaste and lawful marriage between Mind and Nature,"[12] a metaphor expressive of both metaphysical realism and knowledge by correspondence. The structure of this relationship becomes clear when Bacon, in the role of procurer, writes: "I am coming in very truth leading to you Nature with all her children to bind her to your service and make her your slave."[13] Such metaphors clearly genderize the relation of knower (the male Mind) and the known (mother Nature) in a relation of dominance and submission.

Two achievements have conspired to refute realism and the correspondence theory of truth and thereby reinforce the constructivist view of knowledge advocated by the radical feminist. They are, in order of emergence, quantum mechanics in physics and postpositivistic philosophy of science. Postpositivism has effectively rejected the theory-fact and fact-value dichotomies, two of the central dogmas of positivism. Postpositivism also places at least as much emphasis on the interpretive as the explanatory function of scientific theories.[14] As for microphysics it is enough to say that there is no "realistic" interpretation of quantum mechanics. The widely accepted Copenhagen interpretation, actually interpretations, is entirely instrumentalist, meaning that the principles, objects and processes postulated by the interpretation are understood merely as logico-mathematical linguistic instruments for organizing and sequencing experience. The statements that make up the interpretation are nontruth-functional and there are no rules of correspondence connecting the individual terms (names like "quark" or "z-particle") to things in some visualizable model. Quantum mechanics and postpositivism combine to break the spell of Enlightenment objectivism; that is, the notion of a reality detached and separated from the human mind, its interpretive cognitive structures and value system. Instead, science is viewed as a linguistic system of human-made meanings rather than discovered truths. So understood all sciences are, to some degree, interpretive sciences.

Keller premises her entire book on gender and science "on the recognition that both gender and science are socially constructed categories. Science is the name we give to a set of practices and a body of knowledge delineated by a community, not simply defined by the exigencies of logical proof and experimental verification."[15] The feminist alternative to a science mistakenly taken to be totally defined by logical proof and experimental verification is to recognize "that science is a fully social activity – as social and as culturally specific as are religious, educational, economic and family activities."[16] In fine, all of science is best viewed as a social construction that finds itself firmly inside the realm of the revocable and reconstructable. The result of such a feminist perspective is to effectively reverse the usual reduction of human nature to physical nature, the social sciences to the "natural" sciences. Both are human constructions.

Harding suggests that the feminist "assertion of the priority of moral and political over scientific and epistemological theory and activity makes science and epistemology less important, less central...."[17] Recognizing this claim of the priority of moral considerations, and, following Keller's notion that gender and science are socially constructed categories,[17,18] we can better appreciate the depth and significance of the following comment by Carol Gilligan: "the differences between the sexes are being rediscovered in the social sciences. This discovery occurs when theories formerly considered to be sexually neutral in their scientific objectivity are found instead to reflect a consistent observational and evaluative bias. Then the presumed neutrality of science, like that of language itself, gives way to the recognition that the categories of knowledge are human constructions."[19] As Keller expresses it: "if naming nature is the special business of science, naming science is the responsibility of society."[20] She is especially concerned, on this constructivist account, with "the making of men, woman and science, or, more precisely, how the making of men and woman has affected the making of science."[21] If the radical feminists are correct, moral knowledge and scientific knowledge are not totally separable.

If science is a social activity, then, on the feminist account, the central activity of the scientific community is interpretation, i.e., the determination of shared meanings. Keller sums up the situation nicely: "It is by now a near truism that there is no such thing as raw data; all data presuppose interpretation. And if an interpretation is to be meaningful -- if the data are to be 'intelligible' to more than one person -- there must be participation in a community of common practices, shared conceptions of the meaning of terms and their relations to 'objects' in the real world. In short, in science as elsewhere, interpretation requires the sharing of a common language."[22] Sharing language means knowing the "right" names to call things, the "right" syntax in which to pose claims and questions, and a common understanding of what constitutes legitimate questions and meaningful answers. It also involves shared methods, metaphors, images and modes of explanation. The shared metaphors often determine the range of acceptable questions and answers (explanations). On this view we do not simply explain something. We explain something to someone.

Scientific communities are, on the radical account, shaped not by some transcendent epistemological criteria of logic and experimentation, but rather by the structure of the language shared by the community. If we see science as a search for reliable and sharable knowledge, then it is natural to see science as an achievement of a linguistic community, a shared conversation that has been extended over generations. On a constructivist account, the epistemological criteria involved in adjudicating knowledge claims are themselves socio-linguistic constructions and, therefore, subject to reconstruction should it be shown that they too are gender biased.

The notion of science as a linguistic community no doubt owes a good deal to Thomas Kuhn's highly influential The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the concluding sentences of which state: "Scientific knowledge, like language, is intrinsically the common property of a group or else nothing at all. To understand it we shall need to know the special characteristics of the groups that create it."[23] As many have noted, modern science is almost exclusively the creation of white middle-class males whose special characteristics, it is claimed, dominate our image of the activity.

Initiation into the linguistic community, according to Kuhn, is achieved by means of shared linguistic practice. Kuhn describes the process this way: "members of a group, whether an entire culture or a specialists' sub-community within it, learn to see the same things when confronted with the same stimuli... by being shown examples of situations that their predecessors in the group have already learned to see as like each other and as different from other sorts of situations."[24] Once acquired the ability to name things in the same way as other members of the group becomes automatic as we cease to reflect on the activity. Keller describes the dangers implicit in such a situation when she observes: "What is special about many, if not all, scientific communities is precisely the widely shared assumption that the universe they study is directly accessible, represented by concepts shaped not by language but only by the demands of logic and experiment. On this assumption, 'laws of nature' are beyond the relativity of language...."[25] This confidence in the transparency of language leads us to believe that it is absolute and impervious to the need for reflection. If, however, logic and experiment are themselves conceived as products of language, a human construction, then the scientific community always has the right, indeed the duty, to reflect and reconsider their meaning. Reflectivity in science serves to reveal "new questions, new perspectives, new understanding,"[26] in short an enlarged vision. However, such inquiry always presupposes a certain relationship between knower and known -- one of connection.

The feminist critique is concerned with "connection" in two recursively connected ways. First, there is the interpersonal relationship of the self to other selves in society. We saw an important instance of this in the relationship among the members of the shared linguistic community that constitutes science itself. The second concern is with the epistemological connection between the knower (subject) and the known (object). The social sense of connection is sometimes contained within the more general notion of knower and known, one in which the knower (or subject) is a self and the known (or object) is some social other. For the psychologist, for example, the object of knowledge is another person whereas for the sociologist the object becomes society itself.

The currently dominant image of the relationship between the knower and the known in the sciences is, according to radical feminists, one of disconnection, disinterest and autonomy, mistakenly understood as freedom from the influence of desire, hope and belief. Keller calls this "the objectivist illusion" to distinguish it from genuine objectivity. This illusion, she says, "reflects back an image of self as autonomous and objectified: an image of individuals unto themselves, severed from the outside world of other objects (animate as well as inanimate) and simultaneously from their own subjectivity. It is an investment in impersonality...."[27] So imaged the subject (or self) is entirely severed from the object (including both other selves and other things) and, in a strange sense, alienated from itself, its own subjectivity, as well. Rather than neutrality, the result of the objectivist illusion is a distorted sense of self, society and nature. The self is distorted by its failure to reflect upon its own subjectivity and include the results in its accounts of self, other selves, objects, and events. The unreflective self confuses autonomy with total separation, disconnection and selfishness rather than recognizing a reciprocal relation with equally autonomous persons, things and events.

If the radical account is correct, we are initiated into the linguistic community of science by means of shared exemplars, images and metaphors while in the presence of those we either love and/or respect. Once initiated, we cannot speak of objects or events without speaking of other persons and ourselves, for clearly one of the consequences of a linguistic constructivist account is that objectivity _is_ intersubjectivity, not objectivism; that is, objectivity is arrived at by taking subjectivity into account in reciprocal relations of care, concern and connectedness with others. Objectivity as intersubjectivity contrasts sharply with objectivism defined as disconnectedness and dominance. We will eventually seek to replace objectivism with something similar to what Keller calls "dynamic objectivity"[28] and

Nell Noddings refers to as "dynamic relation," i.e., reciprocity, receptivity and intuition.[29] We may anticipate some of what all of this will come to by recalling the possible priority of the moral over the epistemological, at least in the objectivist sense of epistemological, and recalling also these words from Gilligan's In A Different Voice -- "we know ourselves as separate only insofar as we live in connection with others, and that we experience relationships only insofar as we differentiate others from self."[30] This profound unity of opposites can only be held together by what Harding aptly calls a "dialectical tension."[31]

In conclusion, the radical feminist critique claims that communication in science has become "systematically distorted" by special interests that have and continue to dominate scientific discourse. By including the 4 Cs it becomes possible to reclaim the conversation and correct the distortion brought on by masculine gender bias in science. Only by reclaiming conversations can systematic distortions be corrected, but we must be careful. Keller concedes that her work belongs to the "radical feminist critique" of science, but she cautions that the deep-rooted androcentrism of science could either lead to the rejection of science or its total replacement.[32] Keller finds neither of these alternatives desirable, in part because they lead to "extreme relativism." Instead Keller urges "the reclamation, from within science, of science as a human instead of a masculine project...."[33] We recommend that such a reclamation be guided by an expanded version of Jane Roland Martin's "gender sensitive ideal" for liberal education, "taking gender into account when it makes a difference and ignoring it when it does not."[34]

Unlike so many other merely negative critiques that find fault but fail to formulate alternatives, the radical feminists have proposed a positive program with which to transform the foundations of science by, among other things, reconstructing the ideal of objectivity. Simply stated, the reconstruction consists of reconnecting the knowing subject to the object of knowledge by breaking down the false dichotomies and dualisms, and by restoring continuity, what Keller calls dynamic objectivity. Dynamic objectivity, as Keller describes it, is "a pursuit of knowledge that makes use of subjective experience."[35] To make the most effective use of subjective experience in inquiry, it is necessary to be self-reflective. As we have seen, the philosophy of science reflecting on the practice of science has found two basic dogmas of positivism untenable. They are the theory-fact and fact-value distinctions.

The ideal of dynamic objectivity, according to Keller, "requires a sense of self secure enough to tolerate both difference and continuity; it presupposes dynamic autonomy."[36] "Dynamic autonomy," Keller writes, "reflects a sense of self... as both differentiated from and related to others, and a sense of others as subjects with whom one shares enough to allow for a recognition of their independent interest and feelings -- in short for a recognition of them as other subjects."[37] Keller expands on her idea of dynamic autonomy in a paragraph in which she explicitly mentions Carol Gilligan. Keller writes: "The ideal described here requires an exquisite balancing act. It presupposes that the fears of merging, of loss of boundaries, on the one hand, and the fears of loneliness and disconnection, on the other, can be balanced. It also presupposes the compatibility of one's contrasting desires for intimacy and for independence."[38] Dynamic autonomy has manifest implications for better understanding moral thought and action, implications already carefully worked out by Gilligan and others. That dynamic autonomy is prior to and recursively prefigures dynamic objectivity gives added depth to Harding's earlier assertion of "the priority of moral... over scientific and epistemological theory...."[39]

Dynamic autonomy is a razor's edge to tread, "an exquisite balancing act," or to shift metaphors, a "dialectical tension," as Harding calls it, from which it would be easy to stumble or snap. Keller indicates, "the cultural definition of male and female as polar opposites, the one premised on difference and the other on similarity, works against the development of dynamic autonomy for both sexes. It leads to a foreclosure of continuity on the one hand, and of differentiation on the other -- both foreclosures equally inimical to the recognition of intersubjectivity."[40] Gender bias operating in either direction could cause individuals to lose their balance or snap. What is lost is intersubjectivity and eventually objectivity.

Dynamic objectivity, as Keller describes it, "actively draws on the commonality between mind and nature as a resource for understanding" and "aims at a form of knowledge that grants to the world around us its independent integrity but does so in a way that remains cognizant of, indeed relies on, our connectivity with the world."[41] In this regard, dynamic objectivity is not unlike love and empathy in that it "draws explicitly on the commonality of feelings and experience in order to enrich our understanding...."[42] Objectivism, separates the subject from the object, "rather than aiming at disentanglement of one from the other."[43] Dynamic objectivity requires the same kind of reciprocity found in dynamic autonomy, an intimate involvement with others combined with a well-focused sense of self, a sense of one's own subjectivity in a relation of empathy and love. Metaphors of eros and knowledge in science have so far, as exemplified by Bacon, been masculine metaphors of domination, conquest and control rather than love, sharing and reciprocity.

Those familiar with the mainstream of traditional as well as contemporary pragmatism will find many of its themes reflected in the new feminism. In this section we would like to show that we learned something from the lesson Sam Craver gave one of the authors last year by trying to show how these ideas dovetail with pragmatism. We would like to remind the reader though, that pragmatism has never been widely received, in part for reasons feminist help us better appreciate.

In Dewey's Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, the subtitle is significant; we find the following passage: "Logic is a social discipline. One ambiguity attending the word 'naturalistic' is that it may be understood to involve reduction of human behavior to the behavior of apes, amoebae, or electrons and protons. But man is naturally a being that lives in association with others in communities possessing language, and therefore enjoying a transmitted culture. Inquiry is a mode of activity that is socially conditioned and that has cultural consequences."[44] Logic in one form or another lies at the center of all empirical scientific inquiry, or pure mathematics for that matter. What Dewey is saying here is, first, that human nature is continuous with the very nature that it seeks to understand and that, second, logic and any mode of inquiry, scientific or otherwise, is a sociolinguistic construction of shared communities and is therefore always subject to reconstruction as the demands of the inquiry or the inquirers dictates. Once again we witness the priority of the sociological over the epistemological. Metaphysical and epistemological rules and criteria are themselves sociolinguistic constructions. Our point, of course, is that the feminists who we have thusfar referred to as "radical" (and who have referred to themselves in the same way) are, in fact, pragmatists.

Dewey believed that, when properly understood, the values of science and the values of democratic community coincided. The feminist critique has helped bring about such an alignment. Science can be seen as providing the dialectical union between the needs of freedom and individuality, and collective authority and community. "Science," said Dewey, "has made its way by releasing... the elements of variation, of invention and innovation, of novel creation in individuals... who freed themselves from the bonds of tradition."[45] But while honoring the imaginative freedom of inquirers to formulate alternate hypotheses, the warrant of authority of scientific findings is based upon collective social activity. "The contribution the scientific inquirer makes is collectively tested and developed and, in the measure that it is cooperatively confirmed, becomes a part of the common fund of the intellectual commonwealth," wrote Dewey.[46] Seen in this way, the inquiry modes of scientific learning depend on critical, collaborative democratic community and for Dewey "democracy is more than a form of government, it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated living."[47]

Sadly, instead of democratic solidarity, images of science and society in education reflect a picture of domination, distortion and disconnection. Instead of democratic social relations, we see hierarchial technocratic models of institutional management. Scientific knowledge, and the power knowledge provides, enters at the top where it empowers the expert managers of the technocratic system. It is a primitively positivist view of science, one that celebrates objectivism and leaves little room in its technist vocabulary for such terms as care, concern, connection, construction, community or communication. This already systemtically distorted discourse descends the hierarchy as a soliloquy. At the bottom, teachers, usually woman, are held accountable, some would say controlled by, "knowledge" from which they are already alienated. Finally when we look at who occupies what places in the hierarchy of social relations in education we may properly conclude that in education "men rule women and women rule children." There is much to talk about.

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23. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 210.

24. Ibid., 193-4.

25. Keller, Reflections, 130.

26. Ibid., 123.

27. Ibid., 70.

28. Ibid., Chapter Six, Dynamic Objectivity: Love, Power and Knowledge.

29. Noddings, Caring, 162.

30. Gilligan, Different Voice, 63.

31. Sandra G. Harding, "Is Gender a Variable in Conceptions of Rationality? A Survey of Issues. In C. Gould (Ed.) Beyond Domination. (New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld Publishers, 1982), 54.

32. Keller, Reflections, 177-8.

33. Ibid., 178.

34. Martin, "Redefining the Educated Person," 10.

35. Keller, Reflections,

36. Ibid., 118.

37. Ibid., 99.

38. Keller, Reflections, 100.

39. Harding, Science Question, 251.

40. Keller, Reflections, 107.

41. Keller, Reflections, 117.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, (New York: H. Holt & Company, 1986), 19

45. John Dewey, Intelligence in the Modern World, ed., Joseph Ratner, (New York: Modern Library, 1939), 358.

46. Ibid.

47. John Dewey, Democracy and Education, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1910) p.87.

Response to Garrison and Phelan

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Garrison and Phelan have succeeded in writing a thoughtful paper on an important subject. The very success of their effort, however, renders the task of response somewhat difficult. When first reading the paper I felt like part of the "Amen Corner." "Yes", I would mutter to myself. "That's right, good point." And yet, when the reading was done, I was left with a nagging sense of doubt, a sense as if something was missing. It took a long time to identify the source of my discomfort. Within the conceptual framework of the philosophy of science, reconsideration of standards of rationality and scientific objectivity is an important arena for investigation. Incorporation of the "new scholarship on woman" can inform that investigation, it may contribute to the "reconstruction of objectivity and rationality." But in my view Garrison and Phelan have employed the wrong discourse; issues have been framed in the language of reconsideration and reconstruction, while the general conceptual framework is guided by notions of a "paradigm shift", which calls forth images of scientific revolution and transformation. This general observation guides the response which follows.

The argument I wish to present has two parts. In the first, which I call an Androcentric Critique, I suggest that Garrison and Phelan, have offered a "rationalist" reading of the feminist critique of science. Such a reading has the general consequence of "androcentrizing" the feminist critique, on the one hand, while failing to satisfy the demands of "normal" science,[1] on the other. Moreover, I suggest that Garrison and Phelan have performed an incomplete "deconstructive move" relative to the reconstruction of science. The second part of the response will be called an Ideology Critique. There I attempt to show that the feminist critique of science (rendered in this case as rationality and objectivity) is part of a broader critique, centered in the current historical juncture on issues of power and privilege, but oriented more generally toward development of an alternative paradigm antithetical to even a reconstituted androcentric science.

An Androcentric Critique

The point of departure for Garrison and Phelan's argument is Jane Roland Martin's ideal of liberal education (care, concern and connection). They then propose the 4Cs (constructivism, community, communication and connection) as constituting the central concepts of "science in a different style"; of science characterized by theme rather than gender. Such a science is noteworthy by the relations of difference between itself and "normal" science. In this regard the category of "construction" seems central, while the remaining categories are peripheral and derivative. Rejected, within the framework of construction, is the metaphysics of naive realism and the presupposition

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of correspondence between a knowing subject and an objective, independent reality. Instead, following the "linguistic turn" of much contemporary thinking, reality is considered a social construct[2] in which the first move in the creation of meaning is to employ the extant language of a discourse community in the act of naming, and through naming to both constitute the known and to constrain it. I am reminded in this regard of Lao Tsu in the opening of the Tao Te Ching, "In the beginning was the word, and the word gave rise to the ten thousand things." As Garrison and Phelan are, I assume, well aware, this does not constitute a move toward relativity, but rather toward relationalism.[3] Neither the objects nor the strategies of knowing are relativized vis a vis the knowing subject. Rather only by acting through the linguistic structures of their discourse community, and as a representative of that community, does the subject come to knowledge. Both the objects and strategies of knowing are socially shared; knowledge remains then always intersubjective and relative to the internalized linguistic structures of the affiliate social/discourse community. Neither rationality nor objectivity (nor for that matter, science and gender), as linguistic categories, are seen to have a meaningful existence apart from the linguistic structure and discourse community. Nevertheless, both rationality and objectivity are understood to have an existence independent of any particular knowing subject; this existence is intersubjective. This I take as the essence of the argument leading to Garrison and Phelan's statement of equivalence in the form "objectivity = intersubjectivity."

What I don't understand is why Garrison and Phelan find it necessary to turn to the feminist critique to advance what is in fact an established argument in the post-positivist philosophy of science, and for the purpose of establishing a science of theme rather than gender. Could one not treat the remaining Cs ((scientific) communities, communication and connection) more simply as examples or derivations from the central argument? This may be easily accomplished with regard to communities and communication. Science (as ideology), is constituted as a discourse community governed by intersubjectively validated discourse structures. Communication which conforms to the established standards of judgement in defining problems, selecting evidence, and generating solutions is granted legitimacy; all other forms are relegated to the category "nonscience" (or some other competing ideological structure of belief).

The case of connection, however, is somewhat more difficult. The concept "connection" refers to the relationship between (a) the knower and the known, and (b) the knower and other selves in society. As outlined, connection in either sense refers to a relationship in which the knowing subject abandons "the objectivist illusion" (the quest for disconnection, disinterest, and autonomy) in relation to the known, and substitutes interest in their own subjectivity and the subjectivity of others. The problem is, however, that to utilize the feminist critique of science is to accept, at least tacitly, the existence of a biological/gendered basis of thinking.[4] In this regard the (linguistically) knowable becomes gendered. Employing the feminist critique, Garrison and Phelan may hope to challenge the hegemony of androcentric science through incorporation of a gynocentric element.

Such an approach cannot, however, produce an androgenous science, but rather only a "dual" science, with androcentric and gynocentric centers.

If one assumes that gendered thinking is rooted in socialization rather than biology, the possibility for creating an androgenous science is more likely. But why then appeal to a gendered critique in attempts to legitimate such categories as dynamic objectivity and intersubjectivity. Could one not achieve much the same end through use of, for example, Weber's concept of Verstehen, or from critical theory, strategies of ideologiekritik. Or are we to consider that Max Weber, drawing on the work of Wilhelm Dilthy and Henrick Rickert, and that Jurgen Habermas, have produced gynocentric epistemological concepts?

In fact, Garrison and Phelan, ask simply that we recognize that science has systematically distorted human understanding by denying the validity and utility of ways of knowing historically associated with the feminine. Such a request is both reasonable and necessary. So what is the point of my critique? It is this. Implicit in Garrison and Phelan's paper is the desire to obtain an androgenous science, a science in which reason itself is ungendered, or in which the gendered elements of reason are not status ranked. They are engaged in the historical quest, not of truth this time or even for knowledge, but for rationality worthy of our faith. The mistake, in my opinion, is that in adopting a deconstructive move of substitution of one "gendered" epistemic or metaphysical "first principle" for another, they undercut the intersubjective validity of the rational system they wish to reconstruct. Their argument may be read as posing binary oppositions between disconnected objectivity/connected subjectivities and disinterested logic/interested knowing. While one may wish to substitute connected subjectivity and interested knowing, the consequences for the remaining corpus of scientific thought is ignored. Of course one cannot address every issue of consequence in a ten page paper. Nevertheless, one leaves the reading with the sense that Garrison and Phelan believe that once such substitution is made, normal science can proceed with business as usual, and that is simply not the case.

An Ideology Critique

While the first part of this response addressed what Garrison and Phelan did, this part is a critique of what was left undone. The feminist critique of science is part a broader movement to challenge the historically subordinate status of women in society. The issue in this broader movement is not whether science is androcentric (gynocentric, or ethnocentric for that matter), nor whether objectivity equals intersubjectivity, nor even whether the standards of rationality systematically discriminate against "women's ways of knowing", although each of these considerations is important. Rather the central issue is whether the institutions constituting the social formation maintain structured social inequalities. While science, objectivity, and rationality are integral in the construction and legitimation of the extant social formation, it is unlikely that a paradigmatic revolution in science will be successful unless the broader institutional formation is also transformed. Such transformation in either science or society, any "revolution" for that matter, centers on issues of power and control. It is the absence of explicit discussion of the centrality of these dimensions, the reduction of a "paradigm shift" to a rational act of persuasion, that most disturbed my first reading.

Science is one form of discourse among many currently influencing institutional life. At the broadest level, science may be considered an example of instrumental-rational discourse. Weber provides one discussion of the positive contribution of this way of thinking for development of organizational and institutional life. But we should not forget Weber's discussion of the anti-democratic, "iron cage" such thinking could create, nor of his belief in the importance of substantive rational thought. The feminist critique serves to remind us of the importance of the substantive rational, but the significance of the critique transcends gender. More broadly the feminist critique reveals the voices that have been silenced by the hegemony of narrow instrumentalist ways of knowing. Not only women's voices, but the voices of the poor and racial minorities, of teachers and students, and of those who have only their labor to exchange for the necessities of life. Let us raise our voice in support of all groups struggling to be heard. But let us not fall into the trap of dividing the struggle into support for this group or that. In closing their argument, Garrison and Phelan make the case for a critical and reflective pragmatism. That is the argument to make, for science and society. But posing the argument in the rhetoric of feminist critique serves to distort the argument unnecessarily, it creates (gendered) categorical distinctions where none need exist, it subverts the broader political struggle by creating barriers to group identity and democratic solidarity.

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1. I am using the notion of normal science in the Kuhnian sense of the dominant paradigm governing a discourse community. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970) for discussion of normal science and paradigm shifts. See Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) for discussion of thought styles and collectives, or what current fashions would now call discourse communities.

2. See Peter L Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967) for a classic treatment of this approach to social reality.

3. See Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936) for discussion of relationalism.

4. Not to accept at least tacitly the biological determinist/gendered basis of thinking argument leaves one in the realm of conspiratorial theories for the origins of science. One may argue that science is unwittingly androcentric, but I am unaware of evidence of a conscious androcentric impulse in the evolution of science. This formulation, of course, ignores the distinction between biological and cognitive/epistemological masculinity. The significance of such a distinction, however, appears to me to be little more than that associated with referring to ships as "she."

IS IT POSSIBLE TO BE PHILOSOPHICAL ABOUT POVERTY?

J. Gordon Chamberlin
North Carolina Poverty Project

Poverty is a vast reality in contemporary society. The language employed to reflect society's troubled conscience about this reality deserves attention because it appears to conceal more than it reveals about what poverty means. Examining how we all talk about poverty is the concern of this paper.

As you may guess the concern is existential and grows out of three years of heading the North Carolina Poverty Project, an independent educational organization devoted to helping the state develop more appropriate and consistent policies and programs for dealing with nearly one million of its citizens (1/6 of the population) now living in poverty. The Project was established to deal with a basic "why" question: why, after three decades of hundreds of public and private programs and many billions of dollars spent, does poverty persist and increase?

It is becoming increasingly clear that we do not all mean the same thing when we say the P word, but we use the same words, the key phrases, whether we are expressing concern for, or exasperation with, the people at the bottom. Trying to understand, in a deeper and broader sense, this language/meaning confusion has prompted the question of the title. Since we are trying to be philosophers of education we do not ask the question for interesting speculation; it is asked in hopes that it may prompt some guidance for the educational task we have undertaken. I seek the contribution of your ideas about how philosophical reflection can assist in educating the public on this matter.

Three easy answers to the title question come to mind at once. The first is "yes," when as in popular usage being philosophical means rationalization. It is not that being rational has great public appeal, but the term has come to connote relaxed inattention and uncaring. It implies a way of moving away from what may be of interest or responsibility. Undoubtedly a large portion of the populace is aware of poverty yet succeeds in pushing it onto the back burner. Most of the public is untroubled by problems of the poor and is glad to leave them for others to deal with. "Yes" is too easy an answer.

A second answer could be that the key word, "poor," is so subjectively relative a term that trying to appraise its meaning in any systematic or serious way is a waste of energy; it is simply a linguistic sand trap. But the vast army of people who spend those billions of dollars on thousands of programs serving the poor -- and the battalions of legislators and bureaucrats who devise policies and plans for those programs -- occupy a rhetorical sub-continent around the word. They have formulated special texts that have become the canon by which they appear to communicate in carrying on their work. It is a canon of vagueness difficult to penetrate.

Because of the need for some clarity, a third answer must be given:

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philosophical attention is needed for dealing with any matter, including poverty. The way Derrida puts it, "philosophy has always intended, from its point of view, to maintain its relation with the non-philosophical . . with the practices and knowledge, empirical or not, that constitute its other."[1] With that assurance we may employ a bit of deconstruction along the way as we carry on this examination.

II

What impresses me is the limited lexicon used in conversation, political statements, news releases, research reports, and policy documents dealing with this cruel social condition when the reasons people are in poverty are so numerous. Five or six terms are the pegs on which most issues hang: welfare, means-tests, entitlements, cycle of poverty, and a few others. Examining these words in a careful, critical, reflective way soon suggests that the wall which encircles the poor in this country is a wall of attitudes and convictions (or shall we say, of interpretations and assumptions) embedded in a few brief statements. We shall examine only four of them.

An old, old one: "The poor you will have with you always."
A Reagan-minted phrase: "There is a safety net for the truly needy."
A conservative claim: "The private sector can handle this better
    than the government."
What nearly everyone says: "Education is the way out of poverty."

Each of these asserts something about the poor, but is also an affirmation about the state of human affairs, the nature of social existence. They reflect general assumptions about a portion of humankind rather than attempts at precise definitions of a social condition. Each implies an economic situation in which the group being referred to has relatively less in the way of material things than others, but none notes other things which distinguish the poor from the rest of society. Let us look at each one.

III

Our concern here is not the exegesis of that ancient passage of Scripture, "The poor you will have with you always." It is, however, that such an ascription can be, and is, used in many settings as a kind of resignation before the inevitable; or as a simple statement of social realism; or as "being philosophical" about poverty. It can express disdain by the super wealthy in Grosse Point, Michigan, toward families below their class; or by lower middle class people toward those on welfare. Among many interviews of a wide variety of people in a very poor county in North Carolina, it was the poorest person I interviewed who was most hostile toward men on welfare who, she said, sat around in the local park and would not work for a few hours to mow her lawn. For her, poverty was self-inflicted, a very personal judgment of condemnation for sin. The text usually carries a religious tone, as it did for her, and its veracity is assured by its source in the sacred canon.

One difficulty here is the double relativity of "poor." On the one hand we do not know who you mean when you say, "the poor you will have with you always." On the other hand, and quite independently, to be poor means that I have less than others of something. Poor is an adjective that can go to bed with many mates besides money, such as skill, character, spirit or looks.

The other difficulty is that the text has no social usefulness. It cannot provide a base or guide for policy or action. (That is one reason why the "war on poverty" finally had to designate the "enemy" by drawing a "poverty line.") It may indicate for those who use it a portion of the human family. Seldom, however, is it taken as a call to action, appeal for compassion, or the ground for the claims of justice. It can be taken simply as a common sense observation about some people in every society, poor examples of humanity.

This text depicts a movable wall, but whom it separates depends upon the situation or status of the user. It becomes a kind of caste system in which there are but two castes, without any attempt to delineate differences among the poor, or why they belong beyond the wall. And it is a handy excuse for doing nothing.

IV

The most recent text added to the poverty canon does incorporate discrimination of a kind, when Mr. Reagan asserted, "There is a safety net for the truly needy." For him and others who have been using those two terms there are two kinds of poor. It is not clear what distinguishes one group from the other. Are the truly needy better people than others who need, or is it that the needy caused their own condition while the truly needy are innocent of such responsibility? In either case both groups seem to remain on the other side of the wall.

How safety becomes involved is also not clear. Does the phrase imply that some are to be "safe" from poverty by accepting government help, or is the imagery of the net replacing the wall, a net through which the needy (poor fish) will fall but the truly needy will not? The imagery introduces a strange reversal; a fishing net provides no safety; being saved from getting out through a hole is the first step toward the cannery. Safety is being able to fall through the net and swim away. Of course the imagery may come from the circus. If so, would that mean that the truly needy are acrobats, entertainers, actors? This would seem to imply that the net is assistance for those who were affluent but had fallen into poorness, rather than help for those who live in concentrations of the poor.

Whatever the imagery the phrase reveals the reality that those who do qualify for help from federal agencies can become caught in a net of bureaucratic entitlement red-tape of cruel dimensions. The poorer you are, the more your life is controlled by others, which can hardly mean safety except perhaps from starving. As with the prior text this one provides no indication of the character, ability, morals or responsibility of those designated as the poor. Nor does it give a base for dealing with poverty problems. It only implies a three caste system: the non-poor, the truly needy, and the needy.

V

Those holding social views which produced this second text are likely, also, to employ the affirmation that "The private sector can handle it better than the government." For most conservatives, and some liberals, this has not only become a sacred text; it is an article of faith. Although it appears to be a claim for general validity, it is usually employed only in relation to social services. They do not say that other functions, such as the military and diplomacy, can be better done by the private sector. In the domain where it is employed it appears to make a claim of private virtue expressed in creativity, willingness to volunteer, accountability, and cost effectiveness. But beneath these seemingly beneficent attributes of the private sector is a less wholesome reality; the shift of responsibility from the whole citizenry to the generous. As government support of social services is cut back the generosity of the private sector is increasingly strained forcing charitable agencies, more and more, to charge for services. Thus the transfer from government to private becomes a transfer which eliminates entitlement.

Praise of charity, however many points of light it reflects, is asking the generous to take the burden of civic responsibility off of the rest of the population. Furthermore, the text implies that both public and private programs are thought of as charity. Hearing in the check-out line at a super market, "she is buying steaks with my tax money," underlines the assumption on the part of many people that government programs for the poor constitute charity, and that the funds for them are unwillingly extracted from the general tax-paying public.

We should note also that it is not only the poor who receive services from the charitable. In fact far more charitable giving underwrites services to the affluent than to those living below the poverty line. What private charities do is relieve the affluent of responsibility for the poor. What the government does is to be charitable to the powerful. For many kinds of charitable organizations, foundations particularly, the affluent are the truly needy.

VI

The fourth text also offers multiple meanings. It specifies neither what is meant by education nor by poverty. Thus the claim (again implying a general, universal truth) that "education is the way out of poverty" is typically used within the community of those concerned about poverty (interestingly, as much by the poor as by the non-poor) to suggest that going to school or staying in school to develop one's intellectual capacities and employable skills is the way to get a good job and escape one's prior economic status. It implies that the condition of poverty is the result of the inadequacies of poor people.

There is ample evidence, of course, that the most able high school and college students usually get better jobs and earn more than others, but there is very little hard evidence that such personal advance is assured by staying in school and developing the intellect. Good contacts may be more important. Therefore the validity of the claim depends on what is meant by education as well as what is meant by poverty.

Whether referring to education as schooling or as a more inclusive general human process, the kind of education available or introduced has a great deal to do with the outcome for an individual, just as do other personal factors beside intellect.

Similarly, to get "out of poverty" means different things. If economics is the only consideration then a family with an income $20 a year over the poverty line is considered to be out of poverty. That has little to do with schooling.

Christopher Jencks, in a recent paper analysing the vagueness of "underclass," noted that the term is being used for an economic underclass, a moral underclass (with two aspects, criminal and reproductive) and an educational underclass. Explaining the third he writes,

> "If you talk like someone who has been to college and know a lot of things college graduates typically know, others will usually call you middle class no matter what you do for a living. If you do not talk as if you were well educated but you are white, the white middle class will usually think of you as 'working class.' If you are black, the white middle class may see you as part of the underclass.
>
> "While I have labeled this group the 'educational underclass,' few people identify its members on the basis of educational credentials alone. Members of the underclass lack the social and cultural skills that middle class employers take for granted in designing most blue-collar jobs, that middle class civil servants take for granted in dealing with citizens, and that most firms take for granted in dealing with customers.
>
> " . . . we need to bear in mind that there is no absolute standard dictating what people need to know in order to get along in society. There is, however, an absolute rule that you get along better if you know what the elite knows than if you do not. The magnitude of the cultural gap between the top and the bottom of a society determines whether that society has something that can plausibly be labeled an educational underclass."[2]

Thus the relation of education to an individual's getting out of poverty is more complicated than the text implies. Actually the text has two significant implications. One refers to individual accomplishments; the other is that "poverty" usually refers only to economic poorness. But poorness and poverty mean different things. To complete our analysis of getting out of poverty we need to take a brief historical detour.

VII

Within the Judeo-Christian tradition the way society deals with the poor has always involved an ethical concern, a dimension which is often peripheral for religious communities. From the first century a particular moral task was taking care of the poor, implemented not only by prayer but also by practical charity.

For the first ten or so centuries, the need for charity functioned within a system with two distinctive elements. One was that all workers could see a direct relation between their effort and the uses of their products. The other was that under feudalism, in principle the lord of the manor was responsible for all aspects of the welfare of his serfs. This was a long period of Catholic hegemony in Europe, so it could be called Catholic feudalism. (Later, when a parallel system was established with slavery in this country, we could call it Protestant feudalism.) That system was broken in the great upheavals in Europe with the Renaissance, mercantilism, nationalism and industrialism, all fragmenting the hegemony of the continent.

The mercantile and industrial revolutions changed both elements. Now people worked in production lines where it was very difficult to relate effort to uses of products. And in the new system employers did not have other responsibilities for the welfare of their employees beyond paying them wages, which may or may not be sufficient to live on.

The interpretation of the relation between employer and worker, however, often paralleled the religious relationship. Owners and managers under the new system assiduously interpreted a job as charity: "I am giving you a job." Seldom was, or is, the reverse relationship seen in terms of charity, the efforts of the employee as a gift to the employer only partially reimbursed relative to its value. When that interpretation was provided to workers they have revolted, but never very successfully, because the Protestant ethic came along with a new moral imperative, "work as a religious duty" whether one makes a living or not. In the business world, as in the religious domain, the poor and this moral claim upon them, were needed to make possible both economic success and personal virtue. Thus poverty became a system within larger social structures.

It is thus that the term "poverty" refers both to a condition and to a system. Poverty problems are systemic problems; we might also call them basically religious problems. An individual may raise the level of his/her income above the poverty line but that does not change the system which pays low wages in department stores, fast food outlets, social agencies, schools and many other organizations. Nor does it alter the system which forces the poor to live in poor housing and concentrates poor housing in one part of a community.

When one realizes that the poverty system is maintained by the non-poor rather than by the poor; that it is a system which benefits the non-poor by subsidizing costs and profits; then it may be true that "education (of the non-poor) is the way out of poverty (system)."

VIII

We have considered four texts; of course there are many others. One set which deserves philosophical analysis, though we do not have time or capacity to deal with it here, is the mountain of legislation and regulations adopted by government bodies to guide and control the welfare system.

In an recent article in the New England Journal of Human Services, William C. Crawford analysed some particular welfare regulations and made these observations:

> "Public assistance practice is always more restrictive than its underlying regulations and laws. If many poor people are disqualified from assistance by statute, still more needy persons are shut out as the result of federal and state administrative procedures which constitute a melange of secondary barriers. Or to take a different perspective, these barriers form another perverse 'safety net' which functions to block rather than facilitate the participation of the truly needy. . . .
>
> "There is increasing evidence that a general antipathy toward the poor underlies many of our present welfare policies . . . Many of our current administrative policies which are justified

> by technocratic jargon such as 'cost-containment,' 'error tolerance,' and 'error reduction' are primarily policies of discrimination and punishment directed toward the growing underclass of Americans who are living out their lives in poverty amid a nation of plenty . . . The policies and procedures of the 'other safety net' in the 1980's provide sordid testimony to the fact that harsh attitudes about the poor persist in America. Indeed, such punitive notions appear to form the bulwark of our public welfare policy today. The primary objective continues to be the invidious exclusion of the needy."[3]

IX

This attempt at textual examination has revealed several things to me. First is their interesting relationship. It is as though, in sequence, the many people who use them are saying, "The poor are all around us and always have been. Probably something ought to be done for the truly needy. If so, the private sector can do it better than the government. In the end, however, the poor have to do it for themselves, and the way is for them to knuckle down and take advantage of the schooling we provide."

Second, such language performs an important social function, escape from responsibility. It does not imply that the non-poor need education to understand the rest of the world around them, nor does it suggest any explanation of either why individuals are poor nor how the poverty system works. Those matters have been relegated to charity and schooling (another charity).

Third, looking back on these four texts we discover that they are rooted in the perspectives of four basic human processes: religion, politics, business and education. As we have seen, each text is ambiguous about who is over there in that group beyond the wall, but for each "poor" is a pejorative term, there is something wrong with them. Yet each text is also making an affirmation about human nature and the human condition, although we can hardly say these are necessary, universal or immutable truths. They reflect common sense views that are the product of particular historical developments of Western culture but with powerful inertia.

Fourth, for those of us in education, of course, this is not the end. We are activists; we feel the drive to do something about the human situation. Yet we realize that only in trying to understand what we are up against do we have a chance to be educationally effective. So this paper is part of an attempt to understand why poverty persists, by looking under the surface of our use of language.

For educators, philosophical reflections about poverty, rather than signalling escape, is a requirement if we are to have the patience necessary to develop appropriate educational approaches. We have to be philosophical to survive.

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1. Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982) xii

2. Christopher Jencks, "What is the Underclass - and is it growing?" Focus (Madison, University of Wisconsin, Institute for Research on Poverty, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring and Summer, 1989) 23f.
3. William C. Crawford, "Entangled in the Other Safety Net," New England Journal of Human Services (Boston, Osiris Press, Vol. IX, Issue 2, 1989) 20, 25

BEING PHILOSOPHICAL ABOUT POVERTY:

A RESPONSE

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Gordon Chamberlin has requested our ideas about how philosophical reflection can help in educating the public about the poverty problem. Rather than responding directly to his conclusions, I intend to treat philosophically the four assertions he selected which typify statements about poverty. In doing so, I hope to illustrate the contribution philosophical thinking can make to this problem. As I attempt to analyze these statements, I'll point out agreements and disagreements with Mr. Chamberlin's analysis. Since my remarks are in the form of a response to a program paper, I will keep my analysis brief.

"The poor you will have with you always."

This saying is in the form of a claim that there are those persons who fit the conditions which define being "the poor" and that there will always be such persons. The claim cannot be true unless there are those who fit the defining conditions and unless there is some reason to believe there will always be those who fit the conditions.

The saying assumes a stipulation of what to be "the poor" means, i.e., what the defining conditions are. In the context of a discussion on poverty, what "the poor" means is usually not in question. The condition refers to a lack of material goods. No one thinks, for example, that it refers to those deficient in character else the saying would refer to "the wicked" not to "the poor." Although possession of goods is a relative matter, the upper classes do not think of the middle classes as "the poor." The term is limited to those with less than adequate goods particularly in reference to food, clothing, and shelter. Philosophical reflection about the good life in a democratic society, however, can lead to the addition of lack of dignity and self-respect and other negative attributes as these relate to limited possession of material goods. Philosophical discourse can illuminate what possession of adequate goods should mean in our society. To quote a saying from the same source as the one under consideration, "man does not live by bread alone." Philosophy can help to determine the defining conditions of "the poor."

Once the defining conditions are clarified, then we can ascertain whether or not there are those who are "the poor." But what about the claim that there will always be those who fit the defining conditions? The saying cannot be true unless there is some reason to believe that there will always be those who fit the conditions. One approach to challenging this claim is to see if we can imagine a social situation where no one would fit the defining conditions. If such a situation can be imagined, then arguments can be advanced which criticize the present order and advance the new. The move here is from philosophical reflection to political action.

This saying is a claim that a certain state of affairs is universal. Philosophical reflection can contribute to analysis of this saying through insisting that the meaning of "the poor" be clarified and that such criteria as emerge to define "the poor" include deprivation in human dignity as well as in material possessions. More importantly, reflection can question the universality of the claim and move the argument from an attempt to justify the existence of persons who are poor to a consideration of those conditions which create poorness and to the means whereby those conditions may be removed for all persons.

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"There is a safety net for the truly needy."

Understanding metaphors is important if we are to analyze language. The metaphor must, however, speak for itself. A safety net is not a fishing net. The two have different functions and to introduce the function of the latter to explicate the meaning of the former is a mistake. This saying suggests there are provisions to assist those who by definition are poor but cannot for some reason remove themselves from that condition. The "truly needy" must have help. To speak of the "truly needy" is to suggest there are those who by definition are poor but are not truly needy. The not truly needy may be allowed to fall without the protection of a safety net. The saying suggests there are those who are poor but should be able to escape the conditions which define poverty without alterations in our present social arrangement. While the statement seems to resolve the poverty problem through provision of a safety net, the use of "truly needy" to designate those for whom the net is intended raises the question as to whether the not truly needy, who are in fact also needy, i.e. , poor, have the possibility of escaping that condition. The argument is now moved from a defense of a system which allows a portion of the population to be "the poor", and justifies its position by providing protection for those who cannot help themselves, to a consideration of a system which creates a condition where anyone, truly needy or not truly needy, meets the defining conditions of being the poor. Thus the poverty problem is not resolved by provision of a safety net. Rather, this statement is an admission the problem exists. As pointed out under the first saying, philosophical reflection can lead to a consideration of what must be done to remove those conditions which can define a portion of the population as the poor or, in this case, the needy.

"The private sector can handle this better then the government."

The text implies that the conditions which create the poor do not have any necessary relationship to what constitutes the proper concern of government. Government in any form implies administration of the affairs of a nation, state, city, etc. To remove the plight of the poor from the concern of the government is to suggest that the government has no responsibility for the poor or for those conditions which allow the poor to exist. In a government of, by, and for the people, this suggests the poor are non-people. As non-people, the poor have no entitlement. Therefore, their plight can be left to the care of the benevolent. This analysis supports Mr. Chamberlin's point that the text implies that both public and private programs are thought of as charity.

On the other hand, "the private sector" does not necessarily refer to non-profit efforts. For example, a job training program aimed at enabling the poor to secure jobs could be operating on a for-profit basis. This raises the question of the morality involved in a government allowing conditions to exist which permits some to profit at the expense of both the poor who need the services provided and the tax payers whose money funds such services.

Neither charity nor for-profit service agencies are adequate substitutes for civic responsibility in a democracy.

"Education is the way out of poverty."

This claim can be substantiated only if poverty can by analyzed to mean a state of affairs which can be changed by means of actions denoted as education. The text defines neither poverty nor education. A common sense reading suggests education, in the form of schooling, provides the means to change one's economic status. An analysis of poverty might reveal that the non-poor are responsible for a system that keeps a segment of the population poor. Mr. Chamberlin makes this point in his brief historical detour. In that case, education as the way out of poverty might mean raising the consciousness of both the poor and the non-poor about the real causes of poverty. Consciousness raising does not ensure social change, but it can provide the foundation for political action to change the conditions which create poverty.

Conclusion

I have responded to Mr. Chamberlin's paper by suggesting additional moves which might be made in a philosophical enquiry into poverty and the means for a resolution of this problem. I hope the two papers have illustrated how philosophical reflection may be utilized in addressing such problems. What have I learned from my own reflection in writing this response? There are two implications for education in a democratic society.

First, we need a national curriculum, a "canon" of what all human beings need to know and to be able to do. Such an education would equip all citizens to live the good life in a good society and would create a tradition which is the necessary foundation for community.

Second, we need a revitalized civic education which, building upon the canon above, would emphasize the social obligations we all share in community living.

These may appear to be rather tame proposals to meet the harsh realities of the poor. However, to change those conditions which create "the poor" by means of radical political action, even revolution, lies outside the purview of schooling in America.

MORAL IMAGES, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, AND THE PRE-SERVICE PROFESSIONAL CORE CURRICULUM IN TEACHER EDUCATION

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Recall how Plato's character Socrates asks Adeimantus and Glaucon in Books II & III of The Republic if the guardians of the city they are designing need special kinds of instruction in order for the city to be well defended.[1] What they agree to in that discussion is a strange moment in Socrates' attempt to praise justice for it's own sake.

I say strange moment because what follows in the dialogue is the assertion of several guidelines to which the poets must submit if their writings are to be admissible into the city's curriculum. We understand that the poets are the writers of the materials that will be foremostly influential on the guardians; that is, they are the apparent designers of the practical curriculum for the city's leaders.

Notice the nature of those guidelines:

-refer to the God as he is;
-do not refer to the gods as changing or lying;
-do not emphasize the fear of death;
-there must be no reference to gods or heroes as being lovers of laughter;
-do not refer to heroes as benefiting from lying;
-do not emphasize immoderation; and,
-do not emphasize bad human beings.[2]

It is a complicated question as to what eventually transpires regarding justice in Plato's dialogue. It is also a complicated question as to whether we curriculum designers today are doing any of the things that these guidelines were intended to curb.

But surely we must agree that, although the motive of engendering an educational scheme which will produce loyal and courageous soldiers is very important, surely a curriculum design which takes censorship as its primary operational standard is not acceptable. As you know, there were no First Amendment guarantees in the city they go on to develop. While some claim that the work (ergon) of Plato's dialogue may be democratic, surely the theoretic city they develop is not.[3]

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We are suddenly thrust against the most important, many-faceted, and longstanding quandary in the history of social thought: how do we insure that the best city comes into being and sustains itself?

Plato had his worries about democratic institutions, as his 7th Letter attests and given what democratic institutions did to the mentor he loved. Indeed, Allan Bloom, who writes an extremely provocative interpretive essay on The Republic,[4] suggests that the whole dialogue presents us with a moral image of what would be required if democracy is to succeed: a wise elder discussing crucial questions with the most promising youth to the end of moderating their uncivic desires, fostering their philosophic potential, and instilling in them a respectable degree of allegiance to the city --to whatever degree those goals could be achieved.[5] That is, Bloom claims that Plato was not wholly anti-democratic. It seems that Bloom's Plato might well have agreed with Churchill's famous remark that democracy is the worst form of government, except all of the others that have been tried.

Have we accepted or have we rejected the moral image of an elder leading the young in the Socratic manner described above as the proper one to be associated with democratic institutions? That image is a moral image because it gives us fundamental guidance for pedagogy and curricula, is our most important "ought," and illustrates our highest educational aims.

It appears that we cannot avoid asking about the moral image we think is best, in front of which we would move today to set our curriculum. What image would we articulate as best befitting our commitment to democratic institutions? That is the major question of my present inquiry.

As we know, Professor Bloom laments the manner in which the university has strayed from its historically primary essence, that of Socratic inquiry. In 388 B.C., twelve years after the execution of Socrates for worshiping false gods, corrupting the young, and making good arguments look bad and vice versa, Plato purchased the Grove of Academus in Athens and opened the first university in the Western world for just such a purpose, the pursuit and enhancement of Socratic inquiry.

But on the other hand, we have the sequences from The Republic referred to above where Socrates appears to be trying to convince Adeimantus and Glaucon that we must censor the education of the guardians: dangerous things written by the poets should not get into the curriculum to end up guiding and influencing our leaders.

Should we reject this model, this "moral image" that Plato gives us, and, if so, what is its proper substitute? In this paper, I want to reflect on such moral images, suggest one fitting for our democratic institutions, and try to fuse that proper image to the practical concerns we have concerning the pre-service professional core curriculum for all education students in our undergraduate teacher education programs. If Allan Bloom, the

British-American philosophers of this century, or any philosopher for that matter, are to have impact on public school education in our or any time, I believe that their thinking has to come to a pedagogically specific, course proposal bottom line.

To this latter end, I present as an addendum to my remarks an actual course proposal which I think is a viable candidate for the professional core, a viable candidate which I derive from the conclusions of this present analysis. But first we must inquire further about the moral image which should guide us.

I

Hilary Putnum on Moral Images and Democracy: In his 1985 Carus Lectures given in Washington, D.C. in December of 1985 and published in 1987 by Open Court, Putnam provides direction and reason for inspiration about our place and time in social history. Unlike many contemporary philosophers who are focussed on the tentative successes of the empirical sciences and who travel in the intellectual ambience of a post-Kantian, post-Wittgensteinian lebenswelt where the "linguistic turn" is dictatorial, Putnam uses his thoughtful reflections about what is real and about the limits of analysis as a basis for important statements about the nature of ethics and the value of social discourse.

Moreover, Immanuel Kant's work always repays consideration and this is true in Putnam's use of it in his lecture entitled "Equality and our Moral Image of the World."[6]

In that lecture, Professor Putnam states that Kant was mistaken in thinking that moral philosophy is impossible without transcendental guarantees that can be given only if we posit a noumenal realm.[7] Putnam recalls for us that in his own Reason, Truth and History, he presented Kant as the first philosopher to reject the idea of truth as correspondence to a pre-structured reality. Indeed, this would distinguish Kant, as well as Putnam, from Plato. The importance of such a characterization of Kant for Putnam's own philosophical advances he summarizes in the following manner:

> If Kant was saying that truth must not be thought of as correspondence to a pre-structured or self-structured reality; if he was saying that our conceptual contribution cannot be factored out and the "makers-true" and the "makers-verified" of our beliefs lie within and not outside our conceptual scheme; then Kant may be called the first "internal realist." I have just criticized Kant's moral philosophy, for it is there if anywhere that we find the double set of books, the idea of a world behind a veil and a world for us, as in the stock image of "Kantianism." Yet I want to say that even in the second Critique there is a deep tension... it presents

> ideas.. that may be the beginning of a kind of "internal realism" in moral philosophy. It is those ideas, and, more broadly, the idea of "internal realism" in moral philosophy, that I want to sketch in the remaining lectures of the series."

In working toward a moral image suited to our condition, Putnam then formulates two principles which capture the minimal content of the idea of equality, as influenced by the Bible:[9]

> (I) There is something about human beings, some aspect of which is of incomparable moral significance, with respect to which all human beings are equal, no matter how unequal they may be in talents, achievements, social contribution, etc.
>
> (II) Even those who are least talented, or whose achievements are the least, or whose contribution to society is the least, are deserving of respect.

He then adds a third principle which he sees as having been rightly added in subsequent centuries:

> (III) Everyone's happiness or suffering is of equal prima facie moral importance.

Putnam's creative move comes next:

> One thing, however, is clear: in the traditional formulations, theistic and secular alike, the value of equality does not have much to do with individual freedom. What I am going to suggest is that Kant offered a radically new way of giving content to the notion of equality, a way that builds liberty into equality.[10]

If we add the insistence on establishing liberty to the aforementioned three principles of equality, we do get a thicker concept, to be sure. Putnam pursues this project as one quite consistent with his "internal realism," that is, with his view of reality that we contribute something to it in our actions and, I think he would have to say, in our failures to act.

Putnam reminds us that Kant did not see the uses of liberty as properly leading to an "objective" assertion of a list of values that others should automatically follow. What we add or fail to add to our social world does make a difference, for Kant and for Putnam. In his lecture, Putnam summarizes this point as follows:

> To me the most revealing passage in perhaps all of Kant's moral writing, the passage in which he most reveals how the idea of this kind of objective inclusive human end repulses him, is in the post-critical essay entitled "Religion within

> the Bounds of Reason alone". In this essay Kant makes the remarkable statement (many would say it is an absurd statement) that it would be a bad thing if the truths of religion could be deduced by reason, because that would produce fanaticism. Notice how Kant is using the term "fanaticism". He is saying --and with deep psychological insight-- that what makes the fanatic a fanatic isn't that his beliefs are necessarily wrong or his arguments incorrect. It is possible to have true beliefs supported by correct arguments, and still to be what Kant calls a "fanatic"; it is possible to have the kind of undesirable intolerance, intensity, in short, hostility to others thinking for themselves, that represented "fanaticism" to the Enlightenment, and still be perfectly logical. In fact the perfectly logical fanatic, Kant is saying, is the most dangerous kind of fanatic.[11]

Thus, a goal for our "moral image": we must add liberty, and its conditions, to equality, and yet forestall and prevent fanaticism, where the latter is most succinctly seen as a "hostility to others thinking for themselves." To be sure, then, there is a fourth principle that we should add as constitutive of our developing moral image:

> (IV) Equality is genuine only when freedom and self-determination, with all of the latter's requisite and constitutive tools, become explicit and consistent social consequences for all persons.

Thus, the proper moral image is summed by way of these four stated principles:

> (I) There is something about human beings, some aspect of which is of incomparable moral significance, with respect to which all human beings are equal, no matter how unequal they may be in talents, achievements, social contribution, etc.
>
> (II) Even those who are least talented, or whose achievements are the least, or whose contribution to society is the least, are deserving of respect.
>
> (III) Everyone's happiness or suffering is of equal prima facie moral importance.
>
> (IV) Equality is effective only when freedom and self-determination, with all of the latter's requisite and constitutive tools, become explicit and consistent social consequences for all persons, for which we should strive.

In listing the fourth assertion, I have followed Putnam's manner of locution. For clarity's sake, I emphasize that these are all prescriptive claims. Moroever, to do less than strive for the concommitant implementation of these four principles is to act on the basis of inadequate moral image. On the other hand, to accomplish such implementation would seem to be our best guarantee for the bringing into being of and for the sustaining of the best city.

To do less, Hilary Putnam insists, is to risk failure in ethics and social thought as well as to be untrue to our epistemological and metaphysical underpinnings.

While this paper is not the place to track and evaluate Putnam's "internal realism" and its implications in metaphysics and epistemology, it is encouraging to see a philosopher of his reputation engaging in reflections that encourage us to formulate approaches in ethics and social thought which would be consistent with his views of the limits of analysis on the one hand, and yet on the other not reach to the depths of intellectual anarchism that we often find in much of the post-modern thought of our century.

Putnam continues as follows, rendering further this moral image where upon we attempt to add liberty to equality while avoiding fanaticism, that is, while avoiding hostility toward others thinking for themselves; he is explicitly discussing the virtue of reflective self-determination:

> (This image)...contains the idea that this virtue is not just a virtue, but that our capacity for exercising this virtue is the most significant moral capacity we have; it includes the claim that a human being who has chosen not to think for himself about how to live, or has been coerced or "conditioned" into being unable to think for himself about how to live, has failed to live a fully human life.[12]

Surely this virtue must be the primary goal in curriculum development in the pre-service professional core. I will conclude reference to Putnam's thoughts here with a final quote, following directly as it does on the above quote:

> (This image)..contains also the vision of a community of individuals who respect one another for that capacity, and ideas about how such a community should be organized and about the moral position that the members of such a community are in, about what they can and cannot know.[13]

This is a lovely image and a necessary one, if we are genuinely interested in causing and sustaining democratic institutions and the communities they can best create.

II

A Brief Return to The Republic: Of course the problem with what Socrates is saying to Adeimantus and Glaucon in Books II and III of *The Republic* is that it is unchallenged censorship. Yet, in *showing* us this discussion, Plato does not censor.

Such censorship does not bode well for liberty, not to mention the forestalling of and prevention of fanaticism. Yet, it can be claimed, the very work of the dialogue is to show us the consequences of fanaticism. Plato is showing us the consequences of unchallenged censorship: the double foul of infringing liberty and fueling fanaticism. Notice how quickly Adeimantus and Glaucon take up the staff, the consequences of which would be just that double foul. Plato warns us of just that possibility.

From Plato, too, then, comes this formulation of the primary question in social thought: how do we cause and sustain liberty without succumbing to fanaticism on the one hand or nihilism on the other? Our intellectual heritage from De Toqueville and Dewey is dedicated to the same insight. That we find Putnam enlisting Kant in the same project gives us a majority vote.

Incidently, the canon bashers among us ought to be saying "you have to read Hesiod to know that Homer is best," which would preserve their point as well as retain respect for the western heritage. It is not in the actions of all of those who have to some extent encountered that heritage that we should find direction, but in the thoughtful pages of that heritage and any which challenge it. Those who would speak highly of every potential text risk the double foul of infringing liberty and encouraging fanaticism. We must look before we leap as we make comparative judgements about any text, whether in or out of some prescribed canon. Looking before leaping means undertaking close, comparative study. Bashing canons is not comparative study.

III

A Pedagogical Turn: Our practical question, then, is how do we act to foster and sustain this anti-fanatical moral image which shines so brightly regarding liberty, while at the same time render for our guardians a sense of proportion, a sense of standard, a sense of what is due? How, in a phrase, do we foster and sustain desire for the genuine fruits of human freedom while avoiding the double edges of fanaticism and nihilism?

I believe that The Council for Learned Socities in Education (CLSE) and NCATE Compliance Criteria #17-23 give guidance consistent with the image developed above. The CLSE "perspectives", along with the NCATE Criteria, refer to competencies both requisite and sufficient for the kind of community fostered by our developed moral image. With the conference presentation of this paper, I attach a professional core course proposal based on these guidelines. In the published version of this paper, due to space limitations, I attach the course objectives and course competencies.

It is a proposal which, I believe, is guided by the most proper moral image conducive to the causing of and the sustaining of democratic institutions, just the sort of thing our understanding and vision of education ought to do. Additionally, the proposal meets the methodological requirement that our own method is consistent with what we think should best be taught.[14] I hope you will give it comparative study.

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ENDNOTES

1. Cf. Socrates' discussion in Books II and III.
2. Republic, 375-424.
3. Cf. Allan Bloom's essay in his translation of the dialogue published by Basic Books.
4. Cf. Bloom's discussion of Book VIII.
5. It is an open question as to whether Socrates would have ever succeeded with Adeimantus and Glaucon. Surely Plato must have hoped that he would succeed with us.
6. Cf. Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism, Open Court, 1987, Lecture III.
7. Cf. Lecture III, cited above, p. 42.
8. Cf. Lecture III, cited above, pp.43-44.
9. Cf. Lecture III, cited above, p. 43.
10. Cf. Lecture III, cited above, p. 46.
11. Cf. Lecture III, cited above, pp.49-50.
12. Cf. Lecture III, cited above, pp.61-62.
13. Cf. Lecture III, cited above, p. 62.
14. Many thanks and much credit must be given to Joseph Congleton, Helen Harrington, and Roger Eldridge of the School of Education at East Carolina University and to other members of the Professional Core Curriculum Committee and of the EDUC 4200 Writing Team at East Carolina for their thoughtful contributions to the development of this course.

EDUCATION 4200
FIRST SEMESTER, SENIOR YEAR
COURSE OBJECTIVES:

THE DESCRIPTIVE PERSPECTIVE:
Under this perspective, students will increase their facility in the language uses appropriate to empirical research, to moral analysis, and to conceptual evaluation.

Objective #(1):
To clarify in summary fashion the descriptive use of language as used in reporting both historical information and also empirically verified results concerning the contexts of education.

Objective #(2):
To clarify in summary fashion the normative use of language as used in expressions of personal values and worth, of social policy, of professional ethics, and of educational vision.

Objective #(3):
To clarify in summary fashion the conceptual use of language as used in expressions of fundamental concepts and definitions in the schools, in the professions, and in society.

THE INTERPRETIVE PERSPECTIVE:
Under this perspective, the students will enhance their understanding of the nature and actual formal structure of presuppositions and begin applying this understanding in the interpretation of historical resources, empirical studies, and social and educational policies and practices.

Objective #(4):
To develop the students' skills in interpreting the meanings and presuppositions found in historical resources concerning the contexts of education.
(use cases and small group discussions)

Objective #(5)
To develop the students' skills in interpreting the meanings and presuppositions found in the results of empirical research concerning the contexts of education.
(use cases and small group discussion)

Objective #(6)
To develop the students' skills in interpreting the meanings and presuppositions found in social and educational policies and practices.
(use cases and small group discussion)

THE NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE:
Under this perspective, the students will apply their understandings of language use in moral (normative) analysis and the nature of presuppositions to seek out and evaluate the moral (normative) meanings and presuppositions in historical resources, empirical studies, and social and educational policies and practices.

Objective #(7)
To develop the students' skills in discovering and evaluating the normative meanings and presuppositions found in historical resources concerning the contexts of education.
(use cases and small group discussion)

Objective #(8):
To develop the students' skills in discovering and evaluating the normative meanings and presuppositions found in the results of empirical research concerning the contexts of education.
(use cases and small group discussion)

Objective #(9):
To develop the students' skills in discovering and evaluating the normative meanings and presuppositions in social and educational policies and practices.
(use cases and small group discussions)

THE CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE:
Under this perspective, the students will use the course materials introduced in EDUC 4200 as well as materials from other courses in the professional core, the specialty areas, and from arts and sciences to develop their own understanding of and vision of the place of education in a human life.

Objective#(10):
To develop students' skills in determining the use and value of historical resources concerning the contexts of education as compared with their own understanding and vision of education.
(use cases and small group discussion)

Objective #(11):
To develop the students' skills in determining the use and value of empirical research concerning the contexts of education as compared with their own understanding and vision of education.
(use cases and small group discussion)

Objective #(12):
To develop the students' skills in determining the use and value of social and educational policies and practices as compared with their own understanding and vision of education.
(use cases and small group discussion)

THE COURSE OF EDUCATION: TO LEAD OR TO ENABLE

FANATICISM OR LIBERATION?

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In his paper, Moral Images, Democratic Institutions, and the Pre-service Professional Core Curriculum in Teacher Education, Dr. James LeRoy Smith draws our attention to two fundamental questions about education: Should a moral image be our most important "ought" in guiding the development of pedagogy and curricula?; If so, what image would we articulate as best befitting our commitment to democratic institutions? Building on the work of Hilary Putnam he presents a moral image summed by way of four stated principles:

> (I) There is something about human beings, some aspect of which is of incomparable moral significance, with respect to which all human beings are equal, no matter how unequal they may be in talents, achievements, social contribution, etc.
>
> (II) Even those who are least talented, or whose achievements are the least, or whose contribution to society is the least, are deserving of respect.
>
> (III) Everyone's happiness or suffering is of equal prima facie moral importance.
>
> (IV) Equality is effective only when freedom and self-determination, with all of the latter's requisite and constitutive tools, become explicit and consistent social consequences for all persons, for which we should strive.[1]

Adding liberty to this moral image provides us with a vision of a community of individuals with the ability to not just think for themselves but a community of individuals who choose to exercise that virtue as well. How do we achieve this aim? How do we achieve a community composed of individuals thinking for themselves guided by a common moral image? This is certainly not a new question but perhaps never so important a question. Now, when the reform of education is receiving such emphasis from so many quarters, we must not loose sight of this aim.

I

From the perspective of an educator not a philosopher I wish to reflect on two points made by Professor Smith. I do so to clarify the context for the difficult task before us if we hope to develop curricula and pedagogy guided by the moral image addressed in his paper. If we recognize potential constraints we will be more able to deal with them as we attempt to implement the curricula being presented. My remarks speak to the role of formal education, schooling, knowing full well that there are no clear boundaries in the educative process. I use the term schooling to encompass both pre-college (K -12) and college programs. The first point I wish to reflect on deals with a commonly accepted understanding of education, the image of an elder leading the young. The second deals with Putnam's definition of fanaticism referenced by Smith -- "hostility to others thinking for themselves." I address each of these points because I believe factors in education's formal organizations may impede our progress toward the aim of pedagogy and curricula guided by a moral image supportive of democratic institutions.

Education is often perceived as leading the young, but if this perception is accepted as such

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than fanaticism may be unavoidable. For if the elders lead they must know where they are going and the assumption is that, if they are wise elders, they have chosen the right path, and perhaps the only path, to get there. The young must not question the choices. They have been made for them. Elders determine what the young should know and how it should be presented. It is not open to question. It has been pre-determined. The potential for fanaticism, under this perspective, is great.

But we may avoid fanaticism if the role of the teacher, both in the public schools and in teacher education, is perceived as not to lead the young but to prepare them for their own journey, to enable them.[2] Although Dr. Smith mentions both of these perspectives in his paper he does not distinguish the important differences between them. I believe we must directly address these differences, determine which will provide a better opportunity to achieve schools guided by the moral image outlined above, and make a choice. Leading and enabling are two different acts and may lead to two entirely different ends.

Education serves a variety of purposes. Among other things, education socializes the young, enculturates them, allows the development of skills. Education may also develop in students the capability and willingness to become active and effective members of the community. But only if education is guided by a moral image including this aim. Additionally, education from a democratic perspective should also prepare individuals to see possibilities. In doing so they will be able to fully engage in life, to think for themselves, to contribute their part to the betterment of the whole. From this perspective the role of the educator is not to lead but to enable students to become such participants. Education would not simply take them down a set path, lead them, but rather give them the ability to choose the best path and perhaps even a better end. Our aim, to lead or to enable, must direct our method -- our pedagogy.

A democratic perspective on education guided by a moral image places a particularly heavy burden on formal education. Although schooling is only one component of education it may afford the best opportunity to provide a democratic education to the many. It therefore becomes crucial that fanaticism as identified by Putnam, and in turn Smith, be recognized and guarded against particularly in formal education. We must choose enabling over leading. We, the elders, may not have the right answer. Our possibilities may be limited by our experiences. But can we enable students to see possibilities we are unaware of -- better possibilities. Do we have the skill and commitment to do so? Do we have the courage? Will we be willing to listen to them? Strengthening the bond between education and philosophy may provide an affirmative answer to these questions.

II

A common bond between education and philosophy is knowledge. For philosophers it may be the love of knowledge in all its manifestations that is their driving force, whereas the educator's focus may be on the transfer of knowledge to the learner. But what greater knowledge can educators convey to learners than the ability to be critical of knowledge claims. To give them the sense to not simply accept what is but to question what is, to assess its worth, to determine if there is a better way. This allows them to view knowledge not just for its own sake but knowledge as something to build on; knowledge with the potential to make the path chosen a better path, a more enriching path, a more liberating path. Each of those decriptors is an evaluative term. In using them the boundaries between philosophy and education become blurred because philosophy, among all the disciplines, draws our attention to the less tangible aspects of education -- to 'value', 'worth', and 'goodness'.[3] And it is philosophy that models the role of criticism. To assess worth or value, as well as to see possibilities, requires the ability to 'see' critically: to see what is (describe), to understand why (interpret), to determine if it is the best alternative (evaluate), and to see a better alternative (criticize). Philosophy incorporates these four perspectives: the descriptive, the evaluative, the interpretive, and the critical. Educators can find ways to enable students to develop them. By working together, educators and philosophers, we may find the most effective way to accomplish this aim.

But this aim will only be accomplished if we guard against fanaticism at all levels and education, as a field of study, often seems mired in the very fanaticism addressed by Putnam. Educators often see their role as determining what information the learner needs to know, presenting it to them, and allowing no questioning of its worth.[4] Teacher education is paternalistic [5] and father always knows best. Additionally, many of the schools and colleges of education responsible for the education of teachers lack the ethos of inquiry and skepticism which is necessary if critical thinking is to be supported and hostility to others thinking for themselves is to be avoided. It is this ethos "that translates into a critical attitude toward society as well as towards academic materials. This questioning encourages reformist attitudes and values, especially those whose subjects involve culture and society".[6] But this ethos grows from the commitment to questioning what is. Nonresearch sectors within the academy reduce the necessary ethos. The majority of schools of education fall within that sector.[7] But philosophy provides a bridge to an ethos of inquiry.

III

The course outlined by Dr. Smith does this. It is designed to enable students to think for themselves, but to do so critically. It takes as its focus the contexts of education and brings inquiry to that focus. It is designed to begin the development of a critical attitude toward education. Building on what comes before in their course of study it encourages and supports a questioning attitude about schooling and education in its broadest sense. It is designed to enable students to see what is, to understand why, to assess its "truth", to determine its worth, to see better possibilities. If we agree with Scriven [8] that much in education is built on conceptual sand it is crucial that all educators approach their subject matter and teaching responsibilities in this way. To see better possibilities requires a pedagogy and curricula guided by a moral image as well. The moral image outlined by Professor Smith is reflected in the course referenced here. Can education meet this challenge? Or will the reality found in schools of education reflected in an ethos which does not support skepticism and inquiry coupled with the practicality of leading students to "knowledge" as the easiest course of action militate against this aim? The bridge being offered is only effective if we choose to cross it. We must not be held back by our overdependence on reality and practicality. In doing so we, and our students, lose sight of possibilities and "possibilities are more important than what already exists, and knowledge of [reality and practicality] counts only in its bearing upon possibilities".[9]

ENDNOTES

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[1] James LeRoy Smith, "Moral Images, Democratic Institutions, and the Pre-service Professional Core Curriculum in Teacher Education," A paper presented at the South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society, Winston-Salem, NC.

[2] See Gary Fenstermacher, "Philosophy of Research on Teaching: Three Perspectives," in M.C. Wittrock (Ed.), Handbook of Research on Teaching. MacMillan, 1986 for a discussion of teaching as enabling.

[3] Rodman B. Webb and Robert R. Sherman, Qualitative research in education: Focus and methods. (London: Falmer Press, 1989).

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[4] Paulo Friere, The Politics of Education: Culture, Power and Liberation (South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey Publishers, 1985).

[5] Judith Lanier and Judith Little, "Research on Teacher Education." (In M.C. Wittrock (Ed.), Handbook of Research on Teaching, MacMillan, 1986).

[6] Burton R. Clark, The Academic Life: Small Worlds, Different Worlds (Princeton, NJ: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, p. 108).

[7] Ibid.

[8] John Dewey, "Progressive education and the science of education". (In M.S. Dworkin (Ed.). Dewey on Education, New York: Teachers College, 1959, p.119).

[9] Michael Scriven, "Philosophical inquiry methods in education." (In R.M. Jaeger, Complementary Methods for Research in Education, Washington, D.C.: AERA, 1988).

ETHICS AND ARTS EDUCATION:

NOTES ON PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

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> It is here then ... in music, as it seems, that our guardians must build their guardhouse and post of watch.[1]

> It is not easy to determine the nature of music, or why anyone should have a knowledge of it. Shall we say, for the sake of amusement and relaxation, like sleep or drinking, which are not good in themselves, but are pleasant, and at the same time 'make care to cease', as Euripides says? And for this end men also appoint music, and make use of all three alike --- sleep, drinking, music --- to which some add dancing. Or shall we argue that music conduces to virtue, on the ground that it can form our minds and habituate us to true pleasures as our bodies are made by gymnastic to be of a certain character? Or shall we say that it contributes to the enjoyment of leisure and mental cultivation, which is a third alternative?[2]

Our modern tendency to see ethics, politics and aesthetics as disjunct categories without any overlap is an obstacle to understanding classical Greek thought about the arts. For the Greeks, there were no apparent barriers between these areas of inquiry. This makes it less surprising that some of Aristotle's most interesting and moving comments about art appear in the last book of his Politics.

In these remarks, I will comment on some things Plato says in the Republic and explicate some of what Aristotle says in the Politics about arts education. I hope to make clear that according to these Greek philosophers, the arts are an essential part of any educational program. It is in part because "musike" has an ethical power (it both reflects and influences character) that it should be taught to book is often identical to that in Plato's, although the conclusions about these matters are not always the same. Aristotle agrees with Plato in substantial ways; their areas of disagreement may easily loom too large. Where Aristotle disagrees with Plato, he often acknowledges the fact, and presents Plato's reasoning in a every young person. The progression of topics covered in Aristotle's sympathetic way, carefully defending his own position against potential Platonic objections.

"Music" in our narrow modern sense of the word is different from "musike," the term used by Plato and Aristotle in speaking about education. "Musike" includes more than our music. It refers to poetry, dance and drama as well. Greek poetry was commonly presented with musical accompaniment, often along with dance. Greek dramas contained choral episodes which were examples of "musike." Although "musike" refers to a broader range of arts than "music," it does not extend to all the arts. Perhaps Aristotle's arguments, however cogent, cannot properly be extended to the visual arts of painting, drawing and sculpture, to which the word "musike" does not refer. Yet Aristotle frequently hints that the visual arts are analogous to the arts he discusses more directly.

To Plato the ethical and political potency of art seemed so great that he feared its negative influence on the state. Socrates'identification of music as a place

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where we must build a "guardhouse" neatly expresses this Platonic concern. Plato marked out only a severely constrained role for art in his political system: narrative poetry is to be permitted, but not dramatic poetry; imitative art is banned; poetry must be purged of its false stories about the gods; music is not to be performed on many-stringed or "polyharmonic" instruments; triangles, harps and flutes are not to be used. The Lydian mode is prohibited. Yet Plato also speaks eloquently in favor of music education:

> Education in music is most sovereign, because more than anything else rhythm and harmony find their way to the inmost soul and take strongest hold upon it, bringing with them an imparting grace, if one is rightly trained ...[3]

Plato has been tagged as an opponent of the arts but his attitude is more complex than this. He wants to control art because he appreciates (and fears) its power. He is intensely interested in art, and he admires it.

His interest in the arts is manifest in the large amount of attention given to the arts in the Republic; half of Book II, the whole of Book III, and most of Book X. In addition there is a discussion of arts education for women (Plato advocates it) in Book IV. At a safe estimate, one third of the entire work is devoted to "musike." Plato's admiration for the arts is expressed frequently, sometimes in stirring language, as in this other passage from the Republic.

> ... we must look for those craftsmen who by the happy gift of nature are capable of following the trail of true beauty and grace, that our young men, dwelling as it were in a salubrious region, may receive benefit from all things around them, whence the influence that emanates from works of beauty may waft itself to eye or ear like a breeze that brings from wholesome places health, and so from earliest childhood insensibly guide them to likeness, to friendship, to harmony with beautiful reason.[4]

Even then he severely judges art, as in the famous passage from Book X of the Republic where Socrates decrees that imitative poetry will be banished from the State, Plato displays an openness toward it. Socrates pleads for imitative Poetry to provide a defense of herself, "whether in lyric or other measure," and promises to let her return from exile when she can show "that she is not only delightful but beneficial to orderly government and all the life of man."[5]

Both Book VIII of the Politics and all of the Poetics of Aristotle may be read as an extended response to this request by Socrates. In the Poetics, the later of the two works, where Aristotle takes a freer course, he declares that we take a natural and beneficial delight in the illusions created by imitation, and argues for the superior virtues of tragedy. For Plato, illusionist imitation was seen negatively, so in praising imitation and tragedy, Aristotle rejects some of the older philosopher's positions. In doing so, however, he meets Plato on Plato's own ground, acknowledging the seriousness of the Socratic challenge to Poetry

In the Politics Aristotle follows Plato in a number of peculiar, restrictive remarks about art:

> ...experience enabled men to judge what was or was not really conducive to virtue, and they rejected both the flute and several other old-fashioned instruments, such as the Lydian harp, the many-stringed lyre, the 'heptagon', 'triangle', 'sambuca', and the like --

> which are intended only to give pleasure to the hearer, and require extraordinary skill of hand.[6]

And also;

> All men agree that Dorian music is the gravest and manliest. And whereas we say that the extremes should be avoided and the mean followed, and whereas the Dorian is a mean between the other modes, it is evident that our youth should be taught the Dorian music.[7]

Despite his dislike for the Lydian harp and his preference for Dorian music, in which he follows his teacher, in other passages Aristotle demonstrates more liberal, cosmopolitan instincts.

He argues that the music becoming to one's nature may vary with age, and that, for the old, a relaxed mode of music may be more appropriate than for the young:

> ... the musicians ... blame Socrates, and with justice, for rejecting the relaxed modes in education under the idea that they are intoxicating, not in the ordinary sense of intoxication (for wine rather tends to excite men) but because they have no strength in them.[8]

He adds (at this point directly challenging Plato) that:

> ... when men begin to grow old, they ought to practise the gentler modes and melodies as well as the others, and further, any mode, such as the Lydian above all others appears to be, which is suited to children of tender age.[9]

Even here, the differences between Aristotle and Plato may appear greater than they really are. Although the Socrates of the Republic proposes to banish poetry, the Socrates of the Phaedo astounds his followers by writing lyric poems in prison while awaiting death:

> In the course of my life, I have often had the same dream, appearing in different forms at different times but always saying the same thing. 'Socrates, practice and cultivate the arts.' In the post, I used to think that it was impelling and exhorting me to do what I was already doing ... because philosophy is the greatest of the arts, and I was practicing it. But ever since my trial ... I have felt ... that perhaps it might be this popular form of art that the dream intended me to practice... I thought it would be safer not to take my departure before I had cleared my conscience by writing poetry and so obeying the dream.[10]

This story illustrates the complexity of Plato's thinking about the arts, and suggests that the proposals of the Republic are intended to provoke thought and debate as much as they are to formulate rigid doctrine.

Aristotle says repeatedly that music should be studied not for one, but for many reasons;

> ... it makes the hearts of men glad; so that on this ground alone we may assume that the young ought to be trained in it. For innocent pleasures are not only in harmony with the perfect end of life, but they also provide relaxation. An whereas men

> rarely attain the end, but often rest by the way and amuse themselves, not only with a view to a further end, but also for the pleasure's sake, it may be well at times to let them find a refreshment in music.[11]

He is not content that children should be taught to listen to music, he thinks that they should learn how to play it:

> The rattle is a toy suited to the infant mind, and education is a rattle or toy for children of a larger growth. We conclude then that they should be taught music in such a way as to become not only critics but performers.[12]

For Aristotle, "musike" whether through an acceptable use of illusion or by other means) rouses emotion in order to "purge" or purify it. Like Plato, Aristotle is uninhibited from mixing artistic questions with ethical ones. Aristotle argues that music should be studied not just because it "makes the hearts of men glad, but also because of its purgative, healing effects. He thinks that a variety of kinds of music may be justified in terms of these ends. "In education," Aristotle says, "the most ethical modes are to be preferred, but in listening to the performances of others we may admit the modes of action and passion also."[13]

Putting aside the peculiarities and errors in Aristotle's views of music, many shared with Plato, I cheer Aristotle's willingness to disagree at points with the elder philosopher. Aristotle's claims make up collectively a strong argument, based upon ethically sound principles, in favor of art education, one with a vigor often lacking in contemporary arguments for the same position.

In this presentation I can only hope to set the stage for a full consideration of the arguments given by Plato and Aristotle in favor of arts education. Something has been said so far about the pleasure created by music, and about the supposed (or real) influence music has on public ethics and individual character, but what does Aristotle mean when he says that there is a "third alternative"? This third alternative, he says, is one of "leisure and mental cultivation." In Aristotle's eyes this third alternative (another aim which music serves and so another rock upon which to place its justification) is not mere pleasure, not just habitual virtue.

To justify music education on hedonistic grounds is possible: children given the opportunity to perform or listen to music are not only pleased by music but learn to take greater pleasure in it. Music education (as well as education in the other arts) is justified on ethical grounds: children learn a communal discipline through music. If these arguments fail, there is still Aristotle's third alternative: we learn music not just for fun, not just because it helps us to be good, but because it brings about "mental cultivation."

An argumentative structure may survive the failure of some of its premises while continuing to provide support for its conclusion. By openly placing the justification of "musike" on three legs of argument, as he does in the passage from the Politics quoted at the beginning of this presentation, Aristotle creates a framework within which the force of Plato's truest and most positive remarks about music education may be preserved, while the teacher's mistakes are corrected and new lines of argument are opened up.

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1. Plato, Republic, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, in The Collected Dialogues, Bollingen Series LXXI, Princeton University Press, 1961, 424 d.

2. Aristotle, *Politics*, Richard McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, Random House, New York, 1941, 1339 a, 15 - 26.

3. *Republic*, 401 d.

4. *Ibid*., 401 c-d

5. *Ibid*., 607 d.

6. *Politics*, 1341 a 35 - 1341 b 1.

7. *Ibid*., 134 2 b 11-18.

8. *Ibid*., 1342 b 23.

9. *Ibid*., 1342 b 29.

10. Plato, *Phaedo*, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, in *The Collected Dialogues*, 60 3 - 61 b.

11. *Politics*, 1339 b 27.

12. *Ibid*., 1340 b 30.

13. *Ibid*., 1342 a 2.

RESPONSE TO: ETHICS AND ARTS EDUCATION BY FRANS VAN DER BOGERT

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This paper which we have just heard represents an area of concern in educational philosophy much neglected in papers at SAPES and in the texts and, I presume, the courses which we teach. Most of us have probably noticed the absence without ever having repaired the breach. (Perhaps the students of Maxine Green have done better.)

It would be interesting to speculate on the reasons for our neglect of concern for aesthetics in our theories of education. We teach literature, art, and music, but most of our curriculum theory is lacking in a sufficient appreciation of their role in a wholistic view of education.

Van der Bogert's initial comment on the tendency of the Greeks not to view ethics, politics, and aesthetics as distinct categories is important. Dewey's observation of the difficulty of putting things back together which have been defined as separate may apply here. Once we assert that ethics, politics, and aesthetics are separate categories, a wholistic view of social living becomes difficult to achieve. Unless we can achieve such a view of life, our efforts to understand the nature of civilization seems hopeless.

While, in our modern scientific view, many of us find the Socratic concern for the negative influence of certain types of music on the character of the young hard to fathom, we have little difficulty viewing Woodstock as an ethical and political statement. There is still much that needs to be understood about human nature and the role of the arts in its nurture twenty-four hundred years after Socrates.

It is easy to write off the notions of Plato and Aristotle with regard to the arts as interesting commentaries on the nature of life perhaps as mystical nonsense. Certainly the musical instruments they were describing have been superceded by the whole range of a modern orchestra to say nothing of electronic amplifiers. Nevertheless when we observe the many art forms impinging on us and our young in the age of the radio, the Walkman, television, rock and roll, and video music, we may need to consider more carefully the concerns of those giants.

We need to know a great deal more about the relationship of this impact on the ethical and political attitudes of our population. We appreciate Professor van der Bogert calling our attention to this theme in Greek philosophy.

"DEMOCRATIC" CONTROL OF EDUCATION

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Demands for the "professionalization" of teaching[1] raise the question of who ought to control educational policy. How are teachers to be "professionals" and still be accountable to a bureaucracy of school boards, superintendants, and principals? And what will happen to parental control when teachers are given the autonomy approriate for professionals? Who should the teaching "profession" be accountable to, if anyone?[2]

Similar questions arise in a number of other ways: Should individual parents or parent groups have the authority to reject teacher-selected curricular materials, such as textbooks[3] or library books?[4] Should private companies who write and score achievement tests be accountable to parents? or students? or the general public?[5] Should teachers or should parents or school boards decide a student's "track" or grade-level?[6] Calls for tax credits and vouchers to reimburse parents who pay tuition for their children to attend private schools raise the question in a less direct way.

I shall ask what would count as a democratic answer to the problem of educational authority. My title mentions "democratic" rather than democratic control, because one of my underlying theses is that there is a question about what makes something democratic, and that different answers have different implications for how educational authority can be justified, and hence for who ought to have it. I shall describe two types of democratic theory, and discuss their implications for the authority question.

DEMOCRATIC THEORY I

On any plausible democratic theory, a characteristic feature of a democratic society is that as its citizens, we possess the liberty of:

> "framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow;

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> without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them[,] even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong; . . .of pursuing our own good in our own way."[7]

But consider that East Germany calls itself the "Deutsche Demokratische Republik"--German Democratic Republic. It purports to be democratic, yet its citizens certainly do not possess such liberty as Mill describes. The DDR's claim to democracy is implausible if the feature I have picked out is truly characteristic of democracy. But perhaps my characterization is biased or idiosyncratic, and the East Germans are the ones who know what democracy is about? I shall try to explain why we do and should find it implausible that the DDR is a democracy.

I contend that freedom of the individual is more than merely a characteristic of democracy, even more than a pervasive or universal characteristic: rather, it is its justification. The point of democratic government is most plausibly seen as either of two possibilities, each of which presupposes the value of individual liberty. On one hand, democracy is the only form of government potentially compatible with anything worthy of the label "self-government", which is taken to have ultimate and intrinsic value.[8] Only in a democracy do all people have a direct say in how their government acts. (Notice that if this is true, then representative democracy is not true democracy absent an option for public referenda.) As with any system of government, the scope of individual freedom in a democracy may either contract or expand as the sphere of governmental control widens, depending on what is controlled. But if the government does not control X, then each individual can control it; and if the government does control it, then still each individual controls it, through their say in the government.

Many, including myself, will find such claims on behalf of popular suffrage empty, if not simply false. Realistically, my vote gets counted only by being thrown in with the millions of votes of my fellow citizens. The extent to which my self-government is enhanced by this process is virtually nil: e.g., can any of us say that, if she hadn't ever voted, anything would have turned out differently? Accordingly, democrats may value democracy, not for the direct effects of universal suffrage, but for what it *signifies*. And what it is held by many to signify is a public, mutual respect for the individual's right to liberty, to self-government, to control her own destiny (to the extent this is possible in an ordered society.)

This explains why we do not consider the DDR a democracy. It's *not* because there is large-scale state-ownership and control of capital: the same is the case in France and Scandinavia, homes of widely-acknowledged democracies. Whether and to what degree a society has private property is not dispositive of the question whether that society is democratic. Since private property rights secure some freedoms at the expense of others, it is prima facie no less reasonable to pursue freedom through public ownership of capital than to rely on an invisible hand.[9]

Nor is it because the East Germans don't hold elections: clearly they do. But the DDR's elections aren't sufficient to make that country a democracy because regardless of such elections, the East German government is expansive enough to largely prohibit freedom and self-government. Democracy is not simply a matter of voting procedures or property rights. Democracy is a system that embodies and expresses essentially a respect for individual autonomy. We believe the DDR is not democratic because we cannot make a plausible case that the DDR does this.

DEMOCRATIC THEORY II

This at any rate is the democratic theory I shall discuss. To explain why, I shall contrast it with an alternative. This alternative holds that a democratic society is one in which rule is by all the people, as opposed to some sub-group--where the people are in effect the government. According to the first theory, democracy is essentially concerned with protecting or promoting individual autonomy, and justified by its doing this. But according to this alternative theory now under consideration, democracy is essentially concerned with nothing more than popular rule, and justified presumably because every other form of rule--e.g. rule by right of wealth, age, inheritance, physical prowess, intelligence, or random selection--would have bad results.

This theory contrasts with the first in at least one important way. Where the first theory purports to give a moral justification for democratic government, this latter theory does not (although perhaps it could be made to.) According to the first theory, societies ought to be democratic, because (a) societies ought to show respect for the individual's rights to liberty, to self-government, to control her own destiny (to the extent this is possible in an ordered society,) as well as secure, protect, and enhance those rights and their value to individual persons; and (b) democratic societies (aim to) do this. If these functions are demands of justice, then justice demands democracy. Additionally, this theory recognizes limits on the authority of government: governmental actions that abolish, nullify, or impoverish these rights are beyond the bounds of state authority: they are not justifiable and so prohibited.

The alternative theory however places no principled limits on the authority of democratic governments, nor does it rationally connect with recommendations for any particular ends of government. All it says is that the people should rule. What rules should they make? No response. What rules are out of bounds? As yet, only a change in the basic rule. Of course, the account can be supplemented, but the supplement may or may not have a "democratic" flavor; that is, there needn't be anything particularly democratic about the supplement. Indeed, given this understanding of what democracy is essentially about, there couldn't be.

DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF EDUCATION

You may be asking yourself, What does this arcane theoretical disagreement have to do with the practice of education? I am nearly ready to answer this. First, let us return to Mill.

The liberty of thought and action Mill advocated was in some respects greater than that which obtained at the time in England, and Mill fought hard to extend the sphere of liberty. But he realized that it is unwise (among other things) to extend such extensive liberty to children, inasmuch as they are "not in the maturity of their faculties". Individual liberty is to be reserved for those possessing "the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion," for those "capable of being improved by [i.e. learning from] free and equal discussion."[10]

Since democracy is justified on either theory by a concern for self-government, democrats who would follow Mill and deny children the right to self-governance obviously cannot be concerned with children's (current) self-governance. Hence, they ought in addition to believe either or both of the following: (1) When one is not in the maturity of one's faculties, the right to vote does not increase the degree to which one is self-governing; (2) Those not in the maturity of their faculties are not worthy of the respect that is payed to other/full citizens through recognition of their rights to self-governance.

Nearly every democrat I have ever encountered believes both of these (or purports to). According to the democrat, childhood is a time not for exercising liberty but for developing the abilities and capacities called on in the employment of liberty. To paraphrase Locke, children are not born *in* a state of autonomy, though they are born *to* it.[11] More accurately, they are born to be brought to it by adults, through education. Democratic society has an essential function in bringing children to a state of autonomy, in developing or helping to develop in children that "capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion," which characterizes the democratic citizen.

But with this step, we enter new turf; difficult turf; perhaps a treacherous swamp on a moonless night (--perhaps there are poisonous snakes). We began with two conceptions of the democratic society, and neither is adequate. Predictably, the second theory leaves us in the mire without a flashlight (or a map). According to it, the public should decide what to do about education. Majority vote should decide educational policy questions, or elect officials to do so, or leave these questions to individuals to decide for themselves--whatever the citizenry goes in for.

But we already knew this, and our question presupposes it. We were asking which particular policy options would serve democratic values, or how the questions might be settled democratically. Given the second theory, these questions are nonsensical. The democratic policy is simply whatever policy the democratic process turns up.

Thus, the second theory is no help at all. But the first theory abandons us on the same moors. Here, democracy is characterized by self-government; but we have just declared children to be incapable of self-government. When democratic society is conceived as essentially and exclusively concerned with protecting self-government, democratic theory gives no guidance as to what procedures or principles are to guide decisions where self-government is not at issue.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY IN EDUCATION

One might reply that these decisions are up to parents to make. And especially in the absence of any justification for state intervention, parents of right have authority over the education of the children for whom they are responsible.

But this reply begs the question it aims to avoid. That parents have responsibility for the children to whom they've given birth is a social fact, i.e., an artifact: this happens to be the way we allocate or distribute child-rearing responsibilities, but we might have done it some other way.[12] Admittedly, one might view children not as persons but as biological by-products of their parents, something like nail trimmings or plucked eyebrow hairs, and then claim that parents have property rights in their children. But this doesn't avoid the difficulty, since property rights are no more natural or fundamental than parental rights per se.[13]

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATIONAL AUTHORITY

Where can we look to for material with which to embellish our democratic theory, without altering its essential character? Recall that for Mill, the right to liberty is the right of doing as we like so long as what we do does not harm our fellow-creatures. Mill's overall view is that:

> "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."[14]

This is Mill's noted Harm Principle, the classic statement of liberalism. It is natural to examine a liberal modification of our theory, for the democratic theory I have suggested already has a liberal character, focussing as it does on the value of liberty in the sense of self-governance.[15]

The Harm Principle is not as straightforward as may appear. One difficulty we face right off is how to state clearly and convincingly what is to count as harm.[16] But in the present context of our search for justifiable democratic principles for allocating educational authority, we may reasonably bypass the dispute: our democratic theory already gives us an initially plausible conception of harm.

Recall that the democratic theory asserts the ultimate value of self-governance. Why not then say that an action causes prohibited or redressable harm to the extent that it limits or nullifies self-governance? So interpreted, the principle holds that

> the sole end for which democratic societies are warranted in interfering with the liberty of any of their number is to protect each citizen's right to autonomy, consistent with equal protection for all.

The democratic state has authority only to do this. Thus, democratic laws and institutions are justifiable only insofar as they (negatively) do not violate the citizen's right to autonomy, or (positively) protect these rights, or enforce the duties of each citizen not to infringe or trespass on the autonomy of others.[17]

However much the sentiment behind this principle may reverberate within us--and it surely does within me--I am unable to see how the Harm Principle alone could solve our problem, viz., that democracy as so far characterized appears to lack a principled way of distributing or allocating authority to educate. To be sure, this would solve the problem to some extent, since primary education can help prevent certain sorts of harm to others; for instance, if children are taught to obey the law and to respect others.

But educational authority must be directed towards other than merely preventing harms conceived as setbacks to autonomy. Recall that the purpose of education in a democracy is thought to be to develop in young persons the abilities and capacities constituting autonomy; education is to bring children to a state of autonomy, not just to protect what (precious little) autonomy they have. If this is truly the purpose of education in a democracy, then we have not yet adequately characterized democracy, since our theory still has no way of justifying any type of authority over education. And surely there is a serious problem with a political theory that cannot justify social reproduction.

AUTHORITY FOR AUTONOMY

Our earlier step of adopting as the core of our democratic theory an outcome--self-government--rather than a process--popular suffrage--suggests an answer. Educational authority should be allocated in such a way that educational decision-making and education itself will promote the democratic value of individual self-government. What *procedures* will best achieve this end is, I take it, an open question.

In some instances, teacher control will better promote self-government, e.g. perhaps on questions calling for intellectual expertise, such as whether evolution should be taught in high school science classes;[18] but sometimes parental control will do better at promoting self-government, e.g. perhaps on those questions where "democracy" may hamper "smooth" and "efficient" institutional workings.

In a democracy as I have characterized it, schools are authorized to educate in order that children become not simply ballot-casters, but self-governing citizens. In the contemporary United States, the teacher's authority is constantly challenged by those who would have their children become not self-governing, but molded in some particular shape. The "business community" wants skilled compliant laborers.[19] Parents of various religious, political, ethnic, etc. persuasions want their kids to follow in their footsteps, and are willing to work hard and pay dearly to overcome the broadening influence public schools often exert.[20]

To the extent we care about democracy, it would appear that we should resist these attempts. This may sound like a call for professionalizing teaching, i.e., for granting the teacher corps greater autonomy, and in particular more independence from local activists and pressure groups. I am not sure that it is, however. For one thing, public discussions of educational policy matters have important instrumental value. Again, it is Mill who explains this best, but I shall not rehearse his arguments.[21] It may also be that the only way to generate public discussion is to divide authority among competing groups. As well, it is not obvious that the teacher corps is likely in the near future to acquire the kinds and degree of expertise in their field as have the other professions--e.g. law, engineering, accounting. While some think there is a great deal of knowledge about what works in teaching,[22] I am skeptical about these claims.

What I am sure of is this. We recognize, *pace* Mill, that there is often a difference between what is sensible or desirable and what is popularly desired. On most issues that are to be decided collectively, when experts and the public disagree it is appropriate in a democracy to go with what is popular. But that is because on most issues, the consequences of the decision bear primarily and immediately on the lives of the people themselves; unless the public has already agreed to alternate procedures and authority has been previously delegated to a sub-group, nothing other than a popular decision is consistent with self-government. However, we have seen that educational issues are crucially different. The weight of educational policy decisions is not borne by those making the decision, but by the children, who cannot decide for themselves. The procedural point--that the people should decide--is beside the point.

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1. Cf. The Holmes Group, *Tomorrow's Teachers* (East Lansing, MI: The Holmes Group, Inc., 1986).

2. Cf. Bruce A. Kimball, "The Problem of Teacher's Authority in Light of the Structural Analysis of Professions," *Educational Theory* 38, 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 1-9.

3. *McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education*, 529 F.Supp. 1255 (Arkansas, 1982). See also e.g. James C. Hefley, *Textbooks on Trial* (Wheaton, Ill.: Victor Books, 1976).

4. See e.g. *Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico*, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).

5. *Debra P. v. Turlington*, 564 F.Supp. 177 (Florida, 1983: affirmed 730 F.2d. 1405 [11th Circuit, 1984]).

6. E.g. *Kruelle v. New Castle County School District*, 642 F.2nd. 687 (3rd Circuit, 1981).

7. J. S. Mill, *On Liberty* (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1986), ch. 1, paras. 13-14 (p. 19).

8. Utilitarians may claim that self-government has only instrumental value.

9. Cf. G. A. Cohen, "Capitalism, Freedom, and the Proletariat," in Alan Ryan, ed., *The Idea of Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 9-25; also "Self-Ownersip, World-Ownership, and Equality," in Frank Lucash, ed., *Justice and Equality Here and Now* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 108-35.

10. Mill, *On Liberty*, ch. 1, para. 11 (p. 17).

11. John Locke, *2nd Treatise of Government* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952), ch.6, §52 (p. 31).

12. Many disagree with this, but the subject cannot be adequately discussed here. See Brian Crittenden, *Parents, The State, and the Right to Educate* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1988).

13. Cohen, "Capitalism, Freedom, and the Proletariat."

14. Mill, *On Liberty*, ch. 1, para. 10 (p. 16). For a comprehensive discussion of the Harm Principle see Joel Feinberg, *Harm to Others, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law*, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

15. In a highly influential article, Ronald Dworkin has defined a liberal as someone who thinks "the government must be neutral on what might be called the question of the good life": "Liberalism," in *A Matter of Principle* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 191-2. Joseph Raz has raised a key confusion in Dworkin's position: *The Morality of Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 134, n. 1. At any rate, it has been I believe better argued, not only that governments cannot remain neutral, but also that they ought to pursue ideals: Cf. Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, pp. 134-62, 407-24; Cohen, "Capitalism, Freedom, and the Proletariat"; Vinit Haksar, *Equality, Liberty, and Perfectionism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).

16. Cf. Feinberg, *Harm to Others*, ch. 1.

17. Cf. Neil MacCormick, "The Polity and Values: The Question of 'Moral Disestablishment'," in *Absolute Values and the Search for the Peace of Mankind*, vol. 1, Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences (New York: International Cultural Foundation Press, 1981): 203-23.

18. Cf. *Epperson v. Arkansas*, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).

19. Cf. Twentieth Century Fund Taskforce, *Making the Grade* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1983); American Council on Education, *America's Competitive Challenge* (Washington, D.C.: ACE, 1983).

20. Hefley, *Textbooks on Trial*; Alan Peshkin, *God's Choice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

21. Mill, *On Liberty*, ch. 2.

22. E.g. N. L. Gage, *The Scientific Basis of the Art of Teaching* (New York: Teacher's College Press, 1978).

RESPONSE TO "DEMOCRATIC" CONTROL OF EDUCATION

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What can and should we mean when we talk about (and advocate) democratic control of schools? Before we can answer this question, Bilow tells us, we first must get clear about "what makes something [e.g. societies, governments] democratic." Clarification of this issue, in turn, demands that we examine diverse, perhaps even conflicting democratic theories. In his paper Bilow outlines two theories of democracy, arguing that one - democratic Theory II - is fatally flawed, and that democratic Theory I, while justifiable in a way that II is not, nevertheless encounters difficulties resolving problems concerning the democratic control of schools.

I do not want to spend a lot of time examining the case against Theory II. According to this theory, the essential characteristic of a democracy is simply that "all the people rule." This is much too thin a notion of democracy. It leaves open the possibility, as Bilow and others emphasize, that democratic processes, such as formal voting procedures, could be used to subvert, even destroy democracy. Societies are worthy of the modifier "democratic" only when they embody a principled "respect for the individual's rights to liberty, to self-government, to control her own destiny." The authority of democratic government over individuals is constrained by this principled respect for individual rights. There are points in Bilow's discussion here that call for a greater elaboration of, and at times more extensive argument for his claims. For example, he tells us that democratic societies ought to respect these rights "to the extent this is possible in an ordered society." At what point is a society "disordered" to the degree that such respect is impossible, or even ought not to be recognized? We also need further elaboration of the links between the demands of justice and a democratic society's obligation to respect and protect these individual rights. (Of course, Bilow could hardly be expected to provide a fully elaborated and justified theory of democracy in a 12 page paper.)

I would like to discuss briefly two aspects of Bilow's extension of democratic Theory I to the problem of a democratic control of education. First, Theory I, while more defensible than the rejected alternative, nevertheless encounters difficulties on the educational terrain. According the Bilow, even this more justifiable democratic theory "abandons us on the moors" because "democracy is characterized by self-government; but we have just declared children to be incapable of self-government." I would like to suggest that it is Bilow who leaves us "abandoned on the moors" and not the democratic theory he defends. His notion of "self-government" seems too narrow, and he appears to have overlooked that democratic societies respect not only an individual's right to self-government, but also a right to control one's own destiny. While these two rights are undoubtedly closely connected they need not be synonymous.

I find Gutmann's reasoning on this issue more sound. She, like Mill, does not advocate extending to children the same degree of autonomy granted adults in a democratic society. But she would not be sympathetic with, or think justifiable

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within a democratic society positions consistent with Benjamin Rush's declaration that,

> "The government of schools...should be arbitrary. By this mode of education we prepare our youth for the subordination of laws, and thereby qualify them for becoming good citizens of the republic. I am satisfied that the most useful citizens have been formed from those youth who have never known or felt their own wills till they were one and twenty years of age..."[1]

From Gutmann's perspective,

> "The most internally democratic schools typically balance the participatory and disciplinary purposes of education, leaving some significant educational decisions - such as the content of the curriculum and the standards for promotion - largely (but often not entirely) to the determination of teachers and administrators. That an ideal democratic school is not as democratic as an ideal democratic society should not disenchant us either with schooling or democracy, since democracies depend on schools to prepare students for citizenship. Were students ready for citizenship, compulsory schooling - along with many other educational practices that deny students the same rights as citizens - would be unjustifiable. It would, on the other hand, be remarkable if the best way to prepare students for citizenship were to deny them both individual and collective influence in shaping their own education."[2]

Without granting to children the full autonomy adults are due in a democratic society, it nevertheless seems possible to respect and protect students' right to some measure of control over their destiny by providing them with some decision-making authority in educational matters.

The second aspect concerns Bilow's democratic answer to the question of "who should control educational policy?" Interestingly, at least to this reader, the democratic answer appears to leave the issue of control quite unsettled. We are told that "educational authority should be allocated in such a way that educational decision-making and education itself will promote the democratic value of individual self-government." We then are told that "what procedures will best achieve this end is...an open question." The two examples that follow seem to be concerned not with conflicting procedures, but rather with the central question of who should have the authority to make educational decisions (in the two examples the conflict is over teacher vs. parental control). The question of who ought to make the decisions for achieving the democratic aim of education appears to be just as "open" as the procedures for making decisions. Perhaps, it is the case that questions about procedures cannot be considered apart from questions about who ought to have authority over educational policy.

I will conclude my remarks by considering just how open Bilow has left the question of allocating educational decision-making. Recall the context in which he initially raised the question: "Demands for the "professionalization" of teaching raise the question of who ought to control educational policy." He returns to this context - the "professionalization" of teaching - at the end of the paper. After identifying several sources of challenge to teachers' authority, Bilow cautions us not to conclude that he is calling for "professionalizing teaching, i.e., for granting the teacher corps greater autonomy."

Two reasons are given for adopting this cautionary position, only the second one concerns me here. We should be cautious about granting greater autonomy to teachers because we ought to be skeptical about claims that "there is a great deal of knowledge about what works in teaching." (I am not interested here in assessing the validity of this claim about knowledge in teaching).[3] If such knowledge is indeed lacking, we need to ask what justifies allocating any autonomy and authority to teachers for making educational decisions. If teachers do not know in what kind(s) of social, pedagogical and intellectual environment(s) young people's abilities and capacities for autonomy can be nurtured and developed, and are unable to distinguish these environments from ones in which the development of these abilities and capacities is thwarted, or even repressed, then how can schools fulfill their democratic purposes? I have taken "what works in teaching" to mean something quite broad; perhaps Bilow has a more narrow conception in mind. Even with a more narrow conception, questions remain. Are we to justify whatever autonomy and authority is granted to teachers on the basis of ethical (or political) knowledge they possess? If knowledge about "what works in teaching" is lacking, what kind of education do we provide prospective teachers so that they might play a role in educating young persons for autonomy. If such knowledge is not forthcoming, then are teachers to play only a relatively minor role in achieving the democratic purposes of education?

Such a minor role for teachers would stand in marked contrast with the significant role Gutmann assigns teachers in achieving democratic aims in education. She has claimed that "The division between democratic and nondemocratic control over primary schooling depends most crucially on the educational role we attribute to teachers and teachers' unions."[4] Teachers, according to Gutmann, are to cultivate the capacity for critical reflection about a common culture among students; they are "to further democratic education by supporting the intellectual and emotional preconditions for democratic deliberation among future generations of citizens."[5] Do we find here a significant point of disagreement between Bilow and Gutmann? I am not certain. I think we could benefit from further discussion and examination of the democratic control of educational policy and the so-called "professionalization" of teaching and teachers. If Bilow's skepticism about knowledge in teaching is valid, then we certainly need to ask what kind(s) of education prospective teachers should have if they are to play any role in furthering the democratic aims and control of schooling.

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1. Benjamin Rush, quoted in David Tyack, "Forming the National Character: Paradox in Educational Thought of the Revolutionary Generation," Harvard Educational Review 36:1(1966):29-41.

2. Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 94.

3. For some skeptical arguments about a forthcoming wealth of new knowledge about teaching and the improvement of teaching see Francis Schrag, "Knowing and doing," American Journal of Education 89(1981):253-82; D.C. Phillips, "On Teacher Knowledge: A Skeptical Dialogue," Educational Theory 38(Fall 1988):457-466 and Schrag's and Phillips' continuation of that dialogue in Educational Theory 39(Summer 1989):269-272.

4. Gutmann, Democratic Education, 76.

5. Ibid., 76. Although she provides little elaboration, Gutmann does not seem to think that increasing teacher autonomy is without problems: "Too much independence, however, can be as bad as too little. If one thinks only of the best teachers, those with high intellectual standards and humane values, it may be hard to imagine the dangers of granting teachers too much "academic freedom." When one thinks less selectively of public primary-school teachers, who now number about 2.5 million, the dangers of too much freedom are less difficult to discern." Ibid., 82. In Democratic Education Gutmann has stated that "Higher education cannot

succeed unless lower education does." It seems, however, given the central role assigned to teachers in achieving democratic aims in primary schools that higher education must succeed with one group of students - prospective teachers - regardless of their primary schooling. (Gutmann also recognizes that certain institutional constraints undermine the autonomy and authority of teachers and these constraints will have to be removed if primary schooling is to achieve its democratic purposes.)

U.S. Supreme Court Decisions in Bethel and Hazelwood:

Is the Piq in the Parlor Gone?

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This conference theme's primary focus, "Ethics and Democratic Values in the Education Profession," is to consider the moral character education of professional educators. This focus raises numerous philosophic questions. One question is what are the democratic values to be considered for such an education? This paper's focus is on an acknowledged democratic value--free speech. More specifically, the nature of free speech in the public schools.

Free speech has long been recognized as central to the well-being of a democratic society. The operational nature of free speech is determined in large measure by why, how, who, and where it is exercised. One institution responsible for interpreting the legitimate exercise of free speech is the courts. Therefore, a review of court decisions can afford some insights into the meaning of free speech in the context of the public school setting. These insights can assist in indicating what needs to be conveyed to aspiring and practicing educators regarding this democratic value.

The review of court cases will focus on: (1) a brief overview of the law governing free speech; (2) specific legal concepts pertinent to free speech in the context of the public schools; (3) a discussion of two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions on free speech in schools and subsequent lower court decisions; and (4) some general conclusions related to issues related to the conference's theme. This review is about court interpretations of free speech, and is not to develop a philosophic resolution. It is intended to encourage philosophy of education scholars to critique the courts' rationale in determining the nature of free speech as a value in a democratic society. This task is important at a conference whose theme is concerned with the nature and content of professional educators' preparation.

One final note is necessary regarding assumptions that are associated in the relationship of the courts and the operational meaning of free speech as a democratic value. It is important to know the law by what it has done as well as by what it is. The law is a human institution; it is a tale of human choices. Its interpretation concerns central issues of human life: the preservation of human life, the protection of property, the exercise of individual freedoms, and the allocation of society's resources. All encounters in law are personal, human encounters. The study of court decisions is about individuals involved in the state's efforts to determine blame, to punish wrongdoing, and to encourage socially valuable activity.

General Nature of Free Speech

It is helpful to fully understand the nature of free speech rights under the first amendment within the context of public schools to first explore the law governing speech outside the confines of the schools. The first amendment

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states:[1] "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or press." Despite the absolute nature of the language, some limitations on free speech and press are permissible. Some examples are defamatory speech[2] and incitement to illegal action.[3] Even in those situations where speech is not protected, such as obscene speech, the state must grant the speaker access to the courts to challenge such a classification.[4]

The limitation of speech by the state using prior restraint, however, is regarded with disfavor, even though the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to completely ban its use.[5] Any attempts to invoke prior restraint requires the state to justify its imposition.[6] Also, any prior restraint imposed before judicial resolution is enforceable only for a specific and brief period of time.[7]

Free speech can be limited by the forum in which it takes place. Nothing in the Constitution requires the state to grant access to everyone who wishes to exercise their right to free speech on state property without regard to the property's nature or the disruption to state functions that might be caused by the speaker's activity.[8] The U.S. Supreme Court adopted a forum analysis as a means of determining when the state's interest in limiting the use of its property for its intended purpose outweighs the interests of those wishing to use the property for other purposes.[9] The Court said there were three types of public forum. The first is the quintessential public forum which includes streets, sidewalks, and parks which have been consistently used by the public for purposes of assembly to communicate thoughts between citizens on matters of public interest. In order for the state to limit the content of speech in this forum, it must show a compelling state interest. The second is the limited public forum which includes state property generally for communication by the public. While the state is not required to retain the open character of the forum, as long as it does so by either a stated policy or continued practice, it is bound by the same standard as the quintessential forum. The third is the closed public forum which is not by tradition or policy designated as a forum for free speech. Here, there is no constitutional right to access simply because it is owned or controlled by the state. The closed forum can be reserved for its intended purpose, so long as the policy is reasonably related to the property's purpose.

Another limitation to free speech that is pertinent to this paper's topic regards minors. Two Supreme Court decisions limited the speech content for minors, even though the content was protected when directed to adults. The Court held that soft-core pornographic magazines, while not obscene by contemporary community standards for adults, could not be sold to minors.[10] The Court reasoned the state's interest in protecting the welfare of minors and to support parents' objections to the magazines justified the ban. Also the Court upheld a Federal Communication's Commission decision to ban George Carlin's comic monologue from the airwaves.[11] While the Court did not regard the monologue as obscene, its language was vulgar and lewd and this justified the decision because the broadcast was accessible to minors. The Ginsberg and Pacifica indirectly establish that first amendment free speech rights of minors are not coextensive with those of an adult.

Free Speech in School Setting

In the school setting problems arise when first amendment rights come into conflict with the strong public policy that schools are to transmit accepted values and important knowledge to the next generation. The achievement of this policy has been primarily a local concern, and courts have been reluctant to intervene unless there is a possible violation of a right. Such intervention has happened with major impact on how public schools achieve the policy. The intervention of the U.S. Supreme Court is the most significant. In Tinker v. Des Moines School District,[12] the Supreme Court held that school officials violated student free speech rights when a number of students were suspended for wearing black armbands at school to protest the Vietnam War. The Court ruled that the armbands neither disrupted school operations nor invaded the rights of others. The decision's major premise was that students and teachers possess constitutional rights while on the school campus. The Court did caution, however, that those rights must be evaluated in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. Tinker, in essence, defined free speech rights of teachers and students as less than when away from school, but still worthy of respect and protection.

The Tinker decision triggered a great deal of litigation in the federal and state courts. Generally, the courts favored the free-speech rights of students because school officials did not show the speech could or did "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of discipline in the operation of the school."[13]

A number of decisions involving school-sponsored newspapers disallowed censorship by school officials because it violated students' first amendment rights. In three cases,[14] federal courts found that the newspapers were not part of the curriculum, and thus concluded the papers' content was not subject to content control in the same manner as a regular class. The courts determined the papers were a limited forum for student expression and then applied the Tinker disruption test and found no material interference with the schools' operations. In two cases,[15] however, the courts did uphold editorial censorship of school newspapers based on the second prong of the Tinker standard--invasion of other students' rights.

A well-known Supreme Court decision regarding first amendment rights and curriculum values was Board of Education v. Pico.[16] The Court held that the local school board could not remove books from the school library simply because its members objected to the ideas contained in the books. The board's contention that it had absolute discretion to transmit community values was rejected by the Court. While acknowledging the books could be removed if vulgar or obscene, the Court noted the board's motivation for removing the books--some members regarded them personally offensive--did not justify their removal.

It is important to note that after the Tinker decision in 1969, the Supreme Court did not consider any similar free-speech rights in order to reaffirm or modify its standard of material and substantial disruption or violation of another person's rights. The Court had had opportunities, but declined to do so.[17] Then in 1986, the Court handed down its decision in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.[18]

Bethel Decision

Matthew Fraser delivered a speech monimating a fellow student for a student body office. There were some 600 students--many were fourteen years old--at a school-sponsored assembly. The speech referred to the candidate in graphic and specific sexual metaphor.[19] Some students responded to the speech with loud hoots and suggestive sexual gesturing. Other students acted bewildered, and teachers stated they had to take class time to calm students and discuss the appropriateness of the speech's content. Matthew was suspended for three days for violating a school policy regarding the use of profane language and disrupting the school's operations. He sued, claiming violation of his free-speech rights. A federal district held the suspension violated his free-speech rights. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that Matthew's speech was indistinguishable from the armbands in Tinker.[20] Also the court rejected the school district's argument that because it had responsibility for school curriculum it had power to control the language used during a school-sponsored activity.

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling. It first rejected the assumption that the armbands in Tinker were equivalent to the "use of lewd and obscene speech" in order to nominate a fellow student. The Court then turned to consider what level of protection is afforded student speech given the particular characteristics of the school. It first noted that the purpose of the "American public school system" is that "public education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic . . . . It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the nation."[21] How then are student free-speech rights and the school's purpose of inculcating "manners of civility" to be accommodated? The Court said the "undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's counterwailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially inappropriate behavior."[22]

To support such a balance, the Court noted that Congress has rules "prohibiting the use of expressions offensive to the other participants in the debate."[23] The Court, citing the Ginsberg and Pacifica case, said its own jurisprudence "has acknowledged limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience may include children."[24]

Then, applying the Tinker standard to the facts of disruption, the offensive reaction of some teachers and students, and the speech's use of vulgar and lewd content, the Court held the school officials "acted entirely within [their] permissible authority in imposing sanctions upon Fraser in response to his offensively lewd and indecent speech."[25]

The Bethel decision was based on the Tinker standard, and was not a sharp change in the Court's position regarding student free speech rights. The subsequent importance of Bethel, however, is contained in the assumptions the Court made regarding the purpose of schools and the authority of school officials to ensure its achievement. In regard to the purpose of school, the Court noted that the "process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order."[26] Also, the Court stated that the essence of public education "is the inculcation of fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system."[27]

School officials' authority is not limited by the first amendment to determine that a "vulgar and lewd speech such as [Fraser's] would undermine the school's basic educational mission."[28] In such situations the Court concluded that "it was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public school education."[29]

While persons may disagree over the extent of the disruption and the speech's vulgarity, the Bethel decision strongly indicated the Court was willing to limit student speech rights in school-sponsored activities in conjunction with its view of the public school's purpose; i.e. inculcating fundamental democratic values. This willingness was clearly reflected a year and a half later in the Court's decision in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.[30]

Hazelwood Decision

The case concerned the principal's censorship of East Hazelwood High School's newspaper, Spectrum. The paper was school-sponsored and was written and edited by students in Journalism II class. The students received academic credit for their work, and the district allocated funds for the printing of the paper. Page proofs for the last edition of the 1983 year were submitted to the principal, per usual practice, for review prior to publication. The principal objected to two articles. One of them described three Hazelwood students' experiences with pregnancy and the other discussed the effects of divorce on students.

The principal was concerned. Although false names were used in the pregnancy article, he believed the pregnant students could be identified since he had determined who they were. He also regarded the article's reference to sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for the school's younger students. Further, the principal was concerned that a named student in the divorce article had stated her father "was always out of town on business or out late playing cards," and "always argued about everything" with her mother.[31] He believed the student's parents should have been contacted in order to respond or to consent to the publication as required by good journalism practices.

Since there was no time to change the stories, the principal deleted the articles and the Spectrum was printed with two pages eliminated. The staff members of the paper sued, alleging their free speech rights were violated because of the deletions. The federal district court ruled in favor of the school district stating prior restraint could be imposed on speech activities that are an integral part of the school's educational function. This included the publication of a school-sponsored newspaper by a journalism class, so long as their decision had a substantial and reasonable basis.[32] The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision holding the Spectrum was not only part of the curriculum but also a limited forum for student expression.[33]

The Supreme Court granted the school district's appeal to consider "the extent to which educators may exercise editorial control over the contents of a high school newspaper produced as part of the school's journalism curriculum."[34] The Court's response to the issue had three parts. The Court first found the paper was not a limited public forum because it was part of student work done for credit in class, and the district, either by policy or practice, did not open the school's curriculum for indiscriminate use or for use by student organizations.[35]

The second and most significant part of the decision was the Court distinguishing the Hazelwood case from Tinker. The Court stated:

> [t]he question whether the first amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech --the question that we addressed in Tinker--is different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech. The former question addresses educators' ability to silence a student's personal expression that happens to occur on school premises. The latter question concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.[36]

The distinction between the toleration of speech protected in Tinker and the promotion of speech as present in Hazelwood was an important distinction. The Court concluded that "the standard articulated in Tinker for determining when a school may punish student expression need not also be the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student expression."[37]

If the standard is not the Tinker "material and substantial disruption," then what is to be the standard? The Court ruled "that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."[38] The reasonableness standard was regarded by the Court as consistent "with our oft-expressed view that the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges."[39] The Court then suggested a list of possible justifications for censoring school-sponsored student expression: (1) "to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach"; (2) students "are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity"; and (3) "the views of the individual speakers are not erroneously attributed to the school."[40]

The third part of the Court's response was to rule that the principal had not violated the students' free speech rights because it was reasonable under the circumstances. The circumstances noted by the Court were the possible identification of the unnamed students in the pregnancy article, the inappropriateness for the younger students, and the failure to practice good journalism by giving the parent criticized in the divorce article a chance to respond.[41]

For the first time, the Court in Hazelwood analyzed students' first amendment rights without utilizing the rationale used in Tinker. Although Hazelwood does not overrule Tinker, it definitely limits it because the Court limited the Tinker standard to non-school-sponsored activities. Therefore, when student speech can be associated with school-sponsored activities that "members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school,"[42] the courts are to apply the Hazelwood standard. That is to determine if there is a reasonable relationship to legitimate pedagogical concerns that merits limiting student free speech.

Progeny of Bethel and Hazelwood

What has been the effect of the Bethel and Hazelwood decisions on subsequent lower court decisions regarding student free speech rights? A brief review of some cases can afford insight into the nature of this important democracic value. The review will first look at those cases that cited Bethel in considering school officials' authority in relation to student free speech. Second, cases that cited Hazelwood regarding the extent of school officials' authority to determine appropriate school-sponsored expression, will be discussed.

In Gano v. School District No. 411,[43] a federal district court denied a student's request for a preliminary injunction to stop school officials from suspending him for wearing a T-shirt. The student, who had been requested by his senior class to design a T-shirt, drew a caricature of the school's principal, vice-principal, and dean of boys sitting against a fence on a campus drinking alcoholic beverages and appearing drunk. The T-shirt was to be sold to students during homecoming week. School officials suspended the student for three days because they regarded the caricature as offensive. The student filed a lawsuit to stop the suspension. The court first noted, under Idaho law, schools are charged with teaching about the effects of alcohol. Citing the Bethel decision, the court stated that if the school promoted the wearing of the T-shirt it would degrade the administrators as role models, "and their position would be surely compromised if [the] T-shirt was circulated among the students."[44]

A federal district court in Olesen v. Board of Education of School District No. 228 upheld the suspension of a male student for wearing an earring in violation of a school rule.[45] The rule had been enacted to reduce the disruptive effects caused by student gang members. The members wore symbols of their gang membership. The student wore an earring that had a cross; a symbol used by one gang. He said he did not belong to a gang, and wore the earring to express his individuality. The Court said, citing Bethel, school officials have "the responsibility to teach not only English and history, but the role of young men and women in our democratic society."[46] To achieve this purpose, the "direction and manner of this instruction rests with the Board, not the federal courts."[47]

Students' free speech rights were found not to be violated when they were suspended for distributing an unofficial student newspaper on the school campus in Bystrom v. Fridley High School.[48] An article in the paper reported on the vandalism done to a teacher's home, and concluded that many students would like to claim responsibility for the act. The article caused disruption in some classes and the named teacher left school rather than face student reaction to the article. The court regarded the key issue in the case as a challenge to a disciplinary decision by school officials responsible for administration of the school. The court said the "Supreme Court . . . deferred to the school authorities' decision that maintaining order and discipline and proper inculcation of traditional social values required discipline of the student involved."[49] Based on this interpretation of Bethel, the court upheld the suspension because the article advocated violence against the teacher--not a traditional social value.

In Crosby By Crosby v. Holsinger,[50] students brought a first amendment challenge against a principal for banning the school's "Johnny Reb" symbol. The Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the principal citing Hazelwood as giving school officials "the authority to disassociate the school from controversial speech even if it may limit student expression."[51] The court reasoned the symbol bears the school's imprimatur and "school authorities are free to disassociate the symbol because of educational concerns."[52] The educational concerns were complaints the symbol offended blacks and limited their participation in school activities.

A recent and significant decision using the Bethel and Hazelwood precedent was decided by the Eleventh Circuit in Virgil v. School Board of Columbia County.[53] The issue was whether the first amendment prevents a school board from removing a previously approved textbook from an elective course because of some materials' vulgarity and sexual explicitness.[54] The objectionable material was in the translations of Lysistrata by Aristophanes and The Miller's Tale by Chaucer. The court first noted the Bethel and Hazelwood decisions gave school officials authority to protect students from vulgar and lewd material, and to control school-sponsored expression. In applying the Hazelwood standard, the court determined the material was part of the curriculum and could be perceived as bearing the "imprimatur" of the school. The court then considered the motivation for removing the text, and found it was because of the selections' explicit sexuality and extensive use of vulgarity. Therefore, school officials had a legitimate pedagogical reason for removing the text. Acknowledging that Lysistrata and The Miller's Tale were acclaimed masterpieces in Western Literature, the court concluded that because of the students' age--fifteen to seventeen--the decision was reasonable, and the court's role was not to second guess the wisdom of the decision.

Conclusion

The foregoing review of the Bethel and Hazelwood decisions and their progeny raise some general considerations associated with the role of ethics and democratic values related to teacher education. Expressed as questions: (1) Is any discussion of ethics that ignores the law ethical?; (2) Is an attempt to define democratic values viable without discussing the decisions of the courts who are charged with interpreting the source of many of the values--the U.S. Constitution?

What of the pig in the parlor? This phrase refers to the growing area of censorship through what has become known as the "pig in the parlor" test.[55] According to this test, speech that might be protected is not if it occurs at an inappropriate time or place. The "parlor," given the article's topic, is public schools and the "pig" is speech not considered bearing the "imprimatur" of the schools. Some possible questions might be: (1) What are the "fundamental values" necessary for a democratic society?; (2) What are the "appropriate" knowledge and skills needed to inculcate those values?; (3) What are "legitimate pedagogical concerns" to achieve the task?; (4) How is "reasonable" to be determined in relation to pedagogical concerns?; and (5) When is the perceived "imprimatur" stamped on school activities? If _Lysistrata_ and _The Miller's Tale_ are Pigs in the Parlor because they were inappropriate for tenth and eleventh grade students to read in class, what do teacher educators need to convey in regard to teaching the democratic value of free speech?

Notes

1. U.S. Const., amend. I.

2. _See_ New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).

3. _See_ Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).

4. _See_ Organization for Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).

5. _See_ Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).

6. _See_ Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975).

7. _See_ Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372, U.S. 53, 70 (1963).

8. _See_ Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799-800 (1985).

9. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).

10. Ginsberg, v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).

11. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).

12. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

13. _Id_. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).

14. Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F.Supp. 731 (E.D. Va.), _aff'd_, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F.Supp. 1164 (E.D. N.Y. 1974); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F.Supp. 102 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).

15. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1977), _cert. denied_, 435 U.S. 925 (1978) (paper's survey regarding sexual attitudes and practices would invade students' privacy rights by subjecting them to psychological pressure); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F.Supp. 1043 (Ed.D. N.Y. 1978) (paper contained potentially libelous statements).

16. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).

17. _See_ Note, "Administrative Regulation of High School Press," 83 _Mich. L. Rev._ 625, 626 (1984).

18. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).

19. _Id_. at 687.

> I know a man who is firm--he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is firm--but most of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts--he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally--he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end--even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for ASB vice-president--he'll never come between you and the best our high school can be.

20. 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985).

21. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681 (quoting C. Beard and M. Beard, _New Basic History of the United States_ 228 (1968)).

22. _Id_.

23. _Id_.

24. _Id_. at 684.

25. _Id_. at 685.

26. _Id_. at 683.

27. _Id_. at 681.

28. _Id_. at 685.

29. _Id_. at 685-86.

30. 108 S.Ct. 562 (1988).

31. _Id_. at 566.

32. _See_ Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F.Supp. 1450, 1466 (D.C. Mo. 1985).

33. _See_ 795 F.2d 1368, 1373 (8th Cir. 1986).

34. Hazelwood, 108 S.Ct. 562, 565 (1988).

35. _Id_. at 568-569.

36. _Id_. at 569.

37. _Id_. at 570.

38. _Id_. at 571.

39. _Id_.

40. _Id_. at 570.

41. *Id.* at 571-572.

42. *Id.* at 569.

43. 674 F.Supp. 796 (D. Idaho 1987).

44. *Id.* at 798.

45. 676 F.Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 1987).

46. *Id.* at 822.

47. *Id.*

48. 686 F.Supp. 1387 (D. Minn. 1987).

49. *Id.* at 1393.

50. 852 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1988).

51. *Id.* at 803.

52. *Id.* at 802.

53. 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989).

54. *Id.* at 1518. (The text was *The Humanities: Cultural Roots and Continuities*, Vol. I.)

55. J. Nowak et al., *Constitutional Law* 881 (1986).

TEACHING THE DEMOCRATIC VALUE OF FREE SPEECH: A RESPONSE

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Bruce Beezer's paper, summarizing those recent court decisions effecting a student right of free speech in school settings, was both interesting and informative. His review of court cases appears to be designed to inform the listener of those restrictions placed on student speech in the educational setting by recent decisions of the courts. He certainly made this listener more aware of the substantial restraints which legally can be placed on student free speech by school administrators when that speech is considered in the context of the school's "educational" function. The body of his paper thus served a very useful informative function, at least for this participant. My only problem with his paper is knowing how to interpret both the introduction and the conclusion.

Early on, Beezer states that "this review is about court interpretations of free speech, and is not to develop a philosophic resolution." It is evident that Beezer's intent is to present a descriptive document. But if it is that and no more, I am puzzled as to how it will, as he says, "encourage philosophy of education scholars to critique the court's rationale in determining the nature of free speech as a value in a democratic society." The Supreme Court, in its support of the Constitution, certainly values free speech. That could hardly be the issue which Beezer believes needs resolution. Nor would the nature of free speech need resolution, for it is just that . . . free. What does appears contestable is the circumstances under which such speech should be limited by the courts out of consideration for the competing rights and responsibilities of other.

Children are considered by the courts a special case and schools a unique environment. Consequently the need for curtailment of speech in some well-defined settings. My major question is whether such curtailment as represented by the cases Beezer cites represents a threat to the cultivation of civic virtue, i.e., "a willingness to act, in behalf of the public good while being attentive to and considerate of the feelings, needs, and attitudes of others."[1] For if free speech does not nurture civic virtue in school settings, than it has limited educational value.

I would have to conclude that the issue is not the Court's conception of or support for free speech but rather the conditions under which it should be restricted or preserved, viz., for some presumed greater good. The greater good in this case is aptly described by District Court Chief Judge Nangle as those "legitimate pedagogical concerns" or "valid educational purposes."[2] Central, to my mind, is the development of civic virtue. While I can imagine members of this audience legitimately disagreeing about the conditions under which school officials should limit

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student expression in school-sponsored activities, those disagreements certainly should be centered in the issue of what is central to nurturing democratic values in young people.

Justice Brennen in his dissenting opinion would have us believe that the *Hazelwood* decision would

> lead to an Orwellian public school system where educators act as "thought police," stifling discussion of "all but state-approved topics and advocacy of all but the official position."[3]

I would agree with David Schimmel that Justice Brennen may have over reacted and that what we need to do is help educators distinguish between what they have the legal authority to do and the wisest course of action in promoting civic virtue. Educators have always had control over the curriculum and now it seems they have been given responsibility for school-sponsored publications as well. They now have to determine the best approach in handling matters of controversy or sensitive topics. It leaves them with the problem of how to best prepare our young people to exercise their First Amendment rights in a manner consistent with other democratic values. Assuming Richard Pratte is on target, the civic virtues which should be reflected in the "internal landscape" of the school are "the obligation or duty to be fair to others, to show kindness and tact, and, to render agreeable service to the community."[4] Free speech is of import only in the degree to which it nurtures those values.

Even without the recent decisions of *Bethel* and *Hazelwood,* schools are left with the heavy responsibility of protecting and supervising the children entrusted to its care. The problem with many schools is that they see this responsibility as simply an excuse for disciplining students, regardless of whether that management conflicts with the learning that takes place or the values communicated. The court cases under consideration do not change that fact nor do they relieve the schools of the responsibility of assisting young people in looking critically at whether our society reflects those democratic values it professes.

But free speech counts for little unless there is some viable content to that speech. By viable, I mean content related to those issues tied to our survival and prosperity as a democratic nation. Personally, I do not see our democratic traditions being advanced or threatened by prohibiting students from using graphic sexual metaphors in nominating other students for office. That is especially the case where other democratic values, such as social justice, are not nurtured within the school environment and in the larger community in a manner that makes them the central focus of free speech activities.

The court so well put it in the *Bethel* case, where it said that the essence of public education "is the inculcation of fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system."[5] We have a tendency in our culture to treat free speech as an end in itself, to be valued for its own sake exclusive of any consideration of content. But free speech is only a useful view to our society if people have been educated to have something significant to say about our survival as a democratic society. So rather than dwelling on how we might protect the process of communicating in schools as an end in itself, may be we could give more attention to the content worth communicating.

NOTES

1. Richard Pratte, *The Civic Imperative: Examining the Need for Civic Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1988), 17.

2. David Schimmel, "Censorship of School-Sponsored Publications: An Analysis of *Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,*" *Education Law Reporter* (June 9, 1988): 942.

3. Ibid., 949.

4. Pratte, *The Civic Imperative*, 17.

5. As cited in Berger.

SICHEL'S THEORY OF MORAL CHARACTER:

A LINCHPIN CONCEPT FOR MORAL EDUCATION THEORY

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Developing a comprehensive, theoretical map of moral education constitutes the major objective of Professor Sichel in her recent book, Moral Education: Character, Community, and Ideals.(1) In this morning's symposium, we will address two major ideas in her book, namely, moral character and the community context for moral education. These two ideas can only be rightly understood and critiqued in the broader context of Professor Sichel's theory construction project.

Her project is driven by the contention that there has been an unfortunate hegemony of utilitarian and neo-Kantian perspectives in theories of moral education. Lawrence Kohlberg's work exemplifies, in her view, the limitations of building a theory of moral education exclusively with the neo-Kantian emphasis on moral principles and moral reasoning. Professor Sichel points out that significant insights into our moral life, such as those found in the recent writings of Alasdair MacIntyre, Lawrence Blum, Martha Nussbaum, and Carol Gilligan, need to be integrated into an adequate theoretical construction. Her intellectual strategy, then, is to build upon earlier theories and insights, incorporate worthwhile contributions of contemporary discussions, and map out the features as well as parameters for an integrated, comprehensive theory of moral education (p.8).

The linchpin concept of this integrated theory is that of 'moral character.' As Professor Sichel elaborates on her conception of 'moral character,' she concurrently describes the meaning of the concept, provides a rationale for its preeminent status, and draws its connectedness to other morally significant concepts, such a 'community,' 'ideals,' and 'caring'. Drawing on a restructuring of a philosophical tradition originating with Aristotle, Professor Sichel descriptively defines 'moral character' as being dependent on the possession of "coherent moral excellences that have become dispositions or habits with the potential for active moral engagement" (p. 82).

Such a conception of moral character, she contends, provides a focused framework for integrating habits, emotions, ethical reasoning, narrative ideals, and other prominent features of our moral life. To illustrate the concrete expression of moral character, Professor Sichel devotes a chapter to describing an ideal moral character which is anchored by the moral excellence of

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fidelity and is dynamically held in tension with other moral excellences, such as loyalty, truthfulness, honesty, respect, and courage (p. 79).

In addition to identifying definitionally essential features, Professor Sichel makes several important assertions about the development of moral character. First, she contends that the quality of education received during infancy and early childhood is fundamental to the development of moral character (p. 62). Second, primary communities should provide individuals with a set of moral excellences consistent with the community's basic values (p. 114). And third, because of the pluralistic nature of our society, one set of moral excellences ought not to be prescribed by the primary moral community (p. 89).

I applaud the outlines and much of the map of moral character Professor Sichel charts. I think that she is absolutely correct in focusing on moral character as a linchpin concept for the integration of the various components of a moral education theory. And likewise, the intimate connection she draws between moral character and community ideals is an excellent theoretical move. Indeed, I think her book, as a whole, makes a valuable contribution to the current dialogue on moral education and development.

Nonetheless, there is at least one important aspect of moral character formation in her theory that needs to be more satisfactorily worked out in the theory. Implicit in her theory is the prescription, or at least the desirability, that the individual ought to acquiesce in developing the basic moral values of his/her community, albeit in a personalized pattern of excellences. Other than stipulating standards for "reasonable communities" (p. 131 ff.), Professor Sichel does not describe criteria by which moral development can legitimately transcend the moral values in a given community. Even where the moral values of a community seem consistent with commonly shared conceptions of the good life, an adequate theory of moral education needs to provide for the possibility of an individual developing moral excellences not favorably received in that society.

Professor Sichel does, however, recognize the incompleteness of her theory -- in fact, any theory of moral education. She underscores, at the end of her book, that moral excellences frequently find their wellspring in sources not derived from the "forms of moral education recommended by philosophers and psychologists" (p. 279).

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1. Betty A. Sichel, Moral Education: Character, Community, and Ideals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988).

A CRITIQUE OF CHARACTER AND COMMUNITY IN SICHEL'S MORAL EDUCATION

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Betty A. Sichel's Moral Education: Character, Community, and Ideals[1] is a refreshing new addition to the literature on moral education. She forcefully puts the concept of character back into the moral education conversation because, as she says, recent moral theory has been too much defined by a conversation on rights, conflicting claims, and the interests of different individuals and groups.[2] Sichel's work is refreshing because it is neither a rehashing of John Dewey nor another tiresome account of Kohlbergian stage theory; instead, it recognizes the historical importance of the Deweyan tradition, includes some important elements in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, and provides an insightful analysis of character, community, and ideals for moral education theory.

Sichel takes her departure from Dewey because, she maintains, Dewey reduced the concept of character to "'an interpenetration of habits'" which was "'read through the medium of individual acts.'"[3] Dewey's intention to avoid dualisms was only partially successful because he viewed habits, and thus character, as a transaction between the inner and outer, the passive and the active, subject and object, duty and interest and so forth, with the result that his concept of character was reduced to a bundle of habits. Sichel finds this to be problematic, because while Dewey wrote in an age of transition, it was also an age when the Protestant ethos and a civic hegemony still provided a kind of glue to hold the cultural fabric together. Thus, Dewey expected society, family, and school to provide an environment where the best experiences could be passed on to the young and where the culture would be wisely transmitted. In his war against dualisms, he saw character and conduct as inseparable, and character would be formed in the interaction or transaction of the individual and the surrounding world if those surroundings were sufficiently organized and nurtured. As Sichel sees it, the result was that Dewey almost eradicated the concept of character from his educational theory.[4]

Sichel thinks Dewey's version of character development is unlikely to be realized in the face of contemporary cultural conditions. The heart of her contention is that we need to rejuvenate the concept of character and make it central once more to a community-based theory of moral education.[5] This, I think, is an extremely important point, and Sichel's work helps fill the gap. However, there are some bothersome trappings to the concept of character that need airing. Sichel sees character in terms of "moral excellencies," and while I am substantially in agreement with her views, there are some difficulties to be surmounted. The word "excellence" is a currently popular term, a "buzz" word that always seems to surface in times of conservative ideological ascendancy such as we are presently experiencing. Not only has the term become a political bromide with the trappings of a Charlottesville extravaganza,[6] but it seems to elevate "being" over "becoming:" One of the dangers of viewing character as moral excellence is that it can easily be reduced to some original endowment. The problem is that character as an original endowment is an all or

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nothing proposition; that is, one either has it or one doesn't, and in education this can lead to all kinds of static theoretical and practical implications. The other problem is that character seen as original endowment leads us to view education as merely a stripping-away-to or a leading-out-of some assumed core element of the person, something akin to the old Platonic "doctrine of reminiscence." These kinds of problems are, I think, among the reasons why Dewey was reluctant to use the term "character." He wanted to give it a social base and avoid the pitfalls of fostering a view of character as a purely internal thing. So, he went to other terms. Sichel is right--habit is central to Dewey's version of character, but so are such terms as interests (but never, for Dewey, a purely inner or subjective thing), desires, affections, associations, and so forth. I believe a strong case can be made that Dewey's view of the moral self as described, for example, in Theory of the Moral Life, is a fairly full-blown analysis of character.[7]

It could be said that if Dewey's view of character was a "bundle of habits," then Sichel's view is an internal "bundle of moral excellencies." In fact, on my first hurried reading of Sichel's Moral Education, I prematurely came to such a conclusion. But a more serious reading disabused me of that assumption. There is, it is true, a definite reliance in her construction of the thought of Alfred North Whitehead, and I assumed that certain tendencies toward idealism and its Platonic underpinnings in Whitehead's thought were creeping into Sichel's analysis. A more thorough reading now helps me rise above my original prejudice: Sichel has not written a perfect book, but who has? In this time when everyone seems to be taken with Richard Rorty's call to view philosophy as a "conversation of culture," Sichel's work provides a most welcome turn of the conversation on moral education from an over-psychologized theory back to its home-base in philosophy.

If this turn were the only value of her work, it would be enough. In fact, it is not the only value. If Sichel has some Whiteheadian biases, I must also admit my own Deweyan biases that clouded my first reaction to her work. Indeed, she carefully analyzes the social or community bases of character, for in her view character is not a solely internal endowment. As she points out, "Moral excellencies and virtues are derived in part from communities; among other characteristics, moral excellencies and virtues provide defining marks of communities."[8] Furthermore, moral excellencies, sets of virtues, and moral character cannot be evaluated according to pristine logical categories or formal principles: "They do not exist in themselves, but are always embedded within an historical moment of some community, which has translated moral ideals into actual concrete ways of life."[9] In short, her emphasis is on rooting individuals within a community context, and not with developing some Kantian, free-floating rational mind standing outside of ordinary human experience. (In this regard, she is surely in step with certain Deweyan tendencies).

It should be noted, however, that Sichel does not accept any concept of community since some communities are desirable and others are not. She seeks a reasonable community with three characteristics: inner coherence, acceptance of the larger society and other ways of life, and a relationship to the stream of history and historical context. So, children must be educated in communities and societies, because it takes more than formal education to provide desirable moral education, and a proper moral education must be guided by a conception of the good life.[10] But what conception of the good life? She states:

> ...[M]oral education is not limited to a single course or unit on moral problems. It cannot be a conservative enterprise in which students are blindly indoctrinated and inculcated with absolute rules. It cannot be the learning of an authoritarian dogma. Instead, the moral education advocated here requires a radical change in the nature of public education's aims, structure, curriculum, and teaching method.[11]

Here Sichel's promising book pulls back: she does not tell us what these radical departures may be. Clearly, I am not asking for the radicalism of the late 1960's and the early 1970's to be reinjected into contemporary educational debate, because the debate would likely involve—as it did then—all sorts of exotic proposals the public simply will not accept. Let me suggest what a radical departure might entail: We seem reluctant today to confront what I believe is the central issue of our nation's ideological heritage—little "d" democracy, that is, democratic theory clearly within the historical mainstream, but which we have fallen short of realizing in any large sense. The remedies of Jefferson, Mann, or Dewey will not answer our needs today. Each had shortcomings, but each had the virtue of enunciating themes that set agenda for his own time. What we need today are bold departures of such scope, but departures in tune with the present that probe, search, and bring into the public domain a more thoughtful and responsible debate on the educational and social complexities facing us. Let it be clearly understood that I am not suggesting such an enormous burden be placed on Sichel's shoulders, but I would like to see her grapple a bit with a democratic conception of "the good and moral life." Perhaps that would help us flesh out a clearer view of the radical changes needed.

Sichel's Moral Education may not be perfect, but if she did not tie up some loose ends, she certainly provided a philosophical analysis to stimulate thinking about important issues for moral education theory. I found the book to be a breath of fresh air, and I recommend it with enthusiasm.

NOTES

1. Betty A. Sichel, Moral Education: Character, Community, and Ideals, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988).

2. Ibid., p. 25.

3. Ibid., p. 57. Dewey's remarks cited by Sichel come from Human Nature and Conduct, (New York: The Modern Library, 1957), p. 37. See Note 7 below for additional comment.

4. Moral Education, pp. 58-60.

5. Her point of view on the need for a community-based moral education theory is most fully developed in ibid., Chapter 5: "Character, Community, and Education," pp. 135-165.

6. This refers to the recent meeting of governors called by President Bush at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. Amidst the pomp and ceremony, some critics claimed that little of substance was accomplished. "Excellence" was one of the frequent buzz words of that meeting.

7. The argument might proceed along these lines: In his reliance on habit, Dewey was attempting to get at a meaning of character that connected it fully with conduct. As he stated in Theory of the Moral Life, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1960), p. 11: "Moral development...consists in becoming aware that our acts are connected with one another; thereby an ideal of conduct is substituted for the blind and thoughtless performance of isolated acts." The same thought is present in Democracy and Education, (New York: MacMillan Paperbacks Edition, 1961), pp. 357-358: "Morals concern nothing less than the whole character, and the whole character is identical with the man in all his concrete make-up and manifestations." As Sichel points out (see Note 3 above), in Human Nature and Conduct Dewey defined character as "the interpenetration of habits," and he also stated that, "Character can be read through the medium of individual acts." But for Dewey, character was never merely a bundle of isolated individual habits. In that same work, he also maintained (p. 300) that "...conduct and hence morals are social: they are not just things that ought to be social..." Finally, on p. 302, Dewey set the broad context for character and community: "Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them. In its presence we put off mortality and live in the universal. The life of the community in which we live and have our being is the fit symbol of this relationship."

8. Moral Education, p. 114.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 138.

11. Ibid., p. 165. Italics added for emphasis.

A WELL MANAGED LIFESTYLE: A VIEW OF LIBERAL EDUCATION

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My purpose is to articulate a view of liberal education that has emerged in the last ten to fifteen years. The roots of this view go back at least to Pestalozzi and Dewey. But neither thinker had the benefit of the recent studies that have been conducted in adult development. To my knowledge no one has fully developed this view, and I believe that we are venturing into new territory even though some of us around my school, Furman, have been talking about this view for some years now. To develop this view of liberal education, I must first make some disclaimers and then put before you some crucial assumptions. Once the preliminaries have been completed, I will divide what I have to say into four topics: (1) a view of traditional liberal arts education; (2) problems with the traditional view of liberal arts; (3) liberal education as a well managed lifestyle; and (4) liberal education as a well managed lifestyle in the Christian story.

For the preliminaries, my first disclaimer is that I am not developing a thoroughly argued philosophical position. In this setting we do not have the time for such a thing. Second, I do not believe we are here to settle anything, to get a final answer to the issues we raise. That leads me to two claimers.

First, I am attempting to promote conversation among us about matters essential to our lives as educators. Second, I place before you these ideas to help you to clarify your own views. If after I have finished you say, "Buford, I think you are wrong on the following points, you should have said so and so," then I believe that I have accomplished a great deal of my task. Now I turn to four crucial assumptions.

I assume, first, a philosophical commitment to the view that persons are of ultimate significance. Education is for persons, not persons for education. Third, I believe that persons change and that that change can be understood. Whatever educational program we organize we must do so within the context of our understanding of that change. Finally, I assume that colleges are in the business of teaching knowledge. By knowledge I do not mean the narrowly defined knowledge accepted by most philosophers: Knowledge is justified true belief. Rather, knowledge is much broader than that and includes intuition, insight, and revelation, among others.

With these disclaimers, claimers, and assumptions before us, I turn now to set before you a view of a liberal education as a well-managed lifestyle. As a way of getting into the subject I raise a question that has been asked in America for well over 100 years: What is the knowledge most worth having? I suggest that if we understand the way advocates of traditional liberal arts have answered that question and the problems their answers run into, then we will be in a position to understand the persuasiveness of viewing liberal education as a well-managed lifestyle in the Christian story. We turn now to the first topic, a traditional view of liberal arts education.

I. Liberal Arts Education, A Traditional View

Earlier I raised the question, "What is the knowledge most worth having?" In

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the history of American education this question has persisted. With the founding of the American republic some intellectuals wanted to know what is the kind of education most appropriate for this new democratic, republican form of government and society. They were primarily concerned with developing an educational program that educates all the people to participate fully in the body politic. Some saw the English form of education, classical and liberal arts studies, as supporting a class structure. The liberal arts were for the wealthy, elite who would eventually take their places in the positions of responsibility in society. The question of a knowledge that is of most worth was more than an academic one. During the Jacksonian period and the growth of the common school movement, the debate over what knowledge ought to be taught in the schools continued. In 1860 Herbert Spencer wrote an essay, "What Knowledge Is Of Most Worth?" It was widely read. Fifty-eight years later, in 1918, the Commission on Reorganization of Secondary Education was formed, and the question Spencer addressed in his book was raised again, particularly about the American high school.[1] Later, in 1966, the University of Chicago held a conference on liberal arts. The results were published in a book, The Knowledge Most Worth Having.[2] Recently the Association of American Colleges report, Integrity In The College Curriculum, outlines its answer to this question.[3] In William J. Bennett's report on the humanities in higher education, To Reclaim A Legacy, we find another list of knowledge that is most worth having.[4] And E.D. Hirsch, riding the crest of the explosion in knowledge, lists 15,000 items.[5] So, the debate about the knowledge most worth having that was raised at the beginning of this republic continues today among the highest circles of university education.

But what kind of answers have been given to this question? Though somewhat oversimplified, the two answers are: (1) the liberal arts--classics educational program and (2) "realistic studies." The classics-liberal arts education was for the upper classes, those people destined for leadership roles. On the other hand, realistic studies were designed for the growing middle class who were destined for business, industry, and farming. It is within these two alternatives that many of us continue to debate "why studies" vs. "how studies," theory vs. practice, liberal vs. vocational, and general or humane studies vs. technical and specialized studies. At schools such as ours we have come down on the side of professional preparation and interpret that as why studies, theory, liberal studies, general humane studies, rather than the so-called practical or realistic studies, those kinds that Greenville Tech does so well. And we believe that they should continue in that, while we should continue supporting the professions with the classics-liberal arts tradition.

The classics-liberal arts perspective has received its most forceful articulation at the hands of John Henry Newman in his book, The Idea of a University. Newman claimed that the knowledge which is most worth having is theoretical knowledge, knowledge he called philosophical knowledge or liberal knowledge. It is only by possessing a knowledge of the true, the good, and the beautiful and other such universal ideas that one is free to guide one's life intelligently. These ideas are necessary, immutable, and eternal. As we work hard to acquire them, they manifest themselves. In an interesting phrase Newman says that they are gained through "acquired illumination."[6] This illumination guides one through all of one's activities and provides a standard on the basis of which one can make intelligent judgments, understand how all things are integrated, and guide the affairs of men in a peaceful manner. This theoretical knowledge is not sensory knowledge. Sensory knowledge is simply knowledge gained through the senses uninterpreted by reason or by concepts. Neither is it productive knowledge. Productive knowledge is the knowledge of how to accomplish a task. It is the kind of knowledge that a plumber possesses. He can fix the plumbing, but he does not understand the theory behind it all. Neither is it practical knowledge, that kind of knowledge that allows us to guide our moral and political lives. From Newman's vantage point the highest training is the training of the theoretical intellect, and he believed that the purpose of a college was to train the mind to gain this highest form of knowledge. This means that a university is not in the business of teaching people how to sense, how to make it in professions, or how to develop their moral lives. Those activities can be left for the home and for business and industry. Finally, theoretical knowledge is intrinsically valuable. It has no meaning beyond itself. It is not that kind of knowledge that allows one in the use of it to produce something else. Thus, Newman's statement of a classical liberal education emphasizes the education of the mind, general or universal principles, and the development of leadership for those who will guide society. Newman's position is a powerful one. But at the point of his greatest strengths, one can also find his greatest weaknesses.

II. Problems With Traditional Liberal Arts Education

There are at least three problems with this conception of liberal arts education. First, while it emphasizes the education of the mind, it tends to ignore the whole person. Newman and many others who hold this view tend to separate the mind from body, praise the mind, and tolerate the body. They talk about a sound mind and a sound body, but what they mean is "take care of the body so that you will be in a position to do what is really important and that is take care of the mind." Second, while Newman and others emphasize general and universal principles, they tend to ignore the individuality of persons who are learning those principles. They assume that any mind worthy of being liberally educated has the potentiality of acquiring this illumination. Education then becomes a matter of training the mind. Unfortunately, this ignores the individual learner's competencies, his or her potentialities, his or her background, his or her own educational experience. Finally, classical liberal arts emphasizes knowledge that is fit for those who will take leadership roles in society. It ignores developmental stages of adults. The assumption underlying classical liberal education is that students are still immature and that at some future point they will become mature. Maturity is achieved when their rational capacities are developed and they understand fundamental principles. Then, in light of those, they can assume their station and its duties. This conception of persons completely ignores the fact that people tend to go through stages in their development from birth until death.

In summary, the proponent of a classical liberal arts education claims that we must educate the mind, help students to grasp and think through universal principles, and educate them to that knowledge that will allow them to find places of leadership in American society. These principles are, however, incomplete, half-truths. The truth they have can be brought to light only if we see them in a new setting. It's that new setting that gives liberal arts education its distinctive quality.

III. Liberal Education: The Well-Managed Lifestyle

As a point of departure, I quote a colleague of mine, Gerda McCahan, "Respect the material, but educate the person." Wayne Booth, Dean of the University of Chicago for many years, pointed us in the same direction when he said, "The question of what it is to be a man, of what it is to be fully human, is at the heart of liberal education.... When you organize your labor force of your educational system as if they were mere social conveniences, human resources, as we say, contributors to the gross national product, you violate something that we all know, in a form of knowledge much deeper than our knowledge of the time tables or the second law of thermodynamics.... The education that a man must have is what has traditionally been called liberal education. The knowledge it yields is the knowledge of how to act freely as a man."[7] Or to quote John Henry Newman on my side of the issue, "A University is, according to the usual designation, an Alma Mater, knowing her children one by one, not a foundry, or a mint, or a treadmill."[8] While Wayne Booth and Cardinal Newman may be pointing us toward the education of some kind of metaphysical homunculus, I am absolutely confident that my colleague is not doing so. What she is pointing toward is working with a person to help that person to learn how to live well. Indeed, if liberal arts education does not issue in at least a well-managed lifestyle, it's not clear what value it has to the lives of people. But what do we mean by a well-managed lifestyle? Once we have clarified that we will be in a position to indicate its bearing on liberal arts education.

Adult Development--How are we to understand the concept, lifestyle? We can gain some help by placing this concept within the framework of two contrasting views of adulthood. The first I shall call the butterfly picture. In its development the butterfly grows in a cocoon until it is time to emerge as a full-grown, mature butterfly. Once it has left the cocoon it is a butterfly and simply does what butterflies do. It does not grow anymore. It stays the same until its death. Analogously, persons are said to be immature and live under the authority of parents and teachers and ministers until they become adults. Once they become adults they assume their station in life and fulfill its duties. The remainder of their adult lives is lived within that station, and whatever change occurs is a result of becoming more skillful in fulfilling one's duties.

In contrast to that is the lobster picture of adulthood. A crustacean, the lobster molts every seven years. As it grows within the shell the lobster must cast off one shell to develop another one. This new shell protects it against its enemies until the lobster outgrows that shell and molts again. Analogously, adults from the age of eighteen cast off old shells and put on new ones. As they cast off old ones they are in a transition time and they face a period of crisis. They are vulnerable to the many alternatives available to them. But, as they create new shells or new life structures they take on a protective structure that allows them to find stability and order in their lives. This new pattern, life structure, or "shell" protects them for seven to ten years after which time they "molt" and go through a transition with its crises and begin to create new life structures and, thus, enter new stages.

These two ways of looking at adult life sharply contrast the notion of adulthood underlying classical liberal arts education and the notion of adulthood underlying the well managed lifestyle. If we reject the classical liberal education view as Newman understood it, then we will probably also reject the butterfly picture of adult development. We will do so, however, not only because of its educational implications but primarily because of the recent studies in adult development conducted by such people as Daniel Levinson and Roger Gould.[9] Thus we can turn to studies such as those of Levinson to gain a general view of adult development.

Levinson contends that adults go through stages in their life from eighteen until their death and that a new stage is entered about every seven to ten years. The first stage is entered around the age of twenty and another stage at thirty and another at forty. At the end of one stage a person enters a time in which he is not sure what direction he wants his life to take, he enters a crisis period. As he is attempting to gain direction in his life he is in a transitional period. As he leaves that transitional period he creates for himself a life structure. A life structure is built on the basis of choices. A choice for Levinson is a relationship with something in one's world. If one continues to make the same choice, one begins to develop a pattern of behavior that is an element in the highly complex structure of one's life. For the young adult the life structure has two foci, intimacy or marriage and occupation. Most all choices are made in the light of what the young person believes about these two important aspects of his life. Furthermore, choices are made on the basis of a dream or belief. A belief is not only what one accepts as true or real, it is also what one accepts as valuable or important. The choices a young person makes in his or her life is made on the basis of a dream. The dream is the picture or the narrative of the life the person wants to be living when he is thirty or thirty-five. On Levinson's view a young person eighteen to twenty-two is in a transitional stage from leaving home and the structure created for him by family and other significant groups and pensdus to entering the adult world. During this transition the young person is in a period of crisis. He or she does not yet have a fully developed dream on the basis of which to choose among options. Nevertheless, young people do "try on" many options and think them through to see which seems to be the most viable for them. The dream that they have is what we can call their ideal lifestyle.

While Levinson and other researchers have provided us a general description about adult development, William Perry of Harvard University in his book, Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development In the College Years: A Scheme, describes the pattern of change in the intellectual and moral life of college students.[10] His developmental scheme has nine stages. To summarize, a student normally goes from the stage of basic duality through relativism to rational commitment. Students who do not follow this normal growth pattern either temporize, retreat, or escape. But our concern at the moment is with the normal growth pattern. Freshmen view the world within the framework of a basic duality. They believe there is a right and wrong, a good and bad, a true and false, a correct and incorrect, an up and down, a right and left, a perfect and imperfect, and a good and evil. As Perry says, "This division is between the familiar world of Authority-right-we, as against the alien world of illegitimate-wrong-others."[11] Freshmen assume that the teacher has the final answer or, if the teacher does not have the final answer, it is in a book somewhere and that all she needs to do is find it in the library. As students continue their university work this duality begins to erode. By the end of the sophomore year the students have gone through a drastic revolution. Now they re-perceive knowledge as contextual and relativistic. In the words of Thomas Kuhn, the student has undergone "a paradigm shift."[12] During their junior and senior years students find that they have three major options to skepticism and relativism. (1) They can "go limp" and deny any responsibility for their lives. They can drift from context to context without acknowledging their wish to reconcile the discontinuities in their own life. (2) Or they can explore the situation deliberately by becoming an active, self-avowed opportunist. At least at this point they are developing some sense of selfhood. They are defining themselves as opportunists. (3) The third solution is one that takes the form of commitments. By commitments Perry means "an act, or on-going activity relating a person as agent and chooser to aspects in his life in which he invests his energies, his care and his identity."[13] Commitment for Perry is an affirmation "made in a world perceived as relativistic...it is an act in an examined, not in an unexamined life." To manage ones life well requires an examination of one's life by both coming to terms with one's past and affirmatively choosing a future. From the vantage point of Levinson and Perry together we can say that students tend to go from absolutism or duality to skepticism to rational commitment as they work their way through the crisis and transition of leaving home and entering the adult world. As they make their choices they do so in the light of their commitment to a well-managed life that has as its foci marriage or intimacy and vocation.

The significance of what we can learn from Levinson and Perry and other such studies is clear. If we are to follow Gerda's recommendation to respect the material but educate the person, then we must understand the college student's life in terms something like those that I have just described. It also means that we must examine both curricular and extracurricular programs in the college to see that they match the best we know about student life and development. This is one of the points emphasized by the study group on the conditions of excellence in American higher education sponsored by the National Institute of Education. In the 1984 publication, Involvement in Learning: Realizing the Potential of American Higher Education, the study group recommended that "each institution should examine and adjust the content and delivery of the curriculum to match the knowledge, capacities, and skills it expects students to develop....What does it mean for faculty to examine the content, delivery, and organization of the curriculum? It means digging below the level of course syllabi to analyze what students are learning....It means using the literature on student learning and development to inform changes in the content and delivery of the curriculum. If we know that leadership skills are better learned in informal, task-oriented groups than in the classroom, then we have an opportunity to use student organizations to further academic objectives, and strengthen the connection between academic and student affairs in the process."[14] But beyond these generalities what specifically can be recommended?

The College Educational Experience--Education in a college hinges on the student-teacher relationship, but every facet of the university has educational implications. That includes dorms, student center, the dining hall, the athletic facilities, and the grounds. Every person in the institution--from the President to the janitor--is an educator. For convenience we can divide the university into two major sections: curricular and extracurricular. While it may be interesting to look at the structure of the curricular life and extracurricular life at a school, that would be attempting too much at the moment. Rather, I will focus on extracurricular goals and curricular goals.

What are some extracurricular goals suggested by/required by development in the lives of students that we have just described? There are at least four. First, help students to develop relationships. This involves intimacy in the broad sense that Erikson discusses. Included in that would be developing friendships. But more important for the college student is the development of what we will call "peer families." As students leave home and begin to create their first adult life structure, one of their concerns is the experience of intimacy and possibly, eventually, marriage. A first step is the formation of a small, close knit group of friends within a college; this is the beginning of the peer family. Interestingly enough these friendships often last a lifetime. Second, help students explore vocational options. By vocation I do not mean something so simple as becoming a doctor or a lawyer or getting a job. It's neither work nor labor. Rather, it is to find one's calling; it is to find out what one's potentialities are and which of those potentialities one wants to develop. It's in the exploration of both developing personal relationships and exploring potential callings that students begin to form their dream. Third, emphasize leadership. Those in our student body will probably find their way into positions of responsibility in our society. We fail to understand who our students are if we fail to help them develop capacities of leadership and service to their society. Fourth and finally, teach them to play. Leisure time in America is highly desirable. But what to do with leisure time and how to manage it well is seldom addressed adequately. A school can address this need of students through an intramural program and through activities such as Collegiate Educational Service Corporation to work in the surrounding communities.

What curricular goals are suggested by the picture of young adult development? Let's put this in another way. Since young adults go through transition periods and crises in an effort to enter the adult world and to live well-managed lives within that world, then education must help them do that well. They are going to do it. Why not help them to do a good job of it? From this perspective then, the question we asked at the outset gains even greater urgency. What is the knowledge most worth having for people who are seeking to live good lives or in our terminology, seeking to live well-managed lives? It's obvious that since the whole person is involved in this task that the knowledge most worth having will have to do with the whole person as he or she lives in society. There are at least six bodies of knowledge that are required for a well-managed lifestyle.

First, persons must know as much as they can about themselves and their place in the world around them. They must know the presuppositions that underlie their choices in order to control them rather than being controlled or imprisoned by them. Self-understanding as well as facts, theories, and stories are required for speculation. Dean Booth puts it nicely, "but to be a man, I must speculate, and I must learn how to test my speculations so that they are not simply capricious, unchecked by other men's speculations. A college education, surely, should throw every student into a regular torrent of speculation, and it should school him to recognize the different standards of validation proper to different kinds of claims of truth...You can tell an educated man by the way he takes hold of the question of whether God exists, or whether UFOs are from Mars."[15]

Second, a person must be educated to the experience of beauty. I do not mean that a person should be able to discuss various theories of literary interpretation. That belongs in the first curricular goal. I do not mean that a person should be able to analyze a performance of Franck's D Minor Symphony and evaluate the correctness of its interpretation. Again, that comes under the first heading. Rather, a person is less than a person if he or she cannot respond to the art made by other persons.

Third, a person must learn how to understand his own intentions and to carry them out in the world. Again, Dean Booth states it nicely, "The man who has not learned anything about how to understand his own intentions and to make them effective in the world, who has not, through experience in books, learned something about what is possible and impossible, what is desirable and undesirable, will be enslaved by the political and social intentions of other men, benign or malign. The domain of practical wisdom is at least as complex and troublesome as the other two, and at the same time it is even more evidently indispensable."[16]

Fourth, a person should know health or, rather, be healthy. This means not simply knowing a body of information about nutrition and health. Rather, it is the kind of experience that students are actually getting in some health and physical education courses. I would recommend that we expand their vision to include that knowledge being gained by those people working in the fields of behavioral medicine, health psychology, and exercise physiology. Such studies as these emphasize the holistic character of persons and their interrelationships with their social and physical environment. Such knowledge is absolutely necessary for the well-managed lifestyle.

The fifth type of knowledge that is required for a well managed lifestyle is communication.[17] By communication I mean finding interrelations among increasingly wider domains of man's world through the analytic-synoptic method. When a person works toward the correlation of part and whole, in general, and the interrelation among areas of knowledge and among social groups, in particular, he or she is seeking communication in its widest sense. These relations may be logical, personal, historical, but they allow one an insight into an understanding of man's-being-in-the-world in an ever widening coherence. Communication in this sense is demanded by intellectual specialization and social estrangement so wide spread in American society. Persons who want to manage their lives well will have to manage to do so in a social, physical environment. If they continue to develop and grow, they will find themselves having to take responsibility for the quality not only of their own lives and of their families but also of the community in which they are a part.

The final knowledge most worth having is perspective.[18] Perspective in the sense in which I am using it is a value orientation. Perspective in this rich sense is a value system critically developed and consistently worked out regarding its implications for the whole of a person's life. In the terminology of Levinson, the value system becomes concrete in the young person's dream narrative. That dream is what they really want to become. They hold it in high esteem. In this sense the dream is the good; it is that which gives direction and coherence to a person's life. A well-managed lifestyle will always have at its core a perspective which animates that lifestyle and gives it its meaning. But what value system ought one to adopt? What perspective is most worth having? A school will place in front of its students a perspective of some sort. It is not a question of having one or not having one; it's a question of which one.

Before I address that topic, though, let's summarize the view of liberal education as the well-managed lifestyle by noting its strengths in comparison to the traditional view of liberal education. The strengths of the view I have just described are really the completion of the half-truths of traditional liberal arts education. First, liberal education as a well-managed lifestyle emphasizes the education of the whole person and not just of the mind. It recognizes that the mind and body are integrated into one and that one must not have a separation of mind and body, placing the mind above the value of the body. Second, it emphasizes the individuality of persons. The interpretation of these principles occurs within the framework of living persons as they attempt to manage their lives well. Finally, it emphasizes that adults grow through stages and that they may find themselves in various career options during their life. Instead of emphasizing knowledge fit only for those who are going to take leadership positions in society, it emphasizes that knowledge required by adults who want to guide well the development of their lives.

The conception of liberal education as a well-managed lifestyle has one additional strength that is ignored by the traditional picture of liberal education. According to that picture, people must guide rationally their own lives. Once having gained those universal ideas and principles then they can use them as standards for the well-ordered, rational life. Their view of perspective would be that a person rationally acquires illumination of values such as the good, the true, and the beautiful. Then upon knowing these they can intelligently guide their lives. But people do not rationally construct their lives; they become stories they tell and rehearse over and over in their minds. Thus, the dream or the perspective that animates the life of a student is that narrative that he has worked out for himself that he so desperately wants to play out in his own life. Northrop Frye was close when he said that people do not have knowledge. Rather, they are that knowledge. The question of a knowledge most worth having then becomes "With what body of knowledge do you wish to identify yourself?"[19] Thus, that which integrates the life of a person is the story or stories in which they are mimetically engulfed.[20] If students become their stories, what story should the university present to its students? An exploration of that must wait for another time. But a parting comment is in order.

IV. Conclusion: Parable of the Man and the Bird

There was a man who was lonely. He decided to buy a bird who would be a companion to him--one that would talk to him and sing for him. The man went to the pet store and told the owner what he wanted. The owner sold him a bird guaranteed to talk and sing if kept comfortable and happy. The man went home in high spirits, anticipating the conversations and entertainment that would soon be his.

A day later the bird had not made a sound. The man returned to the pet store to complain. The owner asked what kind of cage the man had put the bird in. When he learned that it was a simple metal cage, the owner said perhaps the cage was not fine enough for so fine a bird. The man bought a gilded cage, took it home, put the bird in it, and waited expectantly.

Another day went by and still the bird had made no sound. The man went back to the pet store. The owner said it was plain that the bird was not yet comfortable--perhaps the bottom of the cage was cold--a nice soft rug for the cage would fix that. The man bought the rug for the bottom of the cage, and went home in anticipation of the bird's performance. He put the rug in the cage and waited.

Another day went by, and still the bird made no sound. When the man complained to the pet store owner this time, the owner said that perhaps the bird was bored and suggested an electronic perch that would swing back and forth to entertain the bird. The man bought the perch, installed it, and watched the bird swing back and forth--in silence.

The bird fell off the perch and lay on the soft rug, apparently dying. The man was sad. He said, "Dear friend, I have done everything I could to make you comfortable and happy. Is there anything I can get for you?" With his last breath the bird replied, "Birdseed, birdseed."

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[2] Wayne C. Booth, (ed.), The Knowledge Most Worth Having (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967).

[3] Association of American Colleges, Integrity in the College Curriculum: A Report to the Academic Community, Project on Redefining the Meaning and Purpose of Baccalaureate Degrees (Washington, D.C.: Association of American Colleges, 1985), pp. 15-32.

[4] William J. Bennett, To Reclaim a Legacy: A Report on the Humanities in Higher Education (Washington, D.C.: National Endowment for the Humanities, 1984), p. 11.

[5] E.D. Hirsch, Jr. Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987).

[6] John Henry Newman. The Uses of Knowledge, ed. Leo L. Ward (Arlington Heights, Illinois: AHM Publishing Corporation, 1948), p. 21.
(This book is selections from The Idea of a University.)

[7] Booth. The Knowledge Most Worth Having, pp. 6,20,21.

[8] Newman, The Uses of Knowledge, p. 47.

[9] Daniel Levinson, with Charlotte N. Darrow, Edward B. Klein, Maria Levin son, and Braxton McKee, The Seasons of A Man's Life (New York: Ballentine Books, 1978); and Roger Gould, "Growth Toward Self-Tolerance," Psychology Today, vol. 8, no. 8 (February, 1975), pp. 74-78.

[10] William G. Perry, Jr., Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years: a Scheme (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970). 10Ibid., p. 59.

[11] Ibid., p.59.

[12] Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition, enlarged (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970).

[13] Perry, Forms, p. 136.

[14] Study Group on the Conditions of Excellence in American Higher Education, Involvement in Learning; Realizing the Potential of American Higher Education (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, 1984), p. 45.

[15] Booth, The Knowledge Most Worth Having, p. 25.

[16] Ibid., p. 26.

[17] Thomas O. Buford, "Towards a Philosophy of General Education," The Personalist, vol. 48, no. 4 (Autumn, 1967), pp. 481-84.

[18] Ibid., pp. 484-87.

[19] E. Northrop Frye, "The Instruments of Mental Product," in Booth, The Knowledge Most Worth Having, p. 60.

[20] Bruce Wilshire, Role Playing and Identity: The Limits of Theater as Metaphor (Bloomington, Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 1982), p. 89.

INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY: A RESPONSE TO BUFORD

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Thomas Buford has given us a thoughtful treatment of a central theme of higher education: the role and nature of liberal education. In the era of the "multiversity," with its plethora of offerings and constituents, Buford's discussion focuses instead upon what once, way back when, was a central mission of higher education: the offering of a classical liberal arts education.

This path has always been problematic. As Buford shows, there is a long history of discussion of "the knowledge most worth having." One answer crucial to the development of liberal education divides knowledge into two spheres, the familiar divisions of classical liberal arts and vocational studies. Liberal arts have traditionally been learned for their own sake, an assertion that assumes that they have intrinsic worth.

Buford rightly points out some of the deficiencies of such study. The classical liberal arts ignore the study of the body in any but a companion or ancillary role. This may be an interesting line of criticism, but Buford does not pursue it, except later when he talks about the importance of the study of health. The more interesting criticisms of the classical liberal arts come when Buford states that such studies ignore individual characteristics of people and their developmental stages.

The task of "working with a person to help that person to learn how to live well" is, according to Buford, alive and well, if only at liberal arts universities such as his own. Buford classifies the goals of such an institution as curricular and extracurricular. It is through articulating these goals on both sides that he wishes to address purported shortcomings in the traditional view of liberal education.

Though there is much to praise and talk about in Buford's discussion, I believe that there is a direction that he might have emphasized crucial to any discussion of higher education. Specifically, I would ask that he go beyond the inner directed "well-managed lifestyle" theme that he develops based upon Levinson's work in adult development and move more toward an emphasis upon social responsibility and, to use current parlance, the communitarian aspect of education. I contend that we need

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for our students and our adults to look out toward the world and their fellow man, rather than just to how they may refine their own individual lives.

In an important article, "Four Conceptions of Excellence,"[1] Madhu Prakash and Leonard Waks have argued what I am suggesting here. They would place Buford's "well-managed lifestyle" squarely in conception three, excellence as self-actualization. Fine as far as it goes; but there is a fourth, and higher, form, namely, excellence as social responsibility. Here the person strives toward individual, self-actualized excellence within the framework of broader, participatory social action.

The argument one must then make would show that an emphasis upon social responsibility goes in tandem with and aids individual development. Fortunately, Prakash and Waks lead us in that direction. They claim that their argument for the developmental relationship of the four conceptions "urges a conception of self-actualization in which each person's good depends upon the common good, and it refuses to let the good of any member of society be sacrificed for the self-actualization of another."[2] Prakash, Waks, Robert Bellah,[3] and Maxine Greene,[4] to name a few theorists working in this area, recognize the importance of an individual's growth and social responsibility.

Hegel, echoing Rousseau, argued for what underlies such claims: one cannot speak about human beings abstracted from their social context. Humans are ontologically dependent. Granted, I am interested in my own life, my lobster moltings, to use Buford's stark and delightful metaphor; but I am also inextricably related to those others around me. If I deny these networks of relatedness, I may fall prey to the narcissism of Kierkegaard's aesthete. If I not only recognize that these networks exist, but affirm and foster them, then I become part of a larger community and, as Hegel, Prakash and Waks, Bellah, Greene, and others have argued, a more fully developed individual.

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1. Madhu Suri Prakash and Leonard Joseph Waks, "Four Conceptions of Excellence," Teachers College Record 87, 1, (Fall 1985): 79-101.
2. Ibid., 88.
3. Robert N. Bellah et. al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
4. Maxine Greene, The Dialectic of Freedom (New York: Teachers College Press, 1988).

CONFLICTING VALUES IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION:

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM, 1886-1918

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This paper reviews some events related to academic freedom in 1886-1918 America. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were a time of consciousness raising relative to academic freedom. It was a kind of watershed period which came to define much of the American conception of academic freedom as we understand it today.

Until the 1880s or 1890s, the legal meaning of academic freedom was more fluid; professors were sometimes deemed entitled to certain minimal considerations when their dismissal was at stake. In 1894, however, the court held that professors were employees and subject to dismissal at will. Subsequent court decisions in 1899, 1901, 1905, and 1914 continued to uphold the judgment of university professors as "mere employees."[1]

"The tardiness of the courts in this matter is more easily understood when one considers that the phrase, academic freedom, had little currency at the time"; typical American dictionaries for the time under study did not list the phrase.[2] If the American concept of academic freedom was ambiguous in nineteenth century America, it is only somewhat less ambiguous today. Two dictionaries (chosen by the present writer at random) list the following definitions: "freedom to teach or to learn without interference"; the "right of teachers and students to express their ideas in the classroom or in writing, free from political, religious, or institutional restrictions, even if these ideas are unpopular." Notice the limitations of the words "classroom" and "writing" and the use of the phrase "even if"! This should tell us something about the precarious nature of freedom. Surely Glenn R. Morrow is more on track when he writes: "Academic freedom, in its primary sense, is the freedom claimed by a college or university professor to write or speak the truth as he sees it, without fear of dismissal by his academic superiors or by authorities outside his college or university."[3] To the dual conception of academic freedom (to learn and to teach) transplanted from Germany, the Americans added a third element: freedom to engage in unpopular activities outside the walls of academe.[4]

American universities and graduate schools developed after the Civil War. Previously there had been small colleges for undergraduates; the professor's station (teaching by rote, drill, and memorization) had been one of drudgery and low pay. And trustees had sometimes censored books from courses.[5] Moreover,

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the idea of college teacher as gentleman meant the teacher was less likely than the concerned citizen to engage in controversial activities. But with the development of research universities a new consciousness developed. Teaching the truth asserted by one's superiors was one thing -- independent research in pursuit of truths, something else. There was a move from dull pedagogy to new scholarship.

With the publication of Origin of Species in 1859 there had been conflicts over the right of professors to teach Darwin. But later in the century, as Darwin gained ground, many conflicts arose over social-economic-political issues rather than over religion. The tremendous wealth of the new capitalists contributed to the establishment or endowment of a number of universities. These new very-rich were not predisposed to finance labor-unionism or socialist-radicalism. At the same time, some scholars were significantly questioning for the first time whether they (rather than the board of trustees) should control the university. After the First World War and until today, issues like communism, or loyalty to nation or institution or peers, have had major (if often unstated) roles to play in hirings, firings, and promotions. As Morrow has pointed out, the professor "often requires protection from the pressures of his own institution, as well as from outside forces."[6] Beyond this, a national crisis of one sort or another can aggravate issues related to academic freedom; inquisitions do indeed occur from time to time.

The first of the new academic freedom cases is sometimes credited to Henry Carter Adams.[7] A powerful trustee, Henry W. Sage, had been in the audience when Adams made a pro-labor speech. Annoyed, Sage's position was that "'no socialist was fit to be a professor in a university.'"[8] The trustees of Cornell quietly decided not to renew Adams' half-time two-year contract when it expired in 1887. Adams sought to discourage press coverage and would not even comment on the case; he was in the process of attempting to gain a full-time position at the University of Michigan. Accordingly, he backed off his radicalism and repented. In this way he successfully obtained the full-time Michigan position, never expressing radical opinions again.

Adams, not without reason, apparently considered prudence more powerful than academic freedom. Indeed, he "never answered criticism of his views and refused to let his friends do so."[9] It seems Adams realized that it was not, for example, the personal views of even the university president which counted, but the imperatives of the institution: "a conservative image and good public relations were worth more to a university than an unorthodox professor, no matter how brilliant."[10]

The 1886 Adams incident "acquired lurid colors in the nineties, when such cases occurred in profusion, and when the victims, unlike Adams, would not suffer the blow in silence."[11] In 1894 the widely known economist, Richard T. Ely, was put on trial by the University of Wisconsin regents. It was said Ely entertained union organizers in his home and supported labor strikes.

It was widely publicized that Ely had been completely exonerated. Moreover, this may "have been the first official pronouncement of the governing body of an American university, setting forth its belief in academic freedom."[12] The famous 1894 statement in support of academic freedom "was planned in part as a piece of institutional promotion -- as, in the words of the man who suggested it, 'an excellent advertisement for the institution.'"[13]

"For the first time an economist faced something like a public trial to determine the propriety of his conduct and his views"; but in fact, Ely chose to cave in, in order to optimize his chance of winning.[14] In his trial before the regents, he chose not to defend academic freedom, but to convince them of his conservatism. Moreover, he "stopped writing for a popular audience."[15]

The following year entertained the case of Ely's former student, Edward W. Bemis, at the University of Chicago. Bemis believed in social reform and public advocacy as both a right and a duty of the social scientist. In 1894, the university president had warned Bemis against speaking publicly on controversial issues. In 1895 -- the same year theoretician non-activist Thorstein Veblen unsuccessfully sought there to teach a course about socialism -- Bemis was quietly dismissed. Bemis, after considerable deliberation, chose to make the matter public. The president claimed the issue had been one of competence, not political freedom. Although Bemis was competent (if less than a great scholar), the developing circumstances finally forced his department head to publicly declare Bemis incompetent and that free expression was not at issue. Bemis was forever thereafter unable to locate a university position. In the words of Bemis, the view of his head professor had been "'that, although I hope to take up reform movements years hence, I am now going off in my lectures into transcendental philosophy so as to be as far as possible from these reform movements and thus establish the scientific character of my department.'"[16]

Another student of Ely (but unlike Bemis, a highly respected scholar) was Edward A. Ross. Ross was a gifted economist-sociologist and an outstanding public speaker for his version of societal reform. The widow of Stanford University's founder often suggested to President Jordan that Ross be let go for his outrageous economic-political views. Circumstances finally forced Jordan in 1900 to demand of Ross his resignation. Ross, knowing the importance and methods of good public relations, went public, encouraging peer and public support. Several professors resigned in protest; like Ross, however, they found new positions only with difficulty. President Jordan refused to personally cooperate with the American Economic Association's investigation of the case, while Mrs. Stanford failed to rehire Ross and friends. Indeed, Mrs. Stanford came to be viewed as something of a mental case.

Following the Ross-Stanford incident, relatively little overt conflict over academic freedom materialized at American universities prior to the First World War. As a matter of speculation, this may have been due to the ending of the 1890s depression, the moderating influence of progressivism, the growing tendency of trustees not to become involved in the details of university bureaucracy, or the learning experience of scholars that professors were experts rather than reformers. For whatever reasons, the founders of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) in 1915 believed that improper dismissals were rare.

The AAUP founders saw professional standards as of overriding concern. Yet their memory of the 1890s suggested there could be bad times as well as good. While the founders believed academic freedom important, the primary problem was seen as one of lack of unity among (necessarily independent minded) professors. Would they be able to agree enough with each other even to establish a sizable non-specialized professional organization? The rallying cry of tenure was seen as the solution. Not only would tenure be a very concrete way to protect academic freedom in bad times, but it would add dignity and security to the profession of scholarship. Generally professors were interested in engaging in their ongoing teaching and research activities without having to worry about outside meddlers or economic insecurity. No doubt they also preferred the view that professors and their work were of unusual importance, deserving of dignified recognition by the rest of society. (Given enough time, Socrates might be made society's patron saint after all!) The early AAUP founders believed that professors should be competent, dignified, and temperate, and that they should not indoctrinate but present their students all sides of a controversial issue. They also believed in faculty participation in personnel decisions, tenure after ten years, adequate notice of dismissal, and, if tenured, a fair trial by peers rather than dismissal at will by the trustees.

The infant AAUP did not see itself as able to help those (rare) individuals who had been dismissed improperly. What was more important or realistic was the investigation of academic freedom cases for the purpose of establishing principles which eventually everyone would accept as valid. One of the earliest AAUP cases was that of Scott Nearing. A radical socialist, pacifist, and outstanding teacher, the University of Pennsylvania trustees decided not to reappoint him. On July 14, 1915, he was told (contrary to the faculty's prior recommendation) not to return that fall. The immediate dismissal outraged the faculty. The initial response of the trustees to the AAUP investigation was one of silence. Then they said they had had no choice, as the public and the students' parents constantly misunderstood

Nearing. Following a determination by the AAUP that his academic freedom had been violated, the university issued new guidelines for dismissal procedures. Nearing "received messages of support from all over the country, but only one job offer"; he then taught at the University of Toledo "for two years, until he was fired for opposing the First World War."[17]

Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, declared that opposition to Wilson's great war was treasonous. Previously he had considered Professor James McKeen Cattell merely foolish, but now he recommended to the board Cattell's dismissal without pension. In October 1917, the famous economic historian, Charles A. Beard, resigned from Columbia in protest of Cattell's firing. Beard was a supporter of the war, but defended the right of the tenured Cattell "to protest publicly as well as anyone's right to be a conscientious objector."[18]

Cattell, an immanent psychologist and cofounder of several important scientific organizations, also was noted for his wit. Sometimes he would describe himself as a kind of pacifist, other times as a natural fighter. (Of course, both were true.) In his book University Control, Cattell had proposed an end to university trustees and administrators. By university control he meant faculty control of universities, rather than by vested interests. In 1918, Thorstein "Veblen's The Higher Learning in America . . . expanded Cattell's critique of the American university system."[19]

To round out our story of conflict and peace and war, we must now tell the tale of Richard T. Ely yet again -- this time as he and other faculty members of the University of Wisconsin worked against political freedom and toleration in 1918. Ely and friends were successful in obtaining signatures of over ninety percent of the faculty, on a petition which seemed to charge the antiwar Senator Robert M. La Follette with treason. While the petition is only part of Ely's show of intolerance in time of war, the "petition alone is a serious indictment of the faculty, for it demonstrates that in order to protect their own reputations for patriotism the professors were willing" -- amid widely circulating charges of university anti-patriotism -- "to besmirch the patriotism of another, who was one of Wisconsin's outstanding public servants and a long-time friend and protector of the university."[20]

With the war came a considerable influx of academic freedom cases (dismissals due to lack of patriotism) for the AAUP to investigate. In 1918 the AAUP issued a report on academic freedom in wartime. While more moderate than the positions of Nicholas Murray Butler or Richard T. Ely, it nevertheless imposed restrictions on the scholarly supporters of the AAUP beyond those required by the state. The AAUP, the only significant organization committed to the ideal of academic freedom, apparently assumed, at least in wartime, "that the university should be responsible for its professors' outside utterances. It accepted the premise that the university might impose greater restrictions of speech upon its members than the state imposed upon its citizens"; it would seem, then, that "not all the casualties of war are to be found upon the battlefield."[21] Whether fully conscious of this fact or not, the American intellectuals had decided on conformity in service to war, rather than on community in pursuit of freedom. Today, as we face the twenty-first century, the fundamental choice (more subtle and complicated than ever before) remains remarkably the same.

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1. Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger, The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1955), chap. 9.
2. John S. Brubacher and Willis Rudy, Higher Education in Transition, 3d ed. (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1976), 318.
3. David L. Sills, ed. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1968), s.v. "Academic Freedom," by Glenn R. Morrow.
4. Laurence R. Veysey, The Emergence of the American University (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), chap. 7.
5. Ibid.
6. Morrow, "Academic Freedom."
7. Ellen W. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 1.
8. Mary O. Furner, Advocacy & Objectivity (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1975), 137.
9. Ibid., 141.
10. Ibid., 140; see also Veysey, The Emergence of the American University, 340.
11. Hofstadter and Metzger, Academic Freedom, 419.
12. Robert B. Sutton, European and American Backgrounds of the American Concept of Academic Freedom, 1500-1914 (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, Inc., 1950), 275.
13. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, 23; see also Benjamin G. Rader, The Academic Mind and Reform (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1966), 149.
14. Furner, Advocacy & Objectivity, 153.
15. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, 16; see also Furner, Advocacy & Objectivity, 161; and Rader, The Academic Mind and Reform, chap. 6.
16. Furner, Advocacy & Objectivity, 177.
17. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, 20; see also Scott Nearing, The Making of a Radical (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1972), chap. 5.
18. Peter M. Rutkoff and William B. Scott, New School (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1986), 2; see also Hofstadter and Metzger, Academic Freedom, 502.
19. Rutkoff and Scott, New School, 14.
20. Carol S. Gruber, Mars and Minerva (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1975), 207.
21. Hofstadter and Metzger, Academic Freedom, 504.

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A RESPONSE TO "CONFLICTING VALUES IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION:

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM, 1886-1918

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We have been provided by Tandy with a series of episodes in the life of the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth century academy which are presented to be indicators of a growing consciousness of the meaning and importance of academic freedom within the university and larger community. The stories of professors Adams, Ely, Bemis, and Ross have been given to us to show the conflicts that existed in the time period under review. In these cases conflict between faculty and members of boards of trustees and university supporters were examined relative to the role of faculty in not only searching for truth as they saw it but expressing their opinions on issues of the day. From what we have heard it would appear that in these cases the cause of academic freedom made little progress.

This setback - if it were truly one - would also seem evidenced by the attitude of the early founders of the A.A.U.P. Tandy has indicated that they seemed more interested in "seeking unity among professors" and seeing that faculty received "dignified recognition by society". When it came to helping those in difficulty with their governing boards or administrations the A.A.U.P. in its early days did not seem able to be of much real assistance. The cases of Professors Nearing and Cattell would seem to support this view. Given the "youthful nature" of the A.A.U.P., perhaps it was pursuing the right agenda for its day. Unity and recognition would seem to be first steps toward developing the necessary power to support moves in other directions - such as the recognition of the importance of academic freedom not only to the academy but to the larger society as well. After all, it seems that the moods and views of the society of the day were probably well reflected in the minds of trustees and those who gave to the university. The economic and political philosophy of much of the nation still needed a great deal of rethinking if professors were to speak out in support of the labor movement or take a position against a "great patriotic war to end all wars."

In fact, one wonders if we have progressed very much in our understanding of the meaning of freedom given the McCarthy era of the 1950's and the turmoil that swept campuses and communities during the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights movement of the 1960's and early 70's. How far have we come in defining the meaning of academic freedom today? Are we really, for that matter, addressing the issue of academic freedom? Tandy in the earlier part of his remarks noted the ambiguity the concept "academic freedom" had for the Nineteenth century and may even have for most of society today. His references to the dictionary definitions and their brevity were noted in support of this continuing ambiguity. It might be asked if there has been a "time of consciousness raising" anywhere along the way.

We have, as mentioned, been given some brief definitions from contemporary dictionary sources. For the purposes of furthering our discussion of this important issue, let me, if I may, cite two other sources for the meaning of "academic freedom". The first is found in the chapter "The Purposes of Higher Education" which is part of Amy Gutmann's 1987 work entitled Democratic Education.[1] Professor Gutmann devotes a section of this chapter to academic

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freedom and freedom of the academy. In a section she refers (as has Tandy) to the concept as it has come to us from the German university. The following is how the German idea of academic freedom is presented to her readers:

> As derived from the German concept of 'Lehrfreiheit', academic freedom is neither a universal right of citizenship nor a contractual right of university employees. It is perhaps best understood as a special right tied to the particular office of scholar, similar in form (but different in content) to the particular rights of priests, doctors, lawyers, and journalists. The core of academic freedom is the freedom of scholars to assess existing theories, established institutions, and widely held beliefs according to the canons of truth adopted by their academic disciplines, without fear of sanction by anyone if they arrive at unpopular conclusions. Academic freedom allows scholars to follow their autonomous judgment wherever it leads them, provided that they remain within the bounds of scholarly standards of inquiry.

Professor Gutmann goes on to note that the "proviso of remaining within the bounds of scholarly standards" is often passed over and that such bounds are necessary if we are to "justify the social office that scholars hold" and distinguish academic freedom from the more general freedoms applicable to citizens. She further states that while "these general freedoms also apply to scholars in their roles as citizens" academic freedom is "more demanding." The scholar must follow the rules of "scholarly standards of inquiry as a condition of their social office." This idea of academic freedom being somehow different from general rights of citizens could lead one to see some of the issues highlighted by Tandy as not issues of academic freedom at all but an issue of a professor's "civil rights." Perhaps what we are really addressing here today is the civil rights of the academy - not its right to pursue knowledge wherever the pursuit of knowledge may lead us. Of course, there may be some difficulty finding where the boundary between the civil rights of the scholar and the scholar's freedom to pursue knowledge lies. Perhaps we can, through our discussion of this problem, shed some light on just where the boundary may set - assuming a line can be drawn between the two ideas. To aid in this debate I am sharing with you how my institution has chosen to define for its faculty the idea of the academic freedom. The following is from the 1989 edition of the Appalachian State University Faculty Handbook:

> It is the policy of Appalachian State University to support and encourage within the law full freedom of inquiry, discourse, teaching, research, and publication for all members of the academic staff of this institution. Members of the faculty are expected to recognize that accuracy, forthrightness, integrity, and dignity befit their association with this institution and their position as men and women of learning. They should not represent themselves, without authorization, as speaking for Appalachian State University.
>
> Appalachian State University will not penalize or discipline members of the faculty because of the exercise of academic freedom in the lawful pursuit of their respective areas of scholarly and professional interest and responsibility.[2]

While the foregoing may be subject to further interpretation it does speak to the issue of pursuing one's chosen field of knowledge. It does not address the civil rights of faculty as citizens. Perhaps that is what the Constitution of the United States does best. In short, maybe the Adams, Elys, Bemises, and Cattells of earlier days were pioneers not just for academic freedom - but for the civil rights of university and college faculty as citizens. Discussion on whether the issue is "academic freedom" or "civil rights" would be welcomed as would some commentary on whether the two concepts are so intertwined as to be inseparable. It might also be worth some time pursuing today's views on the two ideas and whether or not society has made or makes any distinction.

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1. A. Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 175.

2. Office of Academic Affairs, Faculty Handbook: Appalachian State University (Boone, North Carolina, July 1, 1989), p. 9, Part III, Section 3.3.